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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis comprises a series of three studies that explore the impact of trade 
reform on fiscal revenue.  Two of the studies use cross-country econometric 
methods and the third utilizes a partial equilibrium approach to analyse the 
impact of trade liberalisation on tax revenue and welfare in Jamaica.  The first 
study examines the impact of trade liberalisation on total revenue and trade 
tax revenue as a share of GDP across countries, explores heterogeneity within 
the sample (in particular the extent to which a country’s level of development 
influences variations in the effects of trade liberalisation) and utilises 
alternative indicators of openness to determine if the findings of the model are 
sensitive to the indicator of openness used.  The study finds that, in the case 
of the openness index used by Khattry and Rao (2002), international trade tax 
and total tax revenue as a percent of GDP are likely to rise as an economy 
becomes less open.  In contrast, when trade as a percent of GDP is used as the 
indicator of openness, the results show a positive relationship between 
openness, and trade and total tax revenue as a share of GDP. The results also 
suggest that international trade tax revenue tends to fall over time as a country 
develops.  The second study uses events analysis to examine the same issue.  
There is weak evidence that trade reform has positive revenue effects in the 
long-run; however, there may be negative impacts within a year of reform.    
The third study explores the impact of trade liberalisation under the EU-
CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) on Jamaica by simulating 
different tariff reform scenarios and comparing the results with the end term 
EPA as negotiated.  It finds that small countries can devise appropriate 
strategies to mitigate potential negative fiscal effects of trade reform such as 
scheduling tariff reductions for high revenue items later in the reform process.  
It also finds that there is often a trade-off between revenue and welfare, which 
makes welfare increasing and revenue enhancing outcomes difficult to 
achieve.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Studies on the impact of trade liberalisation often focus on its effects on 
welfare.  While this normative perspective is important, it is also necessary to 
consider the potential impact of trade reform on fiscal revenue.  This issue is 
of primary concern to policymakers, particularly in developing country 
contexts where sources of fiscal revenue sources may be limited and hence, 
tariff revenue may be a major source of fiscal revenue.  Therefore, although 
there is widespread recognition and acceptance among economists that tariffs 
are a second-best method of achieving fiscal policy objectives (Michael et al. 
(1993)), trade liberalisation is often feared for possible negative fiscal 
consequences due to the potential for loss of revenue as a result of tariff 
reform.   
Additionally, there are political economy concerns that impact the ability of a 
government to implement tariff reform as competing interest groups lobby to 
gain the outcome that is in their best interest.  In many instances, the benefits 
of a tariff tend to be concentrated on certain key interest groups who lobby 
for their continuation while the costs are often widely dispersed (Bliss (1987)).  
Therefore, it often proves difficult for governments to push through reforms 
as there is likely to be an inherent bias for the continuation of tariffs.  It is 
therefore incumbent on policymakers to balance these competing 
considerations and at the same time ensure that the ultimate trade reform 
outcome is positive for the country – whether in terms of fiscal revenue, 
welfare, or both.  
A review of available studies on the fiscal and welfare effects of trade reform 
reveal that there are relatively few on the fiscal aspects and more on the 
welfare effects of trade reform.   In addition, a lot of these studies focus on a 
theoretical rather than empirical assessment of these issues.  This thesis adds 
to the empirical studies on both these aspects of trade reform, with the fiscal 
effects being a primary focus of two chapters.   
While most studies on the fiscal aspects of trade reform measure trade tax 
revenue at an aggregate level, it is useful to analyse the impact of trade reform 
on the different components of trade tax revenue so that reform measures are 
appropriately structured.  An understanding of what drives the change in trade 
tax revenue – whether mainly import taxes, export taxes, and/or other 
components - can identify priority areas for reform and inform the order of 
implementation of reform measures.  Conceivably, one may observe a 
reduction in total trade taxes as a result of tariff reform and yet when the total 
figure is dissected, there may have been a net increase in import duties, and a 
reduction in export duties and exchange taxes.  This type of analysis is 
particularly relevant when comparing the aggregate measure of total trade 
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taxes across countries with varying tax systems as it is likely to be more difficult 
to determine the principal components impacted by the reform; for example, 
whether one is likely to observe mainly changes in import duties, and/or 
changes in export duties.   In this context, the specific research questions that 
this thesis will investigate are: 
• How does trade liberalisation affect total tax revenue, and 
international trade tax revenue in particular?   
• Are there variations in the impact of trade liberalisation depending on 
a country’s level of economic development or dependence on specific 
taxes, such as export taxes? 
• Are the findings of the model sensitive to the indicator of openness 
used? 
 
In addition to consideration of the fiscal effects, the welfare implications are 
also an important aspect of trade reform, particularly as the gains of 
liberalisation are often expressed in terms of an improvement in consumer 
welfare.  For policymakers, a primary concern is how to structure trade 
reforms to obtain the desired outcomes for tariff revenue and welfare; for 
example, an aim of trade reform may be revenue neutrality and positive 
welfare effects.  Most of the studies on the fiscal and welfare effects are 
analysed in a stylised first-best framework of full liberalisation that is not 
particularly realistic for policy makers.  This thesis extends the analysis by 
examining this issue in a second-best framework – where there is partial 
liberalisation under a free trade agreement but tariffs remain on Rest of the 
World (ROW) imports.  For detail and depth of analysis, it is useful to examine 
this issue at an individual country level.  A suitable case study for consideration 
is that of a small open economy (Jamaica) in a free trade agreement (EU-
CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)).  In this second-best 
setting, one can assess various reform scenarios and their likely impact on 
revenue and welfare.   Through a partial equilibrium approach, this thesis will 
answer the questions: 
• How can Jamaica design Rest of the World (ROW) tariffs to minimise 
possible negative fiscal and welfare impacts of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA?   
• Can Jamaica achieve Welfare Increasing and Revenue Enhancing 
(WIRE) outcomes in this context? 
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
 
In order to answer these research questions, the thesis starts by examining the 
question of whether trade liberalisation necessarily results in revenue 
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depletion and assesses the likelihood that countries will recoup international 
trade tax revenue losses by changes in other tax sources, such as domestic 
taxes (Chapter 2).  Two equations are estimated, using fixed effects panel 
regression analysis, with international trade tax revenue as a share of GDP, and 
total trade tax revenue as a share of GDP as the dependent variables.  The 
regressions include relevant socio-economic indicators, such as the level of 
urbanisation, per capita income, population size, and the age-dependency 
ratio.  These equations are estimated at an aggregate level and then by country 
groups based on a country’s level of development in order to assess how 
liberalisation may impact each country differently.  Accounting for possible 
endogeneity issues, the study then goes on to vary the model by using a more 
traditional indicator of openness, trade as a per cent of GDP. 
Chapter 3 continues the analysis within an events framework based on the fact 
that trade liberalisation is often driven by economic shocks and externally 
imposed under loan agreements with multilateral lending institutions.   We can 
therefore examine the impact of trade liberalisation through changes in key 
fiscal variables, such as total tax revenue and trade tax revenue as a share of 
GDP, in the period before and after liberalisation.  This chapter also explores 
the issue of heterogeneity within the sample, in regard to varying levels of 
development among countries and the treatment of export taxes by individual 
countries.   
Chapter 4 takes the analysis further and examines the tariff revenue, trade 
creating, trade diverting and welfare effects of full liberalisation under the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA at the product level for Jamaica.  It also examines the 
different effects of utilising statutory tariff rates versus collected tariff rates in 
the analysis and analyses how Jamaica may adjust Common External Tariffs on 
ROW imports after implementation of the EPA in order to address concerns 
about tariff revenue depletion and welfare loss, for example.  It then examines 
the feasibility of achieving welfare increasing and revenue enhancing (WIRE) 
outcomes for tariff adjustments on ROW imports post-EPA. 
The thesis then concludes in Chapter 5 where the main findings and higher-
level conclusions, along with their limitations, are identified.   
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2. THE FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The impact of trade liberalisation on fiscal revenue has long been a concern for 
policymakers and researchers.  Their main concerns include exploring whether 
adverse revenue effects necessarily accompany trade liberalisation and 
possible mitigating measures where adverse effects are observed.  In addition, 
researchers have analysed the factors that are likely to influence the degree of 
revenue loss such as a country’s level of development, the degree of 
urbanisation and the degree of openness of its economy.   
In order to investigate these issues, researchers have utilised various 
methodologies, ranging from cross-section regression analysis to more recent 
efforts to take advantage of both time and group variations with the use of 
panel datasets.  Limitations of some of these models, such as cross-country 
simple linear regression analysis, include the inability to examine changes in 
the variables over time which is especially important in the context of 
international trade given that trade liberalisation usually has lagged effects.  
Additionally, some models (including those that use panel datasets) have 
undesirable features such as endogeneity, depending on the indicators used 
to measure variables such as openness and international trade taxes.   
This essay examines the question of whether trade liberalisation necessarily 
results in revenue depletion and the likelihood that countries will recoup 
international trade tax revenue losses by changes in other tax sources, such as 
domestic taxes. Using fixed effects panel regression analysis, with 
international trade tax revenue as a share of GDP, and total tax revenue as a 
share of GDP as the dependent variables, the study estimates the relationship 
between openness and international trade tax revenue and total tax revenue 
as a share of GDP. 1   The regressions include relevant socio-economic 
indicators, such as the level of urbanisation, per capita income, population 
size, and the age-dependency ratio.  The concept of openness is explored by 
using alternative measures - an openness index (Khattry and Rao (2002)) and 
the one-year lag of Trade as a share of GDP).  The openness index is 
endogenous to the model and is therefore unlikely to provide reliable 
estimates.  The lag of trade as a share of GDP does not face this criticism as it 
is less likely to be contemporaneously correlated over time with trade and total 
                                                          
1  International trade tax revenue comprise taxies imposed on goods and services 
entering a customs territory, including import duties, export duties, profits of export 
or import monopolies, exchange profits, and exchange taxes.  Total tax revenue refers 
to all compulsory transfers to the central government. (IMF Government Financial 
Statistics Database - 2014) 
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tax revenue as a share of GDP.    In addition, the study explores heterogeneity 
within the model by estimating the equations by country groups based on a 
country’s level of development in order to assess how liberalisation may 
impact each country differently.  Before delving into the data analysis and 
regression results, the next section provides a review of key literature on trade 
liberalisation and its possible impact on fiscal revenue.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The Literature Review first provides an overview of the relevant theoretical 
underpinnings for tariff formulation and the principles of taxation in general.  
This section also provides a rationale for the imposition of tariffs and their 
impact on domestic and global welfare.  It then goes on to focus specifically on 
the factors that influence the level of trade taxes (of which revenue earned 
from tariffs comprise the vast majority) in total tax revenue and as a 
percentage of GDP. Following this discussion, it examines the impact of trade 
liberalisation on tax revenue, taking account of issues such as the impact on 
domestic tax revenue, and export taxes.  It also provides an overview of the 
methodologies that have been used thus far to investigate the nature of the 
relationship between trade tax revenue and trade liberalisation.  Finally, it 
concludes by summarising the main findings from the literature review and 
charts the layout of the rest of the chapter. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundations 
In order to have a complete understanding of the issues surrounding the 
impact of trade liberalisation on trade taxes, this section assesses the  factors 
that influence the amount of trade taxes that a government can raise in order 
to gauge the final revenue outcome from liberalisation.  In this context, there 
are often conflicting effects at play; for example, some effects of tariff 
liberalisation depend on the elasticity of substitution between imports and 
their domestic substitutes and it is therefore difficult to predict the final reform 
outcome.  The section then goes on to trace the likely impact of trade 
liberalisation on key variables as identified in the economic literature. 
   
(a) Factors Influencing the Share of Trade Tax Revenue in Total Revenue and in 
GDP 
The share of trade tax revenue in total government revenue and in GDP varies 
between countries due to several factors.  It may be observed that the share 
of trade tax revenue in GDP varies with a country’s level of economic 
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development.  It is argued that as a country becomes more developed, tax 
systems mature, administrative experience and efficiencies are gained, and 
thus other sources of revenue become much more significant than trade tax 
revenue.  Greenaway (1980) attributes this inverse relationship between trade 
tax revenue and the level of economic development to a country’s level of 
industrialisation which gives rise to greater need for cash transactions; low 
income elasticity of trade tax revenue; changes in the composition of imports 
demanded as economies develop, towards intermediate capital goods; the 
maturity of infant industries which causes less revenue to be earned from their 
import substitutes; and the general disinclination of industrialised countries to 
use trade taxes as a source of revenue.   
One can also assume that the degree of openness of an economy provides an 
indication of potential revenue earnings from taxes on trade.2  One can expect 
a positive correlation between trade tax revenue and the size of the traded 
goods sector as, ceteris paribus, the more goods that are subjected to import 
duties and export taxes, for example, the more earnings a government is likely 
to receive.  In a general equilibrium context, however, where there is imperfect 
competition, the imposition of additional duties and taxes on imports may 
induce changes in consumer behaviour such as increased spending on 
domestic substitutes.  In this case, even where producers of domestic 
substitutes take the opportunity to increase product margins, the increase may 
be less than the full amount of the tariff; hence, the final outcome is 
unpredictable.  Moreover, in many developing countries, there is a difference 
in the average nominal tariff and the collected tariff rate due to the number of 
exemptions available. 
In its common manifestation, trade liberalisation involves the reduction and/or 
removal of duties on imports entering into a country.  One would therefore 
expect that the amount of trade tax revenue earned by a government would 
vary depending on the rates of import duties, export taxes, and stamp duties, 
for example.  Khattry and Rao (2002) posit that the direct effect of tariff 
liberalisation is dependent on whether or not initial tariffs were relatively high 
and above their revenue-maximising levels.  If they are not above their 
revenue-maximising levels, tariff liberalisation will increase tariff revenue; if 
they are, then tariff liberalisation will lead to declining revenue.  They also 
point out that the indirect effects of tariff liberalisation depend on the 
elasticity of substitution between imports and their domestic substitutes.  It is 
noted that in general the net change cannot be predicted.  
                                                          
2  For a more intensive discussion, see Greenaway (1980), Greenaway and Milner 
(1991) and Cole (1992) 
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Where a country is heavily dependent on primary agricultural products, there 
may be increased likelihood of the presence of export taxes on products from 
the traditional export sectors (Burgess and Stern (1993)).  As noted by 
Greenaway and Milner (1991) and Khattry and Rao (2002), the removal of 
export taxes is expected to reduce tax yield but other export enhancing 
measures could be pursued such as tax rebates which may encourage 
increased exports and hence, greater earnings and direct tax yields from 
sources such as income tax.  Export taxes, however, are a negligible source of 
revenue for the vast majority of countries currently. 
Changes in the exchange rate can affect the share of trade taxes in total 
revenue and GDP.  A depreciation of the real exchange rate makes imports 
more expensive in domestic currency terms and can therefore reduce the 
quantity of imports demanded and increase demand for domestic import 
substitutes.  The precise effect depends on the relevant price elasticity of 
demand for imports and the price elasticity of supply for import substitutes.  If 
price elasticity of demand for imports is relatively inelastic then the 
government would expect to see increased revenue earnings from tariffs.  
Greenaway and Milner (1991) note that this is often the case for capital goods 
and intermediates for Less Developed Countries.  On the other hand, 
consumer goods and food items with domestic substitutes tend to have high 
elasticity.  Currency depreciation also has a positive effect on exports which 
may lead to increased revenue from taxes on income.  The net impact 
therefore depends on these competing considerations (Agbeyegbe et al. 
(2006)). 
Khattry and Rao (2002) point to the structural constraints faced by many 
developing countries in relation to their level of urbanization and age-
dependency ratios.  In Lewis’ (1954) model of structural change, an economy 
becomes more urbanised as it develops.  This increases its need for and 
capacity to tax as the urban population demands provision of additional public 
services and provides a targeted tax base through the economic activity 
generated.  In many developing countries where the rural economy tends to 
be the dominant sector, economic activity tends to be less concentrated and 
mostly informal in nature, which makes tax assessment difficult.  Therefore, in 
some cases, governments levy taxes on agricultural exports.  In addition, the 
high age-dependency ratios in many countries mean that the tax base is 
smaller than in developed countries which tend to have lower age-dependency 
ratios.   
The factors discussed above constitute the explanatory variables that influence 
changes in trade taxes and total taxes.  The age dependency ratio, the level of 
urbanization, and per capita income account for structural characteristics in 
the economy that determine a country’s taxable base.  The inclusion of the 
exchange rate in the trade tax revenue model accounts for the possible impact 
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of changes in monetary policy on exports and imports.  Additionally, one 
should be mindful that the final impact of trade liberalisation on fiscal revenue 
is also dependent on other factors such as a country’s existing tariff structure 
and where tariffs are located in relation to their revenue-maximising levels, 
the availability of domestic substitutes and their elasticities of supply and 
demand, and other structural constraints faced by individual economies. 
 
(b) The Impact of Trade Liberalisation  
The likely impact of trade liberalisation can be assessed in terms of the 
measures that comprise the reform process.  This section sets out the a priori 
expectations of reforms, such as the removal of quantitative restrictions; tariff 
reform, including liberalisation and reduction in dispersion; domestic tax 
revenue; and exchange rate adjustment, on fiscal revenue.  One of the most 
frequent components of reform has been the tariffication of quantitative 
restrictions (QRs).  The replacement of quantitative restrictions provides an 
additional source of tax revenue but the extent to which this happens is 
dependent on the impact of tariffs on domestic prices and hence on domestic 
demand for the affected products. It may be the case that the increase in prices 
reduces demand and hence the volume of trade, thereby affecting the revenue 
outcome.  Ebrill et al. (1999) note that the impact of changes in quantitative 
restrictions is dependent on the nature of the restriction itself and the 
administrative capabilities of the countries implementing such reform.  For 
example, removing quotas on imports that are also subject to tariffs may lead 
to an increase in revenue due to increased import volume.  
Another plank of trade reform is tariff liberalisation.  As already discussed, if 
the initial tariff rate is above the revenue maximising rate, then any reduction 
of the tariff is likely to increase trade tax revenue as the incentive for evasion 
is lessened by the decrease or removal of the tariff and positive changes in 
income may be induced.  The converse is also true.  If the initial tariff rate is 
below the revenue maximising rate, then tariff reduction or elimination is likely 
to result in a reduction in government revenue from trade taxes.  The final 
impact of tariff changes will therefore take account of the number of tariffs 
above and below the tariff maximising rate, the magnitude of tariff changes, 
and cross price elasticities of demand of imports and supply of import 
substitutes. (See Greenaway and Milner (1991)).  
Domestic tax revenue is also impacted by trade liberalisation.  In many 
developing countries, taxes on imported goods and services are an important 
source of revenue.  Indeed, these taxes are often levied on the tariff-inclusive 
price.  The removal of tariffs is therefore likely to reduce tax yield if the base is 
eroded.  Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) note, however, that the ultimate impact on 
revenue yield has to take account of possible changes in import demand 
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(positive) and demand for import substitutes (negative) due to lower prices on 
imports from removal of the tariff.  Moreover, there may be long-term effects 
on the tax base if liberalisation has a positive effect on economic growth.  
Liberalisation measures often comprise a reduction in the dispersion of tariff 
rates, and simplification of the tariff structure - with significant reduction or 
removal of tax exemptions.  Greenaway and Milner (1991) note that this 
should be revenue-neutral but may have the positive effect of reducing the 
incentive for tax evasion and improve administrative efficiencies and this will 
have a positive effect on the revenue outcome.  Ebrill et al. (1999) focus on the 
relative importance of price elasticities of demand of imports impacted by the 
reform measure.  In this regard, it is argued that if reducing tariff dispersion 
negatively affects effective rates of protection, then there is likely to be an 
increase in imports and hence, increased revenue from trade taxes.  In 
addition, higher tariffs tend to be associated with goods that have higher price 
elasticities of demand and if these tariffs are lowered, then the positive 
revenue effect is likely to be reinforced through increased demand for these 
products. 
The removal of export taxes – another facet of liberalisation - may lead to a 
reduction in trade tax revenue, ceteris paribus, if export volume is not affected 
positively.  Greenaway and Milner (1991) posit that one can expect an inverse 
relationship between the significance of export taxes and the share of non-
traditional exports in total exports.  This follows from the fact that export taxes 
are applied to traditional exports in most cases and often allow for exemptions 
so that producers are competitive. 
In addition, one can expect some amount of exchange rate adjustment in many 
trade reform packages.  This can be analysed using the standard implications 
of devaluation in a small open economy.  Devaluation will increase the price of 
imports but the extent to which this affects customs revenue depends on the 
price elasticity of demand for imports.  In addition, devaluation makes non-
tradeables more attractive to consumers than tradeables (which are now 
relatively more expensive).  This has a dual effect – there is likely to be a 
decrease in customs revenue but also an increase in domestic indirect tax 
revenues.  Income taxes from tradeables may also rise as the now lower price 
of exports in foreign markets should encourage greater demand for these 
products; once producers respond, they should see increased earnings. 
Khattry and Rao (2002) also discuss a terms of trade shock effect of 
liberalisation.  This would result from simultaneous trade liberalisation by 
several developing countries which could lead to a glut on the market of similar 
products.  It is argued that this would depress the prices of these exports and 
negatively affect export revenue and also income tax earnings from exporters.  
This argument fails to take account, however, of the supply constraints and 
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rigidities faced by many developing countries which makes it very unlikely that 
a significant number of these countries could increase production to take 
advantage of the now more open economies simultaneously.  Importantly, one 
also needs to consider the demand for the products in question – more open 
economies do not necessarily lead to increased demand for particular 
products. 
Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) also explore other impacts of trade liberalisation on 
income and profit taxes.  The short-run channel through which these impacts 
are transmitted is via the changes in profits of importers and producers of 
import substitutes.  In addition, there may be long-run consequences if trade 
liberalisation impacts on economic growth – positively or negatively – and 
therefore on incomes and income tax liabilities.  These general equilibrium 
considerations are not the subject of this study but it is useful to bear in mind 
that there are other possible indirect effects of trade liberalisation.  
In addition to the nature of the trade reforms themselves, timing and 
sequencing of reforms are also important considerations in determining the 
final impact of trade liberalisation.  Papageorgiou et al. (1990) argue that for 
liberalisation to succeed it is best to implement reform measures quickly 
rather than gradually – fast removal of QRs, and real depreciation of the 
domestic currency. In addition, there should be a stable macroeconomic 
environment.  On the other hand, others such as Toye (2000) object to the “big 
bang” approach and would rather see more gradual implementation of reform 
measures with particular attention being paid to the sequencing of reforms 
with stabilisation policies. 
A common thread in the discussion above is that there can be no firm 
expectation of the final impact of trade reform.  Each country’s experience 
depends on the its initial tariff structure before reform, price elasticities of 
demand and supply for imports and domestic substitutes, the nature of trade 
reforms, the pace and sequencing of trade reforms, and the extent of exchange 
rate adjustment, if any.  While recognizing that more detailed country-specific 
analysis is necessary for any country contemplating trade reforms, cross-
country and panel analysis is useful to assess general patterns and trends over 
time as countries have liberalised their economies.  The next section examines 
empirical studies conducted on the subject, with a view to identifying 
appropriate methodologies for this research and the application of new or 
different techniques where appropriate.  
 
2.2.2 Methodologies 
There is no single approach to determining the impact of trade liberalisation 
on revenue.  Most studies of the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
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changes in tax revenue utilise both correlation and regression analyses.  The 
regression models range from limited three variable cross-country regressions 
(see Greenaway (1980) and Cole (1992)) to very extensive multi-variable 
models with panel data (see Greenaway et al. (2002), Baunsgaard and Keen 
(2005); and Khattry and Rao (2002), for example).   One common thread in the 
approaches taken by the various authors is careful selection of the trade 
liberalisation variable.  Indeed, one finds that in some instances the sensitivity 
of results depends on the measure of liberalisation used.  This section will 
explore the models that have been used so far to examine the question of how 
trade liberalisation impacts on growth and what are the best indicators of the 
factors under consideration.  It will also identify the limitations of some of the 
indicators of trade liberalisation and models used and how researchers have 
addressed these issues. 
Measures of Trade Liberalisation and Openness 
 
Researchers have investigated several approaches to measure the degree of 
openness of an economy.  Openness is often seen as being synonymous with 
the outward orientation of an economy.  Wacziarg (2001) lists three categories 
of openness indicators – outcome measures, policy indicators and deviation 
measures – in his study on the relationship between trade policy and economic 
growth.   
Outcome measures comprise indicators such as changes in trade volume and 
composition that show the results of a country’s interaction with the global 
market.  The conventional measure of openness is exports plus imports, as a 
percentage of GDP.3  However, some researchers have used the collected tariff 
rate (import duties as a percentage of total imports) to measure openness.4  A 
less accepted measure is the ratio of international trade taxes to international 
trade used by Khattry and Rao (2002).  The use of this measure gives rise to 
issues of endogeneity where the share of international trade taxes in GDP is 
used as the dependent variable.  Moreover, as noted by Agbeyegbe et al. 
(2006), this measure is limited in its application as a close relationship is not 
directly observed between changes in one of the components of international 
trade tax revenue, exports, and trade liberalisation. 
More generally, the main drawback of outcome measures is the lack of a 
strong theoretical framework for analysis as most theoretical papers utilise 
trade policy measures such as tariffs (see David (2008) and Pritchett (1996)).   
Wacziarg (2001) rejects the use of outcome measures, citing endogeneity 
concerns relating to the use of outcome measures and variables such as 
                                                          
3 See Ebrill et al. (1999), Greenaway and Milner (1991), Greenaway et al. (2002) 
4 For example, Ebrill (1999) 
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economic growth.  He also notes that outcome measures include a gravity 
component (trading patterns simply based on variations in geographical 
location and country size) which would not be appropriate for a study that 
seeks to capture the policy regime and that there are endogeneity concerns.  
Other researchers such as Chang et al. (2009) have no issues with the use of 
outcome measures.  They use the volume of trade (the ratio of real exports 
and imports to real GDP) to measure openness in their study on the effect of 
openness and other variables on economic growth.  Chang et al. (2009) 
highlight that after controlling for country and time specific effects, the trade 
to GDP ratio is a suitable proxy for trade policy.  In addition, when the trade to 
GDP ratio is replaced with average tariff rates to measure the robustness of 
the model, the results remain the same.   
Policy measures include the scheduled or applied tariff rates, non-tariff 
barriers, and tariff revenues.  Their levels indicate a country’s trade orientation 
– low levels suggest openness to trade; high levels may suggest a 
protectionist/anti-free trade leaning. Pritchett (1996) classifies these 
indicators as “incidence” measures where there is direct assessment of the 
trade policy measure.  Wacziarg (2001) states that policy measures are likely 
to influence outcome measures directly; for example, high tariff rates and the 
existence of non-tariff barriers directly influence the amount of imports and 
therefore, trade as a share of GDP.  However, their utility may be limited based 
on data availability and endogeneity concerns, depending on the variables in 
the regression model.  
Finally, deviation measures are based on the divergence of actual trade volume 
from predicted free-trade levels, pioneered by Leamer (1988).  The models are 
based on gravity equations and factor endowments.  The main drawback for 
these models is the likelihood of omitted variables, including ones that reflect 
policy stance and are highly correlated with gravity or endowment variables.   
Arguing that it is best to combine variations in several measures to obtain an 
indicator of openness that captures different dimensions of trade policy, 
Wacziarg (2001) develops a Trade Policy Openness Index by measuring the 
variation in trade shares attributable to various trade policy measures.  The 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP is regressed on policy, gravity and 
endowment variables.  The components of the index are: 
• The share of import duties in total imports 
• The unweighted coverage ratio for the pre-Uruguay Round 
time period published by UNCTAD 
• Dummy variables based on country’s liberalization status, 
using Sachs and Warner (1995) 
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The regression also includes the log of land area, log of population and the 
growth rate of GDP per capita.  The coefficients from the regression are used 
as weights to construct a weighted average of these variables – the trade policy 
openness index, equal to the portion of observed trade shares attributable to 
the effective impact of trade policy.  According to Wacziarg (2001), his 
methodology avoids the problem of measurement error, as he constructs the 
difference between potential and observed trade shares, and collinearity 
between endowment, gravity and policy factors. 
Also favouring the use of liberalisation indices, Greenaway et al. (2002) utilise 
three indicators of liberalisation: indices developed by Dean et al. (1994), Sachs 
and Warner (1995), and whether the country has a Structural Adjustment Loan 
(SAL).  Dean et al. (1994) derive a composite index of liberalisation to assess 
when liberalisation occurred in their sample of thirty-two developing 
countries.  Reference is made to changes in tariffs, quotas, export measures, 
and exchange rates.  Sachs and Warner (1995) assess whether an economy is 
open or closed based upon movements in non-tariff barriers and average tariff 
levels; whether or not the country is socialist; the existence of state 
monopolies over key exports; and the difference between the official and black 
market exchange rates.  All three indicators are entered as dummy variables 
into a dynamic panel setting. 
In addition to the measures cited above, there are other methods that assess 
trade liberalisation and openness by comparing price levels across countries.  
For example, Dollar (1992) estimates a cross-country index of real exchange 
rate depreciation to estimate “outward-orientation”, using a measure of price 
levels compiled by Summers and Heston for 121 countries.  The measure is 
similar to comparing purchasing power parities (PPP) across countries.  The 
main drawback of these measures, as noted by Balassa (1964) is the risk of 
overvaluation of the exchange rate by PPP as developed countries tend to have 
a comparative advantage in the traded goods sector (leading to higher 
exchange rates) which imply that non-traded goods cost more in developed 
countries when compared with less developing countries using the same 
exchange rate, which is often not the case. 
 
Estimation Techniques 
Various techniques have been employed to explore the impact of trade 
liberalisation on tax revenue.  Ebrill et al. (1999) explore the impact of trade 
liberalisation on revenue using fixed effects panel regression in two models.  In 
the first model, using a dataset of 27 countries over the years 1980-92, import 
tax revenue as a share of GDP is determined by the import base and dummy 
variables representing the reduction of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and 
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export barriers.  Other variables included in the estimating equation are 
exports as a percentage of GDP, per capita income in 1990 U.S. dollars, dummy 
variables for whether the country has a VAT, the achievement of Article VIII 
status with the IMF ( possible indicator of a liberal trading regime as Article VIII 
refers to the acceptance of the obligations of member states to avoid 
discriminatory currency practices and restrictions on current payments for 
international transactions), and the real exchange rate.  Article VIII status with 
the IMF is used as a liberalisation indicator since it is thought to be unrelated 
to trade tax revenue and thus, uncorrelated with the error term, while at the 
same time signalling a country’s commitment to free trade.  The sample used 
only includes countries that have undertaken liberalisation.  Their results show 
that tariff reductions have not had a significant impact on trade tax revenue 
while changes in export taxes have had a significantly negative impact on trade 
revenues.  In addition, changes in QRs, using appropriate exchange rate 
policies to support the reform process, and stimulating imports are likely to 
have a positive and significant effect on trade tax revenue. 
The second equation models trade tax revenue as a function of the collected 
tariff rate, its square, and the other independent variables included in the first 
model, excluding the liberalisation dummies, the import base, and exports as 
a share of GDP.  A quadratic form is estimated of the relationship between the 
collected tariff rate and trade tax revenue to capture the idea of a revenue 
maximising rate above which the collected tariff may actually decline.  The 
model confirms the existence of a revenue-maximising tariff rate. 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) use similar fixed effects regressions to assess the 
impact of trade liberalisation on tax revenue.  However, the approach here is 
different from those outlined previously in that the model seeks to estimate 
the relationship between the costliness of collecting alternative forms of 
revenue to trade taxes or the value of public spending, and trade liberalisation.  
The dependent variable in this case is domestic tax revenue which is regressed 
against a lagged dependent variable, trade tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
and a vector X that includes per capita GDP, openness, inflation, aid per capita, 
and agriculture as a share of total value added.  Similar to Ebrill et al. (1999), 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) include a dummy variable reflecting whether the 
country has a VAT in place, and have interaction terms of the VAT with 
openness, and VAT with per capita GDP.  In addition, a one-step Generalised 
Method of Moment (GMM) regression is estimated to deal with issues of 
endogeneity associated with trade tax revenue and bias from inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable.  Their findings indicate that some trade tax 
revenue lost as a result of trade liberalisation is likely to be recovered from 
other sources and that countries with a VAT recover less revenue than those 
without. 
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Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) use GMM estimation with an “orthogonal deviation 
transformation” based on Arellano and Bover (1995) to estimate the 
relationship between trade liberalisation and tax revenue for a panel data set 
of 22 Sub-Saharan African countries over 1980-1996.  An orthogonal deviation 
transformation expresses each observation as the deviation from the average 
of future observations in a sample for the same unit (for example, country) and 
weights each deviation to standardise the variance.  Where errors are serially 
uncorrelated and homoskedastic initially, the transformed errors will also have 
the same properties.  The dependent variables are indicators such as total tax 
revenue, trade taxes, and taxes on goods and services as a share of GDP.  These 
are regressed on the standard variables in the tax literature – per capita GDP, 
the share of agriculture in GDP, the share of industry in GDP, the terms of 
trade, inflation, government consumption, the real effective exchange rate, 
net aid transfer, openness (share of international trade in GDP and share of 
customs revenue as per cent of total imports), and a dummy variable for CFA 
franc countries.  They find that the openness indicators are not significant in 
either equations, i.e., trade liberalisation does not have a significant impact on 
trade tax revenues for this group of countries. 
Khattry and Rao (2002) also use regression analysis to determine the factors 
that influence tax revenue in general and trade tax revenue in particular.  The 
two models use panel data for 80 countries for the period 1970-98.  For the 
first model, the share of tax revenue in GDP is regressed on the natural log of 
population size, the natural log of real GDP per capita, the age-dependency 
ratio, the degree of urbanisation, and the index of openness.  The second 
equation looks at the effect of openness on customs revenue, using the same 
independent variables as in the previous equation and adding the share of 
domestic indirect taxes/GDP, the exchange rate, and the trade/GDP ratio.  
Applying the same logic as Ebrill et al. (1999), the second equation includes a 
quadratic form of the openness index because it is believed that rates of trade 
taxation above a certain threshold may lead to declining tax revenues.  The 
openness variable selected is endogenous to the model, which limits one’s 
ability to draw inferences from the estimation.  Approaches to address 
endogeneity include using lagged values, instrumental variables, 5  GMM 
estimation,6 and event studies.7    An appropriate approach for this current 
study is therefore to estimate an alternative specification of the model that 
includes a lagged value of the traditional indicator of openness (Trade as a 
share of GDP) to control for endogeneity and test the robustness of results, 
using an extended data set.  In addition, an event study will be done using the 
liberalisation indicators identified in Greenaway et al. (2002) in a fixed effects 
                                                          
5 For example, Ebrill et al. (1999) 
6 See Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), Agbeyegbe et al. (2006), and Chang et al. (2009). 
7 Greenaway et al. (2002) 
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regression framework.  The results from these two analyses will then be 
compared to see if results are consistent across methodologies.   
2.2.3 Conclusions 
The literature on the impact of trade liberalisation on tariff revenue is diverse 
but provides several starting points for analysis.  Common variables that are 
thought to affect the share of trade tax revenue among the studies researched 
include GDP per capita, the share of agriculture, and domestic taxes as a 
percent of GDP.   The final effect of trade liberalisation depends on the 
interplay of these factors, and the relative strength of each.  It is accepted that 
any assessment of the impact of liberalisation should include an analysis of 
existing tariff levels and their location in relation to the revenue-maximising 
rates.  In addition, trade liberalisation also features less dispersion of tariff 
rates, and the tariffication of quantitative restrictions.  The analysis would 
therefore need to take account of the impact of relative prices and demand for 
final and intermediate goods as a result of changes in the price level due to 
adjustments in the tariff structure.   
Other issues that need to be assessed include: the pace of the liberalisation 
process (rapid vs. gradual); the impact of exchange rate changes, usually 
depreciation, that often accompany trade liberalisation; and the impact of 
liberalisation on domestic tax revenues. With respect to the pace of 
liberalisation, there is disagreement on whether a ‘big-bang’ approach is best 
when implementing trade reform as it may speed up the adjustment process; 
or whether a slower paced reform programme is best to give interest groups 
time to adjust to incremental changes.  For exchange rate changes, the impact 
of depreciation is dependent on the elasticities of demand for exports and 
imports and the availability of domestic substitutes.  Domestic tax revenues 
are also likely to be affected by trade liberalisation because most countries levy 
taxes such as stamp duty on the tariff-inclusive price of the commodity; hence, 
any reduction in that price is likely to affect revenue, ceteris paribus. Another 
central question is the extent to which other sources can compensate for lost 
trade tax revenue.  Possible mitigating policies include measures to strengthen 
the administrative capacity of tax institutions, and concomitant introduction 
of other indirect taxes such as a consumption tax or a VAT.  
Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that a definitive outcome cannot 
be predicted for the impact of trade liberalisation on particular countries.  
However, the likely impacts can be assessed based on the experiences of 
countries that have undergone liberalisation and any general trends that may 
be observed.  It is generally felt that a panel framework is best suited for this 
analysis as it allows for the capturing of both cross-country and inter-temporal 
effects.  A key variable in any model estimating the impact of trade 
liberalisation on fiscal revenue is the indicator of openness.  All measures have 
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advantages and disadvantages, with liberalisation indices arguably being the 
most recommended.   While trade as a share of GDP is an outcome measure 
and therefore not a direct indicator of trade policy, it can be argued that trade 
ratios show the manifestation of trade policy.  If an economy is inward-looking, 
one should expect to see lower trade to GDP ratios, ceteris paribus, as 
consumers and producers respond to high tariffs.  Additionally, changes in 
trade ratios depend on factors such as the structure of the economy, and 
elasticities of demand and supply, and income elasticities.  One criticism of the 
measure is that in the case of developing countries that are dependent on the 
exports of commodities, the share of imports in GDP tends to be relatively 
stable over time but the share of exports in GDP is likely to vary based on 
changes in the global market.  The openness indicator may not fully capture 
policy changes in this case where changes in trade as a share of GDP are driven 
by exogenous factors on the global market that affect primary exports. 
This research utilises a panel regression framework to analyse the impact of 
trade reforms on fiscal revenue, similar to Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) and 
Khattry and Rao (2002) and modifies the model to take into account 
endogeneity concerns.  The next section describes the data that will be used 
in the model and presents trends in trade tax revenue and total tax revenue as 
a share of GDP, the exchange rate, the level of urbanization, the age 
dependency ratio, per capita income, population size, domestic taxes as a 
share of GDP, the level of urbanization and trade (exports plus imports) as a 
share of GDP. 
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2.3 Data Analysis 
 
The data for the model are relevant tax and socio-economic indicators for 78 
countries (see Appendix 2A) over the period 1970-2006.  These include the 
share of tax revenue in GDP, the share of trade tax revenue in GDP as 
dependent variables.  Independent variables are the exchange rate, the 
natural log of population size, the dependency ratio, per capita GDP, domestic 
taxes on goods and services as a share of GDP, the level of urbanisation, and 
trade as a share of GDP.   
 
2.3.1 Definition of key variables 
In order to understand fully the composition of the model, it is necessary to 
define the key variables.  These definitions are from the International 
Monetary Fund’s Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database. 
Tax revenue (% of GDP): Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the 
central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as 
fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds 
and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative 
revenue. The data are sourced from International Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and 
OECD GDP estimates.  
Taxes on international trade (current LCU): Taxes on international trade 
include import duties, export duties, profits of export or import monopolies, 
exchange profits, and exchange taxes.  Data are sourced from International 
Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files.   
Trade (% of GDP): Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic product.  Data are sourced 
from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data 
files. 
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2.3.2 Descriptive Analysis  
Figures 2-1 to 2-3 show general trends in the key revenue indicators – total tax 
revenue and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP, and the trade tax to total tax 
revenue ratio.   
 
Figure 2-1: Share of Total Tax Revenue in GDP 
 
Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP generally increases over the period 
under study for most country groups, except for low income countries, as 
shown in Figure 2-1.  There is a significant gap in the percentage of tax revenue 
in GDP (TRgdp) collected by high income countries compared with that 
collected by other country groups.  This may be explained by the fact that high 
income countries tend to have more highly developed institutional structures 
for tax collection and thus, are able to collect a higher proportion of tax 
revenue than less developed countries. For high income countries, TRgdp 
averaged 29% over 1972-78 and 35% over 2000-06. At the other end of the 
spectrum, TRgdp was 12% in 1972-78 and increased slightly to 15% for low 
income countries over the 2000-06 period.   
Taxes on international trade as a percentage of GDP (TTgdp) generally trend 
downwards for lower and upper middle income countries over the period (see 
Figure 2-2).  For high income countries, there was an increase in TTgdp from 
2% in the late 1980s to 5% for most of the 1990s, before falling in the late 
1990s onwards.   TTgdp ranged from 4% to 5% over the period 1972-2006 for 
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low income countries; and from 4% to 6% over the same period for lower 
middle income countries.  For upper middle income countries, TTgdp averaged 
a low of 2% for the 2000-2006 period and a high of 4% for 1979-1985.   
Figure 2-2: Share of Trade Tax Revenue in GDP 
 
Figure 2-3: Ratio of Trade Tax Revenue to Total Tax Revenue 
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Figure 2-3 shows that high income countries have the lowest proportion of 
international trade taxes in total taxes while the highest proportion is observed 
in low income countries.  Over time, the trade tax to total tax ratio falls for all 
country groups, except the high income group.  However, high income 
countries have the lowest rates for most of the time period.  This again 
confirms the theory that as economies develop, the sources of tax revenue are 
diversified and countries rely less on trade tax revenue.   
Average values of the variables for low income to high income countries are 
broken down into six-year time periods to see any trends in Table 2-1.  Tax 
Revenue as a percentage of GDP is highest in high income countries.  This 
supports Khattry and Rao’s (2002) discussion that a country’s capacity to tax 
increases with its level of development due to increased urbanisation and 
institutional capacities.  The level of trade taxes (TT) as a share of GDP is 
smallest for high income countries at 2.5%; the share for low income to upper 
middle income countries ranges from 3.5% to 5.6%.  This is complemented by 
the fact that high income countries have the highest average share of domestic 
taxes as a percent of GDP at 10% compared to low and lower middle income 
countries with averages of 4.7% and 5.6% respectively. Interestingly, trade 
measured as per cent of GDP is highest in lower middle income countries and 
lowest in low income countries.  The openness index (tt) is seen to increase 
with the level of development.  On average, the share of taxes on international 
trade as a per cent of total trade for high income countries is 3% compared to 
12% for low income countries and 7% for lower middle income countries.  
As is expected, GDP per capita increases as one moves to higher income 
groups, with average per capita income being $317 in low income countries; 
$1,191 in lower middle income; $3,677 in upper middle income; and $18,010 
in high income countries.  Per capita income increases for middle income and 
high income countries, with the sharpest increase for high income countries 
over the period.  Per capita income in low income countries fluctuated over 
the time periods and income for the 2000-2006 period was in fact lower than 
that for the initial 1972-78 time-frame.  For all countries, the share of domestic 
taxes in GDP increases over time – suggesting that the capacity of the state to 
tax increases over time and with development (higher income levels).   
The dependency ratio gets progressively lower as income levels increase – 
from an average of 0.9 in low income countries to 0.5 in high income countries.  
The ratio declined for all countries over time - most significantly for lower 
middle income and upper middle income countries.  The level of urbanisation 
is also highest in high income countries where the urban population as a per 
cent of the total is 74%.  This compares with a rate of 23% for low income 
countries and 43% for lower middle income ones.   Additionally, urbanisation 
increases, as is expected, over time and with the level of development.  This is 
evidenced by the over 7 percentage point increase in the urban population as 
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a per cent of a country’s total population from 70% in 1972-78 to 77% in 2000-
06 for high income countries, compared with a movement from 18.03% to 
28.55% for low income countries over similar time periods.  For lower middle 
income and upper middle income countries, the comparable percentages are 
36.94% in 1972-78 to 49.25% in 2000-06, and 53.30% to 70.34% for the same 
years, respectively. 
For all country groups, the value of trade as a per cent of GDP increased year 
on year for all time periods.  Low income countries consistently had the lowest 
share of trade in GDP, ranging from 46.84% in 1972-78 to 57.83% in 2000-2006.  
Interestingly, lower middle income countries have a higher share of trade in 
GDP than upper middle income countries, with trade averaging 67.07% and 
95.91% of GDP for lower middle income countries over 1972-78 and 2000-
2006 respectively.  This compares with 47.18% and 84.06% of GDP for upper 
middle income countries over the same time periods.  High income countries 
had the highest value of trade in GDP at 102.26% for the 2000-2006 time 
period. 
The openness index (tt) was highest (least open) for low income countries but 
declined over 1972-2006.  The values for the other country groups are quite 
similar, with upper middle income countries being the most open at the end 
of the period.  Lower middle income and high income countries had the same 
value of the openness index rounded to one decimal place for the 2000-2006 
period. 
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Table 2-1: Variable Means by Country and Year Groupings (1972-2006) 
  Variable Means by Country and Year Groupings (1972-2006) 
Countries Years lnpop GDPpc (PPP US$) TRgdp (%) TTgdp (%) tt Trade (%) Urbpop (%) Dep ER DTaxgdp (%) 
Low Income 1972-1978 16.12 342.68 12.12 4.75 12.71 46.84 18.03 0.92 22.55 4.18 
  1979-1985 16.31 321.93 13.23 4.69 11.52 47.32 20.85 0.92 31.97 4.79 
  1986-1992 16.51 304.04 14.19 5.04 12.5 46.42 23.48 0.9 90.99 4.88 
  1993-1999 16.68 296.56 12.54 3.59 9.72 52.54 25.96 0.88 372.51 4.35 
  2000-2006 16.85 312.82 14.66 5.18 10.32 57.83 28.55 0.85 1,297.73 5.59 
                        
Lower Middle Income 1972-1978 15.36 1,010.49 16.41 6.36 9.12 67.07 36.94 0.91 33.25 4.34 
  1979-1985 15.54 1,134.04 18.49 6.12 7.85 74.17 40.46 0.87 47.24 5.43 
  1986-1992 15.7 1,150.85 16.84 5.33 6.86 78.57 43.84 0.82 103.79 5.15 
  1993-1999 15.84 1,281.75 17.59 5.49 6.36 90.55 46.7 0.75 229.66 6.41 
  2000-2006 15.96 1,449.37 17.13 3.81 3.68 95.91 49.25 0.67 456.63 7.89 
                        
Upper Middle Income 1972-1978 15.97 3,062.65 17.71 4.08 6.6 47.18 53.3 0.82 3.81 5.24 
  1979-1985 16.12 3,267.31 18.86 4.39 5.96 63.41 57.19 0.75 27.7 5.85 
  1986-1992 16.26 3,440.99 18.36 3.94 5.13 69.73 62.29 0.68 255.68 5.79 
  1993-1999 16.38 4,131.39 16.95 2.63 2.97 78.68 66.71 0.62 11,952.84 6.99 
  2000-2006 16.48 4,665.01 19.45 1.67 2.1 84.06 70.34 0.57 107,906.60 9 
                        
High Income 1972-1978 15.72 13,226.08 28.66 2.61 3.62 68.6 70.02 0.59 61 8.7 
  1979-1985 15.78 15,173.66 31.53 1.71 2.12 77.1 72..57 0.54 97.82 9.68 
  1986-1992 15.82 18,031.14 33.41 1.66 2.1 72.88 74.45 0.51 100.32 10.23 
  1993-1999 15.88 20,718.91 34.66 4.59 4.95 79.7 76.12 0.5 113.32 10.91 
  2000-2006 15.93 24,694.78 35.32 3.84 3.71 102.26 77.53 0.49 51.31 11.21 
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Graphical Representation of Data (1970 – 2006) 
Figure 2-4: Scatterplot TRgdp and Urbpop                      Figure 2-5: Scatterplot TRgdp and lnpop 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Scatterplot TRgdp and Dep 
                               
Figure 2-8: Scatterplot TRgdp and tt 
 
There appears to be a positive relationship between the share of tax revenue 
in GDP and the levels of urbanisation and per capita income. From Figure 2-6, 
it can be seen that higher per capita income levels correspond to higher tax 
revenue shares.  In addition, the relationship between total tax revenue and 
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the openness index (tt) is not clear, as shown in Figure 2-8.  The relationship 
appears positive; however, if the outliers from Madagascar are removed, then 
most points are clustered around a ratio of trade taxes to total trade below 
15% and a share of total tax revenue in GDP below 25%.  Similarly, the 
relationship shown in Figure 2-6 between the share of total tax revenue in GDP 
and per capita income suggests that the relationship may be non-linear.  
Alternatively, there could be two different groups of countries split at around 
40% of tax revenue as a share of GDP where a positive relationship is seen for 
those countries with a ratio below 40% and a negative relationship is observed 
for countries above 40%.  The square of income will be included in the equation 
to model this relationship to see if there are any impacts on parameter 
estimates.  On the other hand, higher dependency ratios predominantly 
correspond with lower tax revenue shares in GDP (Figure 2-7).    No clear 
relationship is seen graphically between the Tax Revenue as a per cent of GDP 
and the country’s population size.   
With respect to the graphs of the level of trade taxes and the levels of domestic 
taxation, income and trade as a per cent of GDP, there appears to be no clear 
direct relationship which suggests the possibility of a non-linear relationship 
(see Figures 2-9 to 2-11).   Where this is the case, there is the risk that the linear 
estimators are biased and the regression model may be mis-specified. The 
fixed effects panel regression framework is fairly standard for this type of 
analysis and appropriate specification tests are conducted for the model. 
Khattry and Rao found a negative relationship in their analysis between the 
ratio of trade taxes to total trade and domestic taxes; a positive but 
insignificant one with respect to the log of per capita GDP; and a positive 
relationship for the share of international trade in GDP.  The regressions that 
follow will determine whether the data collected yields similar results. 
 
Figure 2-9: Scatterplot TTgdp and lnGDPpc                       Figure 2-10: Scatterplot TTgdp and DTaxgdp 
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Figure 2-11: Scatterplot TTgdp and Trade 
 
 
Correlation 
With respect to Equation 1, Tax Revenue as a percentage of GDP is negatively 
correlated with population size, the dependency ratio, and the openness 
index.  It is strongly and positively correlated with per capita GDP and the level 
of urbanisation. 
With respect to equation 2, there is small negative correlation between Taxes 
on International Trade as a percent of GDP (TTgdp), and the share of domestic 
taxes in GDP and the exchange rate.  Larger negative correlations are observed 
for population size, per capita GDP, and the level of urbanisation.  
Unsurprisingly, there is large positive correlation between TTgdp and the 
openness index as the numerator is the same in both measures.  There is much 
smaller correlation between TTgdp, and Trade as a percent of GDP and the 
dependency ratio (see Appendix 2B). 
2.4 Methodology 
Based on the empirical approaches discussed in the Literature Review, this 
section uses various methods to analyse the revenue effects of trade 
liberalisation and notes the extent to which the results obtained are similar or 
different to earlier findings.   
The regression model uses a similar panel regression analysis to Khattry and 
Rao (2002) in the first instance.  The model is then varied by utilising 
alternative specifications. The openness index is dropped and the traditional 
indicator of openness – trade as a share of GDP –  is incorporated into the 
model.  The time period of the model is also extended from 1972-1998 to 
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1972-2006.   Dummy variables are used for individual countries and years to 
capture unobservable country and time specific factors.   
 
2.4.1 Regression Model 
The model for the determinants of Total Revenue as a Share of GDP is : 
TRgdpit = a0 + a1 lnpopit + a2 ln GDPpcit + a3depit + a4urbpopit + a5ttit + γFE +  
δFE + eit            (1) 
where 
TRgdpit  is the share of tax revenue in GDP 
lnpopit  is the natural log of population size 
ln GDPpcit  is the natural log of per capita GDP 
depit   is the age-dependency ratio 
urbpopit  is the degree of urbanisation 
ttit  is the index of openness, measured by the ratio of international 
trade taxes to the volume of total trade.  A fall in this ratio is 
indicative of greater trade openness. 
γFE is the country fixed effect  
δFE is the time fixed effect 
The model for the determinants of Total Trade Tax as a share of GDP is as 
follows: 
TTgdpit =  a0 + a1 ttit + a2 ttit2+ a3ERit + a4 lnpopit + a5 ln GDPpcit + a6depit + 
a7urbpopit + a8tradeit + a9Dtaxgdpit + γFE + δFE + eit  (2) 
where 
TTgdpit  is the share of trade tax revenue in GDP 
ttit  is the index of openness, measured by the ratio of international 
trade taxes to the volume of total trade.  A fall in this ratio is 
indicative of greater trade openness. 
ERit  is the nominal exchange rate  
lnpopit  is the natural log of population size 
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ln GDPpcit  is the natural log of per capita GDP 
depit   is the age-dependency ratio 
urbpopit  is the degree of urbanisation 
tradeit  is trade as % of GDP 
Dtaxgdpit is domestic taxes on goods and services as % of GDP 
γFE is the country fixed effect  
δFE is the time fixed effect 
It should be noted that Equation 2 in particular has endogeneity issues as, 
arguably, it is likely that the error term is not uncorrelated with the 
independent variable Taxes on International Trade as a percent of Total Trade 
(tt).  Changes in Trade as a share of GDP may influence directly the ratio “tt”.   
 
2.4.2 Regression Results  
Using a fixed effects regression technique, regressions were run for equations 
1 and 2 – both for the time period 1972-1998 to compare to Khattry and Rao’s 
(2002) results and for the extended time period 1972-2006.  Table 2-2 reports 
the results and shows that all variables, with the exception of the dependency 
ratio, were significant in Equation 1 for both time periods.  For the extended 
time period, a negative but insignificant relationship is estimated between Tax 
Revenue as a per cent of GDP and the dependency ratio.  However, for the 
reduced time period, a positive but insignificant relationship is observed.  
Positive relationships are seen between the share of tax revenue and the level 
of urbanization, per capita income, and the index of openness.   
As can be seen from Table 2-3, with the exception of the population size 
variable and the coefficient on the dependency ratio for the reduced time 
period, all signs of coefficients are similar to those obtained by Khattry and Rao 
(2002).  The difference may be attributed to the slightly smaller sample size in 
the equations that were run for the time period 1972-1998.  For equation 1, 
with TRgdp as the dependent variable, the countries missing were Barbados, 
Israel, Myanmar, Paraguay and Singapore.   
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Table 2-2: Regression Results, TRgdp and TTgdp 
All countries 
  Eq (1) Eq (1) 1972-
1998 
 Eq (2) Eq (2) 1972-
1998 
  TRgdp TRgdp TTgdp TTgdp 
lnpop    -2.85** -3.39* -0.29 -0.16 
  (1.17) (1.23) (0.49) (0.67) 
lnGDPpc   0.92 1.09 -0.50** -0.47*** 
  (0.60) (0.74) (0.24) (0.28) 
Dep   -1.23 0.66 1.64** 2.14** 
  (1.76) (1.98) (0.72) (0.89) 
Urbpop    0.06** 0.06*** -0.06* -0.03* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
tt    0.25* 0.30* 0.88* 0.81* 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
tt2   -0.008* -0.006* 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade   0.05* 0.05* 
    (0.004) (0.005) 
Dtaxgdp   -0.13* -0.11* 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
ER   0.00 0.00 
    (0.00 ) (0.00) 
N 1701 1432 1709 1449 
No. countries 78 75  78 76 
Adjusted  R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.93 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
For equation 2, with TTgdp as the dependent variable, the same countries are 
missing information, except Israel.  While a positive and significant relationship 
is observed at the 95% level between population size and the share of trade 
revenue in GDP in Khattry and Rao’s regression, a negative and significant 
relationship is found at the 99% and 95% level in both equations run for the 
reduced and extended time periods respectively.  The coefficients on the level 
of per capita income and the openness index are significant at the 95% and 
99% level, respectively, for both time periods.  It may also be observed that 
the relationship between the level of urbanisation and the share of tax revenue 
in GDP increased in significance from the 90% to the 95% level when the time 
period is extended to 2006. 
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Table 2-3: Comparison of Khattry and Rao Equation 1 Coefficients with Eq. 1 Regression Estimates, 
TRgdp 
Variables Khattry & Rao 
Coefficients 
Regression 
Coefficients 1972-
1998 
Regression 
Coefficients 1972-
2006 
lnpopit   +** -* -** 
ln GDPpcit + +** +** 
depit - + - 
urbpopit +* +*** +** 
ttit +* +* +* 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***-significance at 90% level. 
With respect to Equation 2, which has the share of trade taxes in GDP as the 
dependent variable, when the similar time frame (1972-1998) is applied, 
domestic taxes as a per cent of GDP has a negative and significant relationship 
with the share of taxes on international trade in GDP.  (See Tables 2-3 and 2-4 
for a comparison of regression coefficients.)  This concurs with the significant 
negative relationship that Khattry and Rao estimate in their model and this is 
also found in the extended model.  In addition, the level of urbanisation was 
estimated to have a significant negative relationship with Taxes on 
International Trade over the period 1972-1998.  Khattry and Rao (2002) found 
a negative but insignificant relationship for this variable.  A positive and 
significant relationship was found between TTgdp and the dependency ratio at 
the 95% level of significance for both time periods.  The exchange rate variable 
(ER) was not found to be significant for both time frames. 
Table 2-4: Comparison of Khattry and Rao Equation 2 (TTgdp) Coefficients with Regression Results 
Variables Khattry and Rao 
Coefficients 
Regression Coefficients  
1972-1998 
Regression Coefficients 
1972-2006 
ttit +* +* +* 
ttit2 -* -* -* 
ERit + + + 
lnpopit   +* -  - 
ln GDPpcit + -*** -** 
depit + +** +** 
urbpopit - -* -* 
tradeit +* +* +* 
Dtaxgdpit -* -* -* 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***-significance at 90% level 
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While Khattry and Rao (2002) found a positive but insignificant relationship 
between GDP per capita and total trade taxes as a share of GDP, the regression 
coefficient for this variable for both time periods was found to be negative and 
significant; that is, as per capita income increases, one is likely to observe a 
decrease in the proportion of international trade taxes in GDP.  This result is 
consistent with economic theory and observed patterns discussed in Section 
2.3.2 where countries with higher levels of income tend to have lower 
proportion of trade tax revenue in GDP due to diversification of sources of 
taxation and other factors.  Additionally, a negative and insignificant 
relationship was found between population size and taxes on international 
trade.  This result was inconsistent with the positive and significant 
relationship found by Khattry and Rao (2002).  This may be explained by the 
different samples used.  Barbados, Israel, Myanmar, Paraguay and Singapore 
are missing from the model run for 1972-1998 when compared to Khattry and 
Rao’s sample.  
2.4.3 Specification Tests 
The Hausman test was conducted on both Equations 1 and 2 to see if a random 
effects estimator would be more appropriate than a fixed effects estimator.  
The results of the test on Equation 2 show that the coefficients estimated by 
the efficient random effects estimator are not the same as the ones estimated 
by the consistent fixed effects estimator.  In this case, it is best to use a fixed 
effects model.  The test could not be performed on Equation 1 as the data 
failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the test. 
The Wooldridge test for serial autocorrelation in panel data sets revealed that 
both equations have serial autocorrelation.  Heteroskedasticity is also present 
in both equations and so, robust standard errors are reported for the models.  
In addition, tests were conducted for non-linearity in the per capita income 
variable.  As shown in Figure 2-12, the predicted values of the natural log of 
per capita income (lnGDPpc) in the model are different from the lowess 
smoothing curve estimate.  This suggests that that the relationship is likely to 
be non-linear.  Equations were estimated including the square of per capita 
income, with results reported in Table 2-5.  The square term of per capita GDP 
is significant in all equations.  However, as all the values of the remaining 
parameters are similar in direction and significance as those observed in 
models without the squared term, it is clear that the linear estimator does not 
significantly bias the results.  The next section examines the differing effects of 
the model if countries are grouped by income.  
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Figure 2-12: Augmented Component Plus Residual Plot for lnGDPpc, Equation 1 
 
Table 2-5: Regression Results with the square of Per capita GDP, TRgdp and TTgdp 
All countries 
  Eq (1) Eq (1) 1972-
1998 
 Eq (2) Eq (2) 1972-
1998 
  TRgdp TRgdp TTgdp TTgdp 
lnpop    -5.95* -6.92* -3.27* -2.02* 
  (1.43) (1.54) (0.60) (0.75) 
lnGDPpc   9.96* 12.47* 9.04* 5.81* 
  (2.81) (3.57) (1.26) (1.49) 
lnGDPpc2   -0.65* -0.82* -0.67* -0.44* 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.08) (0.10) 
Dep   -0.78 0.54 2.20* 2.21** 
  (1.76) (1.96) (0.71) (0.87) 
Urbpop    0.10* 0.10* -0.03* -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
tt    0.26* 0.31* 0.90* 0.81* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
tt2   -0.008* -0.006* 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade   0.05* 0.05* 
    (0.004) (0.005) 
Dtaxgdp   -0.13* -0.10* 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
ER   0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
N 1701 1432 1709 1449 
No. countries 78 75  78 76 
Adjusted  R2 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***-significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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2.4.4 Breakdown by Country Group 
 
There are likely to be differences in the relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables for individual country groups – low income, lower 
middle income, upper middle income and high income.  Tables 2-6 and 2-7 
show the results of regression run for Equations 1 and 2 respectively for each 
country grouping.  For Equation 1, the openness index and the level of 
urbanization are the only variables that exhibit a consistent (positive) 
relationship with the share of tax revenue in GDP across country groups.  With 
respect to the openness index, the relationship is not significant for the high 
income group.  In contrast, the level of urbanisation is found to be a significant 
variable for only the low income group.  Country size, as indicated by total 
population, has a positive relationship with TRgdp that is significant for low 
income countries.  At the same time, a negative relationship is observed for 
the three other categories of countries, with the lower middle income and high 
income categories showing a significant relationship at the 90% and 99% level, 
respectively, between population size and the share of trade revenue in GDP. 
Table 2-6: Equation 1 Regression by Country Group, TRgdp 
 Eq (1)  TRgdp 1972-2006 
 
  Low Income Lower Middle 
Income 
Upper Middle 
Income 
High Income 
lnpop    17.20* -5.42*** -0.87 -0.75* 
  (2.62) (3.08) (4.75) (2.57) 
lnGDPpc   5.53* 1.80*** -0.19 -3.99* 
  (0.84) (1.03) (1.26) (1.32) 
Dep   11.01* -6.09 -11.16** -17.35* 
  (2.42) (3.98) (5.12) (4.27) 
Urbpop    0.39* 0.08 0.09 0.03 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) 
tt    0.22* 0.92* 0.27** 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.08) (0.13) (0.03) 
N 390 490 274 547 
No. of countries 18 21 12 27 
Adjusted  R2 0.90 0.80 0.61 0.93 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The relationship between GDP per capita and TRgdp is positive and significant 
for low income and lower middle income countries but negative for upper 
middle income and high income countries, with significance being observed 
only in the case of the latter group.  The dependency ratio shows a negative 
and significant relationship for upper middle income, and high income groups.  
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A negative relationship is also seen for lower middle income countries but this 
is not significant. On the other hand, a significant positive relationship is seen 
for low income countries. 
With respect to Equation 2 which seeks to quantify the relationship between 
Taxes on international trade as a share of GDP (TTgdp) and variables such as 
population size, per capita GDP, and Trade as a per cent of GDP (Table 2-7), the 
variations across income groups observed for equation 1 are also seen.  
Population size has a positive and insignificant relationship with the share of 
trade taxes in GDP for low income and high income countries; while the 
relationship is negative for lower middle income and upper middle income 
countries.  Significance is only observed for the upper middle income category. 
Table 2-7: Equation 2 Regression by Country Group, TTgdp 
   
Eq (2)  TTgdp 1972-2006 
  Low Income Lower Middle 
Income 
Upper Middle 
Income 
High Income 
lnpop    0.25 -0.66 -5.49* 0.27 
  (1.35) (0.99) (1.36) (1.14) 
lnGDPpc   0.16 -0.37 -2.85* -1.09* 
  (0.40) (0.32) (0.52) (0.39) 
Dep   0.66 -2.53** -3.45** -0.43 
  (1.08) (1.02) (1.34) (1.97) 
Urbpop    -0.10* -0.03 0.01 -0.03*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
tt    0.40* 0.88* 0.51* 1.56* 
  (0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) 
tt2 -0.003* -0.005 -0.003 -0.02* 
  (0.0008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) 
Trade 0.08* 0.06* 0.01* 0.04* 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Dtaxgdp -0.17* -0.14* -0.06 -0.09* 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
ER 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 396 467 274 572 
No. of countries 18 21 12 27 
Adjusted  R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.97 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
With respect to GDP per capita, lower middle, upper middle and high income 
country groups show a negative, but significant only for the last two categories, 
relationship with TTgdp.  A positive relationship and insignificant relationship 
is observed for the low income group. 
The dependency ratio varies inversely with the level of international trade 
taxes for lower middle income, upper middle income and high income 
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(insignificant) countries.  For low income countries, the relationship seen is 
positive and insignificant. 
The level of urbanisation is shown to have a negative relationship with the level 
of international trade taxes for low, lower middle and high income country 
groups, with significance at the 99% level for the low income countries and at 
the 90% level for high income countries; the relationship is not significant for 
lower middle income and high income countries.  For the upper middle income 
group, the relationship observed is positive but insignificant. 
The coefficients on the openness index and trade as a percentage of GDP are 
positive and significant at the 99% level for all country groups.  This implies 
that regardless of the level of development, increases in exports plus imports 
as a per cent of GDP generally imply an increase in the level of international 
trade taxes as a per cent of GDP.  However, an increase in the openness index, 
“tt”, means that there is a higher ratio of trade tax revenue to total trade.  
Therefore as “tt” increases, the economy becomes less open), the positive 
coefficient on the openness index suggests that international trade tax as a 
percent of GDP is likely to rise as an economy becomes less open. 
Domestic taxes as a per cent of GDP have a negative and significant 
relationship with TTgdp for low, lower middle, and high income countries.  A 
negative but insignificant relationship is observed for upper middle income 
countries.  Although the estimated coefficient is very small, the Exchange Rate 
variable is significant for low income and lower middle income countries, at 
the 95% and 99% level respectively, but insignificant for upper middle income 
and high income countries. 
Table 2-8 shows the results of running both equations for only developing 
countries, that is, countries in the high income category were left out.  These 
regressions yield results that are generally similar to those obtained by Khattry 
and Rao (2002) for both models.  However, there is now a positive relationship 
between population size and the share of international trade tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP (TTgdp). All other signs remain unchanged.  With respect 
to the Total Revenue equation (TRgdp), the coefficients on the population size 
and dependency variables have changed to positive, with the other signs 
remaining unchanged. 
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Table 2-8: Regressions without high income countries, TRgdp and TTgdp 
  Eq (1) Eq (1) 
1972-1998 
  Eq (2) Eq (2) 1972-
1998 
  TRgdp TRgdp   TTgdp TTgdp 
lnpop    4.45* 5.51*  0.94 1.13*** 
  (1.70) (2.04)  (0.60) (0.68) 
lnGDPpc   1.87* 2.86*  -0.84* -0.72** 
  (0.67) (0.81)  (0.27) (0.28) 
Dep   0.02 2.53  2.24* 1.76** 
  (1.99) (2.15)  (0.67) (0.81) 
Urbpop    0.04 0.02  -0.06* -0.05* 
  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) 
tt    0.35* 0.42*  0.58* 0.59* 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) 
tt2    -0.005* -0.004* 
     (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Trade    0.04* 0.05* 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
Dtaxgdp    -0.12* -0.11* 
     (0.03) (0.03) 
ER    0.00 0.00*** 
     (0.00 ) (0.00) 
N 1154 966  1137 958 
No. of countries 51 50  51 50 
Adjusted  R2 0.81 0.82  0.92 0.93 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
These models have examined fully the effects of liberalisation using the fixed 
effects model of Khattry and Rao (2002).  It has been shown that this model is 
robust to changes in time periods and has varying effects depending on the 
country group under study.  One consistent finding across all models is that 
the openness index has a positive relationship with both Total Tax Revenue 
and Trade Tax Revenue as a share of GDP.  Due to its construction, an increase 
in the index means that the economy is becoming less open and therefore the 
results in this case suggest that as an economy becomes less open, trade tax 
revenue and total tax revenue as a share of GDP increases.  This finding will be 
further examined given the challenges with using the openness index (tt) and 
the next section will present alternative measures that could be used, such as 
the traditional indicator of openness – trade as a per cent of GDP, and event 
analysis.   
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2.5 Addressing Endogeneity in the Model 
Khattry and Rao (2002) use “tt” as a new measure of openness.  This variable 
is the ratio between total international trade taxes and total trade.  For them, 
a decrease in this ratio means greater openness.  This indicator has certain 
challenges with respect to measuring the concept of openness.  In the first 
instance, Khattry and Rao themselves note that there is the potential criticism 
that this measure is endogenous with respect to the dependent variable (total 
trade taxes as a share of GDP).  They note the potential solutions such as using 
instrumental variables (Lee (1993); Frankel and Romer (1999)) but find that 
findings from these studies are not superior to measures that use tariffs 
directly.  This criticism could be avoided by using the traditional indicator of 
openness – trade as a percentage of GDP – in their models. 
They also note other potential shortcomings of using this “index of openness”, 
including possible underestimation of the Laffer effect of peak tariffs and of 
the impact of smuggling and other tax evasion efforts.  Specifically, the 
composition of the indicator with total trade as the denominator and taxes on 
international trade as the numerator does not adequately capture cases where 
there may be a reduction in the tariff that leads to an increase in international 
trade tax revenue.  This would result in an increase in the openness index, “tt”, 
ceteris paribus.  However, the economy in this case did not become less open.  
Khattry and Rao (2002) counter this criticism by arguing that changes in trade 
volume (the denominator) reflect the net effect of policy changes and 
exogenous factors and therefore, the index accommodates instances such as 
these.  This argument should be rejected as the relative effect depends on the 
extent to which there has been an increase in marginal trade tax revenue vis-
á-vis total trade.  Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) also point out that this measure is 
limited in its application as a close relationship is not directly observed 
between changes in exports and trade liberalisation. 
Greenaway and Milner (1991) note that the net effect of a tariff reduction is 
dependent on the initial tariff and the elasticity of demand for imports over 
the tariff range in question.  Trade tax revenue will increase if the initial tariff 
is above the revenue maximising rate.  They also note external effects of 
liberalisation such as reducing the incentive for smuggling thereby increasing 
compliance and the tax base.  A reduction in trade tax revenue would result if 
the initial tariff is below the revenue maximizing rate.  For Greenaway and 
Milner (1991), the net effect of tariff liberalisation is dependent on the location 
of existing rates in relation to the revenue maximising rate, the shares of the 
respective imports in total imports, and relevant individual own and cross price 
elasticities of demand and supply – a very complex issue.   
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2.5.1 Trade as a share of GDP as the indicator of openness 
In order to test its usefulness and to address the problem of endogeneity, 
Equations 1 and 2 were run for both time periods excluding the openness 
index, “tt”, and using the one-year lag of Trade as a per cent of GDP. Trade as 
a share of GDP itself could be seen as being endogenous to the model as it is 
also dependent on changes in GDP along with the dependent variables – 
international trade taxes (TTgdp) and total tax revenue (TRgdp) as shares of 
GDP.   Lagging the variable removes the contemporaneous relationship among 
the variables and is one way to address this issue.  In addition to the one-year 
lag, regressions were also run with the three-year lag of Trade as a share of 
GDP to test for sensitivity of the time period chosen.   
 
Table 2-9: Regressions using 1-year lag of Trade, TRgdp and TTgdp 
All countries 
  Eq. 1 (1972-
2006) 
Eq. 1  (1972-
1998) 
 Eq. 2  (1972-
2006) 
Eq. 2  (1972-1998) 
  TRgdp TRgdp TTgdp TTgdp 
lnpop    -9.16* -8.25* -5.68* -2.44 
  (1.02) (1.12) (1.06) (1.56) 
lnGDPpc   -0.92 -0.42 -2.82* -2.16* 
  (0.58) (0.73) (0.35) (0.40) 
Dep   -2.37 -0.43 3.91* 1.97 
  (1.68) (1.99) (1.16) (1.44) 
Urbpop    0.08* 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tradet-1 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dtaxgdp   -0.29* -0.27* 
    (0.04) (0.05) 
ER   0.00* 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2077 1681 1713 1447 
 No. of 
countries 
78 76 78 76 
Adjusted  
R2 
0.93 0.93 0.74 0.76 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
With respect to Equation 1 with Tax Revenue as a percentage of GDP as the 
dependent variable, the Adjusted R-squared value remains high for the 
equation without “tt” at 0.93 (see Table 2-9).  This suggests that the model 
does not lose much of its explanatory power if “tt” is dropped and replaced by 
Trade.  The one-year lag of Trade as a share of GDP is shown to have a positive 
and significant relationship (at the 99% level) with the Tax Revenue as a per 
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cent of GDP.  A negative and significant relationship is found between the 
share of tax revenue and population size; while a positive and significant 
relationship is found with respect to the level of urbanisation (at the 99% level 
of significance). The dependency ratio and the level of per capita income have 
negative but insignificant relationships with the share of tax revenue in GDP.  
When the reduced time period is applied to the equation, population size 
remains a significant variable in the model and the level of urbanisation is no 
longer a significant variable.  
For the extended time period with the one-year lag of Trade as a share of GDP 
(Tradet-1) as the only indicator of openness in Equation 2, significant negative 
relationships were found between the share of Taxes on International Trade in 
GDP and population size, the level of per capita income, and the share of 
domestic taxes on GDP – all at the 99% level.  Significant positive relationships 
were found with respect to the dependency ratio, and Trade as a per cent of 
GDP.  Hence, by this estimate, higher trade means higher taxes on 
international trade, ceteris paribus.  Additionally, when the time period is 
reduced, two variables lose their significance: population size, and the 
dependency ratio.  The exchange rate is not significant in either time period.  
The adjusted R-squared falls substantially in the model without “tt”, however.  
This is not surprising, given the significant correlation between TTgdp and “tt” 
because of the inclusion of the value of taxes on international trade as an 
element in both variables.  
Another variation of the model in Equation 2 was undertaken by excluding the 
one-year lag of Trade as a per cent of GDP as an independent variable.  Thus, 
“tt” and its square was the only indicator of openness.  The results are reported 
in Table 2-10 and are different from those obtained in earlier estimates with 
respect to the fact that in this estimation, population size, the level of per 
capita income, and the dependency ratio do not have a significant relationship 
with the share of international trade taxes in total trade.  The significant 
variables for both time periods are the level of urbanisation, the openness 
index and its square, the share of domestic taxes in GDP, and the exchange 
rate variable.   
It should be noted that the removal of the openness variable has a greater 
impact on Equation 2 than on Equation 1.  This is expected given the high 
degree of correlation between the dependent variable (TTgdp) and the 
openness index (tt) and the endogeneity issues associated therewith.  
Importantly, the revised regressions with the one-year lag of the traditional 
indicator of openness (Trade as a share of GDP) indicate that an increase in 
international trade increases trade tax revenue and total tax revenue.  This is 
contrary to Khattry and Rao’s (2002) finding that an increase in openness 
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negatively affects trade tax revenue and total tax revenue.  The digression 
suggests that the tt openness index may not be an adequate indicator to 
capture the effects of liberalisation on tax revenue.   
Table 2-10: Equation 2 without Trade, TTgdp 
  1972-2006  1972-1998 
  TTgdp TTgdp 
lnpop    -0.62 -0.21 
  (0.55) (0.73) 
lnGDPpc   -0.07 0.001 
  (0.27) (0.32) 
Dep   1.14 1.30 
  (0.78) (0.98) 
Urbpop    -0.04* -0.03** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
tt    0.85* 0.76* 
  (0.05) (0.06) 
tt2 -0.007* -0.005* 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade ------ ------ 
    
Dtaxgdp -0.15* -0.10* 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
ER 0.00* 0.00** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
N 1709 1449 
    
Adjusted  R2 0.89 0.91 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
In addition, the findings are sensitive to the lag chosen for Trade as a share of 
GDP (see Table 2-11).  The three-year lag of Trade as a share of GDP is 
significant at the 95% level for Equation 1, with TRgdp as the dependent 
variable, over the period 1972-2006.  However, income as measured by GDP 
per capita and the dependency ratio are now significant variables.  The results 
for the reduced time period (1972-1998) are not sensitive to a change in the 
lag of trade as a share of GDP as the results remain the same.  Only population 
size and the three-year lag of Trade as share of GDP are significant for this time 
period. 
With respect to Equation 2, with TTgdp as the dependent variable, the results 
are not sensitive to a change in lag value of Trade as a share of GDP to three 
years.  Population size, per capita income, the dependency ratio, domestic 
taxes as a share of GDP and the exchange rate all remain as significant variables 
with similar directional relationships as the equation with the one-year lag of 
Trade as a share of GDP.  The results are the same when the time period is 
reduced to 1972-1998. 
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 Table 2-11: Regressions using 3-year lag of Trade, TRgdp and TTgdp 
All countries 
  Eq. 1 (1972-
2006) 
Eq. 1  (1972-
1998) 
 Eq. 2  (1972-
2006) 
Eq. 2  (1972-1998) 
  TRgdp TRgdp TTgdp TTgdp 
lnpop    -9.48* -8.78* -6.66* -3.53** 
  (1.05) (1.19) (1.13) (1.70) 
lnGDPpc   -1.09**** -0.79 -2.89* -2.01* 
  (0.60) (0.76) (0.39) (0.45) 
Dep   -3.25*** -2.03 3.68* 1.40 
  (1.70) (2.03) (1.20) (1.55) 
Urbpop    0.08* 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tradet-3 0.02** 0.03* 0.02* 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) 
Dtaxgdp   -0.30* -0.27* 
    (0.04) (0.05) 
ER   0.00* 0.00** 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2022 1618 1659 1389 
 No. of 
countries 
78 76 78 76 
Adjusted  
R2 
0.93 0.94 0.73 0.76 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
The next chapter will apply one other method - event analysis - to the question 
of the impact of liberalisation on taxes on tax revenue.  This will assist in 
evaluating the validity of findings of these models. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined two techniques to analyse the fiscal implications of 
trade liberalisation.  Both are set in a fixed effects panel regression model – 
the difference lies in the measurement of tariff liberalisation (openness).  In 
the first instance, equations 1 and 2, with dependent variables as tax revenue 
as a share of GDP and international trade tax revenue as a share of GDP, 
respectively, were run for two time periods (1972-1998 and 1972-2006).  The 
results suggest a negative relationship between trade liberalisation, as 
measured by the openness index, and international trade tax and total tax 
revenue.  All variables, but for the dependency ratio, are significant in Equation 
1 for both time periods.  With the exception of the population size variable and 
the coefficient on the dependency ratio for the reduced time period, all signs 
of coefficients are similar to those obtained by Khattry and Rao (2002).  The 
results suggest that the share of tax revenue in GDP increases with advances 
in level of urbanization, per capita income, and a fall in an economy’s openness 
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(an increase in the openness index means an economy is becoming less open).  
On the other hand, in contrast to Khattry and Rao’s (2002) finding, the 
regression results indicate that the share of tax revenue in GDP is likely to fall 
as population size increases.    With respect to Equation 2, the results show 
that the share of international trade tax revenue in GDP is likely to fall as 
domestic taxes as a per cent of GDP, and the level of urbanisation increases.    
Additionally, it is observed that as per capita income, and the age-dependency 
ratio increase, one is likely to observe an increase in the proportion of 
international trade taxes in GDP. 
In order to determine any variations due to differing levels of development, 
these models were then analysed by country group.    The results show that 
the share of tax revenue in GDP is likely to fall as an economy becomes more 
open.  For Equation 1, the openness index is one of two variables (the other 
being the level of urbanisation) that exhibit a consistent (positive) relationship 
with the share of tax revenue in GDP across country groups.   Importantly, the 
results suggest that international trade tax revenue tends to fall over time as 
a country develops (level of per capita income increases).  For equation 2, the 
coefficients on the openness index and trade as a percentage of GDP are 
positive and significant for all country groups.  The positive coefficient on trade 
as a percentage of GDP implies that regardless of the level of development, 
increases in exports plus imports as a per cent of GDP generally imply an 
increase in the level of international trade taxes as a per cent of GDP.  
However, in contrast, as an increase in the openness index means that an 
economy is becoming less open, the positive coefficient on the openness index 
suggests that international trade tax as a percent of GDP is likely to rise as an 
economy becomes less open.  The model also predicts that trade tax revenue 
is likely to fall as domestic taxes as a per cent of GDP increase.  This relationship 
is significant for low, lower middle, and high income countries and suggests 
that domestic taxes are one avenue through which countries may recoup lost 
trade tax revenue as a result of trade liberalisation. 
As both models utilised by Khattry and Rao (2002) contain an openness index 
which presents certain challenges, including the potential for endogeneity 
within the model, the model was varied to utilise an alternative measure of 
openness - trade as a per cent of GDP. It should be noted that Trade as a share 
of GDP is also endogenous within the models as the dependent variables are 
also conditioned on GDP.  The method chosen to address this was to lag Trade 
as a share of GDP for one and three-year periods.  Choosing two different lags 
allowed for testing for robustness of results to the time period chosen. When 
the one-year lag of Trade as a percent of GDP is used as the indicator of 
openness, the results show a positive relationship between openness, and 
trade and total tax revenue as a share of GDP for both equations; that is, trade 
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tax revenue and total tax revenue are likely to increase as an economy 
becomes more open.  This suggests that the models are sensitive to the 
indicator of openness used.  In addition, the final effect of trade liberalisation 
is difficult to predict and is dependent on a variety of factors that may be 
difficult to capture in one model.  Except for Equation 1 with total tax revenue 
(TRgdp) for the time period, 1972-1998, the results are not sensitive to the lag 
value chosen.  One can therefore use the one-year lag which provides greater 
degrees of freedom and more power to the results. 
Given the findings from these models, it is clear that there is much room for 
further analysis in this area to find better ways of measuring the net impact of 
liberalisation on government revenue.   The analysis could be extended to 
examine the impact of lowering tariffs as against eliminating non-tariff 
barriers, for example.  In addition, there could be further breakdown of the 
different components of trade taxes, by import taxes and export taxes, for 
example, to see how the liberalisation process impacts each component. There 
is also room to analyse the net effect of trade liberalisation by using a general 
equilibrium model that can take account of the impact of relative prices and 
demand for final and intermediate goods as a result of changes in the price 
level due to adjustments in the tariff structure.  
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APPENDIX 2A - COUNTRIES IN EQUATIONS 1 AND 2 
 
Low Income  Lower Middle Income 
Bangladesh  Bhutan   
Burkina Faso  Cameroon  
Burundi  Colombia   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Congo, Rep.  
Gambia, The  Dominican Republic  
Ghana  Ecuador   
India  Egypt, Arab Rep.  
Kenya  Fiji   
Liberia  Guyana   
Madagascar  Jordan   
Malawi  Lesotho   
Myanmar  Morocco   
Nepal  Nicaragua  
Pakistan  Paraguay   
Papua New Guinea  Peru   
Sierra Leone  Philippines  
Uganda  Sri Lanka   
Zambia  Swaziland   
Zimbabwe  Syrian Arab Republic 
  Thailand   
  Tunisia   
     
Upper Middle Income High Income  
Argentina  Australia Japan  
Botswana  Austria Korea, Rep. 
Brazil  Barbados Luxembourg 
Chile  Belgium Malta  
Costa Rica  Canada Netherlands 
Malaysia  Cyprus New Zealand 
Mauritius  Denmark Norway  
Mexico  Finland Portugal  
Panama  France Singapore 
South Africa  Greece Spain  
Turkey  Iceland Sweden  
Uruguay  Ireland Switzerland 
  Israel United Kingdom 
  Italy United States 
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APPENDIX 2B: CORRELATION MATRICES 
 
Table 2-12: Correlation Matrix for Equation 1 
 TRgdp lnpop lnGDPpc tt Dep Urbpop 
TRgdp 1.0000      
lnpop -0.1369 1.0000     
lnGDPpc 0.6729 -0.0045 1.0000    
Tt -0.1332 0.0121 -0.5043 1.0000   
Dep -0.4799 -0.1115 -0.7801 0.4047 1.0000  
Urbpop 0.5111 0.0258 0.8372 -0.4306 -0.6787 1.0000 
 
Table 2-13: Correlation Matrix for Equation 2 
 
 TTgdp lnpop lnGDPpc tt tt2 DTaxgdp Trade ER Dep Urbpop 
TTgdp 1.00          
lnpop -0.32 1.00         
lnGDPpc -0.27 -0.03 1.00        
tt 0.72 0.02 -0.47 1.00       
tt2 0.52 0.04 -0.21 0.83 1.00      
DTaxgdp -0.09 -0.05 0.51 -0.11 0.13 1.00     
Trade 0.34 -0.57 0.15 -0.14 -0.09 0.03 1.00    
ER -0.04 0.06 0.005 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 1.00   
Dep 0.28 -0.10 -0.78 0.38 0.16 -0.43 -0.11 -0.04 1.00  
Urbpop -0.25 -0.01 0.84 -0.41 -0.20 0.47 0.15 0.02 -0.67 1.00 
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3. EVENTS ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The impact of trade reform on fiscal revenue can be measured in various ways 
but a key variable to consider is the definition of trade reform itself.  Some 
models have used the degree of openness as an indicator of trade reform.  
Openness indicators include, for example, a change in exports plus imports as 
a share of GDP or the openness index (the ratio of total trade tax revenue to 
the value of total trade as in Khattry and Rao (2002) and Chapter 2), that 
indicate a country’s general orientation towards the world.  Researchers utilise 
an openness variable to examine the impact of trade reform on fiscal revenue, 
taking into account other variables such as population size and the 
dependency ratio.  The vast majority of these models measure liberalisation 
over time although trade liberalisation was often driven by economic shocks 
and externally imposed under loan agreements with multilateral lending 
institutions.  As a condition of the loans, countries (mainly developing) were 
required to undergo a series of reforms, including trade liberalisation.  In these 
cases, trade liberalisation can be linked to specific periods when these reforms 
occur.   
In this case, one can analyse the impact of trade liberalisation directly by 
observing the changes in key variables, such as total tax revenue and trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP, in the period before and after liberalisation.  Events 
analysis is a valid methodology for conducting this analysis as it takes into 
account the context within which reforms occurred and how that may have 
affected the composition, pace and sequencing of reforms.  This chapter 
explores this methodology and applies it to an analysis of the impact of trade 
liberalisation on total tax revenue and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP.  It 
compares the results from these models to those obtained in Chapter 2 in 
order to evaluate robustness of findings.   
Chapter 3 also explores the issue of heterogeneity within the sample, 
specifically relating to the varying levels of development among countries and 
the treatment of export taxes by individual countries over the time period and 
their impact on the liberalisation experience and fiscal revenue.  The fact that 
developing countries often undertook trade reforms as part of a lending 
programme with the Fund or the World Bank means that their liberalisation 
experience is likely to be different from countries that liberalised with no 
external impetus.  For example, the pace of liberalisation may have been more 
aggressive for those countries in a reform programme when compared to 
those that liberalised on their own timetable, leaving them vulnerable to 
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shocks to fiscal revenue.  This chapter analyses the models in terms of 
developing and developed countries in order to explore these issues and to see 
if there is any empirical basis for these inferences. 
In addition, export taxes constitute a relatively small proportion of total trade 
tax revenue for most countries.  However, for those countries where export 
taxes constitute a large proportion of government revenue, it may be argued 
that they may seek to implement a reform programme that aims to minimise 
the impact on export tax revenue.  In this case, they may therefore be willing 
to reduce import taxes at a much faster rate and decrease export taxes more 
slowly when compared to countries that do not have a high proportion of 
export tax to total trade tax revenue.  Moreover, under IMF and World Bank 
reform programmes, export taxes were often targeted in the first phase of 
reform; thus, putting even more pressure on those countries with significant 
export tax revenue levels.  In this context, it would be interesting to see if there 
are significant differences in fiscal revenue of those countries over time when 
compared to other countries. 
Chapter 3 starts by providing an overview of the events measures that will be 
used in the study.  It then goes on to explore the correlation between the 
events measures and the fiscal revenue indicators – total tax revenue and 
trade tax revenue.  The results from the regression models are then analysed.  
The next section goes on to explore heterogeneity within the sample based on 
the level of income and dependence on export taxes.  The chapter then 
concludes by summarising the main findings and implications for future work. 
3.2 Measuring Events 
There are several approaches to measuring events.  Some include composite 
indices, while others explore specific indicators of a particular event.  All of 
them involve a subjective assessment, to some extent, of the variables to be 
used as an event indicator and the date the event occurred.  An events 
indicator may be viewed as being exogenous to the model as it is less likely to 
be correlated over time with trade and total tax revenue as a share of GDP.  
Indeed, for developing countries, liberalisation events occur oftentimes as part 
of package of reforms under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World 
Bank.  One may therefore be able to use a dummy variable such as the date 
when a country entered into a structural adjustment loan with the World Bank 
(Greenaway et al. (2002)).  Using indicators related to a specific year or event, 
however, may present challenges because liberalisation takes place over time 
and there may be years when an economy is perceived to be open but a change 
in government or other external factors alter the movement towards 
liberalisation.  Although these issues are recognized, events analysis is still 
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useful to examine liberalisation through a different lens.  This chapter draws 
upon the work of Sachs and Warner (1995), Dean et al. (1994), and Greenaway 
et al. (2002) to identify the year of liberalisation events and apply the analysis 
in an econometric model to assess the impact of these events on government 
revenue. 
With respect to composite indices, the Sachs-Warner index is one of the most 
often cited work in empirical studies.  Sachs and Warner (2005) develop a 
composite indicator of the degree of openness of thirty-four countries using 
five criteria.  A country is judged to be closed if it had: 
1. Nontariff barriers (NTBs) that apply to 40% or more of its trade. 
2. Average tariff rates greater than 40%. 
3. A black market exchange rate that deviated from the official exchange rate 
by 20% or more, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s. 
4. A socialist economic system. 
5. A state monopoly on major exports. 
The liberalisation date is set from the year at which the economy is deemed to 
be continually open until the end of the sample period of the study in 1994.  
Sachs and Warner (1995) note that there are limitations to the methodology 
used such as the subjective dating of the liberalisation event and the arbitrary 
levels of indicator thresholds.  In addition, there is the criticism that the Sachs-
Warner index ascribes a discrete value (either liberalisation occurred or it did 
not) to a process that usually lasts several years (David (2008)).  Other 
challenges include the lack of significance and small magnitude of the effect of 
tariffs and quotas in the index once all its constituents are separated (Harrison 
and Hanson (1999) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001).  While the index is an 
imperfect measure (as are all indicators of openness), it is useful and relevant 
as it includes features that are typical of a closed economy and can therefore 
be used to compare and contrast the effect of liberalisation with open 
economies.   
Alternatively, studies such as Dean et al. (1994) evaluate the individual 
components of trade reform and therefore, do not face criticism on conflating 
several factors in one index as seen in Sachs-Warner (1995).  They assess 
changes in tariffs, non-tariff barriers, foreign exchange controls, and export 
impediments in thirty-two countries from 1982 to 1993 in South and East Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa.  Data include changes in the level, range, and 
dispersion of tariffs, and the extent of quantitative restrictions. Based on the 
changes in these variables, a year(s) of liberalisation is derived for each 
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country.  As is often the case in studies of this nature, there is some subjectivity 
in ascribing the year of reform given that there are several indicators that may 
not be all pointing in the same direction at the same time. 
There is also the use of a relatively simple policy proxy dummies, such as the 
date of signature of a country’s Structural Adjustment Loan with the World 
Bank.  Measures such as these do not directly measure the liberalisation 
experience; however, a structural adjustment loan may be seen as an indicator 
of a country’s intent to liberalise (based on the policy conditionalities of the 
loan) and thus, provide an indicator that is not directly correlated with trade 
tax revenue and total tax revenue.  Greenaway et al. (2002) utilise such an 
approach in their analysis of liberalisation events.  
The event measures are distinct and are not interchangeable as most provide 
different estimates of the liberalisation event even for the same countries.  In 
fact, only Venezuela records the same year of liberalization for all three 
measures and another two countries – Ghana and Costa Rica - have a variance 
of one year among the event indicators.  The analysis in this section treats each 
event indicator separately and a judgement is not made on the superiority of 
one measure over the other.  This approach is useful as it tests the robustness 
of these measures across time and may provide an indication of the main 
factors that influence trade tax and total tax revenue, in general, as the event 
indicators measure liberalisation differently.  
Similar to Greenaway et al. (2002), we include two variations of the Dean et al. 
and the Sachs-Warner dummies in the regression models – one where the 
dummies take a value of 1 only in the year the event occurred and the other 
where the dummy takes the value of 1 in the year of liberalisation and for all 
subsequent years.  The event indicators replace the openness index in both 
equations estimated by Khattry and Rao (2002).  The model also incorporates 
lagged values of the Dean and Sachs-Warner variables.  Appendix 3A provides 
the list of the predominantly developing countries used in the sample and the 
date of liberalisation based on the three event indicators over the period 1972-
2006.  The next section analyses the data that will be used in the regression 
models. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Each event dummy is plotted against total trade tax revenue as a share of GDP 
to see if there is any pattern that can be observed.  With respect to the World 
Bank dummy, there is no clear pattern pre- and post-signature of a World Bank 
Structural Adjustment loan agreement (see Figure 3-1).  There are several 
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factors that may influence the relationship between a structural adjustment 
loan and total trade taxes as a share of GDP.  In the first instance, a reform 
programme is multi-faceted and the final impact on trade tax revenue and 
total tax revenue depends on the execution of the programme and the 
response of the economy to reforms.  For example, there may be a revenue-
enhancing component in the form of technical assistance in customs 
administration and at the same time, there is a requirement to reduce tariff 
peaks on luxury items which may have a negative effect on fiscal revenue.  At 
the same time, where tariff rates are above the revenue maximising rate, a 
reduction in rates may lead to increased revenue as consumers are 
incentivised to increase consumption.  The final effect on trade tax revenue 
depends on the interplay of all these and other factors.   
 
Figure 3-1: Scatterplot of Total Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and the World Bank Dummy 
The plot of trade tax revenue in GDP and the first Sachs-Warner dummy (SW1) 
shows that there appears to be a greater proportion of points below the 5% 
mark after trade liberalisation.  The Sachs-Warner dummy in this case takes 
the value of 0 before the year of liberalisation and 1 in the year of liberalisation 
and all the subsequent years.  It measures the average post reform effect of 
trade liberalisation on trade tax revenue as a share of GDP.  Although the data 
points post-liberalisation appear to be lower, it is not clear that total tax 
revenue as a share of GDP is significantly different after trade liberalisation.  
From Figure 3-2, it can be seen that trade liberalisation generally took place in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
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Figure 3-2: Scatterplot Total Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and the Sachs-Warner1 Dummy 
For liberalisation to have taken place using the Sachs-Warner measures, there 
would be less Nontariff barriers (NTBs), a significant reduction (>20%) in the 
black market exchange rate, a move from a socialist to a free market economy, 
and a removal of state monopolies on major exports.  The extent to which 
these measures generate positive effects depends on how they are 
implemented and existing economic structures.  For example, a removal or 
reduction in NTBs could be revenue enhancing if there is a complementary 
shift in trade facilitation that encourages imports.  Depending on individual 
elasticities of demand and supply of imports, one could see increased trade tax 
revenue.  On the other hand, if NTBs are removed but an anti-import stance 
remains, then one is not likely to see any positive effects on trade tax revenue.   
In addition, if there were taxes on exports that were previously collected by 
the state monopolies and export taxes are removed under trade reform, then 
it is likely that there would be a reduction in export taxes, and therefore trade 
taxes collected post-reform, all things being equal.  Another factor to consider 
is the broader macroeconomic environment.  If the rate of GDP growth 
exceeds that of trade tax revenue, then the share of tax revenue in GDP is likely 
to fall over time.   The Sachs-Warner index takes into account exchange rate 
changes and movement towards a capitalist economy which have direct 
impact on the macroeconomy and GDP.  One will therefore have to estimate 
the regression models to see how these factors affected the countries in the 
sample.  
Figure 3-3 plots data points where the second Sachs Warner dummy (SW2) 
takes a value of 0 in the years before and after trade liberalisation and 1 in the 
year of liberalisation itself.  This dummy seeks to capture the immediate 
impact of trade liberalisation on trade tax revenue and total revenue as a share 
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of GDP.  There is no clear immediate impact of trade liberalisation on the share 
of trade tax revenue in GDP.  The immediate impact depends on the nature of 
the reform programme, including factors such as the timing and sequencing of 
reforms.  If there are drastic movements in the exchange rate and immediate 
implementation of free market reforms, then immediate effects are more 
likely to be observed. However, if reforms are implemented over time (as is 
likely the case), then significant immediate effects are less likely to be 
observed.     
 
Figure 3-3: Scatterplot Total Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and the Sachs-Warner2 Dummy 
 
Figures 3-4 and 3-5 show a roughly similar picture to the scatterplots of trade 
tax revenue in GDP and the Sachs-Warner dummies.  The first Dean dummy 
(D1) measures the average effect of trade liberalisation on trade tax revenue 
and total tax revenue as a share of GDP over time.  Figure 3-4 shows that the 
share of trade tax revenue in GDP appears to be lower post trade reform.  The 
Dean measure is based on changes in tariffs, non-tariff barriers, foreign 
exchange controls, and export impediments.  The average impact of trade 
liberalisation on trade tax revenue in GDP therefore depends on the 
components of the trade reform, including timing and sequencing 
considerations.   In addition, one has to take account of the broader economic 
reform programme which affects GDP. 
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Figure 3-4: Scatterplot Total Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and the Dean1 Dummy 
In Figure 3-5, no clear difference is seen between trade tax revenue as a share 
of GDP in the year of liberalisation, as measured by the second Dean dummy 
(D2), and the years before and after trade reform.  Like the SW2 dummy, D2 
estimates the immediate impact of trade reform on trade tax revenue as a 
share of GDP.  The dummy takes a value of 0 in the years before and after trade 
reform, and 1 in the year of trade liberalisation.  The immediate impact of 
trade reform depends on how aggressive is the reform timetable, the nature 
of reforms, and the components of the broader economic reform programme, 
among other factors. 
 
Figure 3-5: Scatterplot Total Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and Dean2 Dummy 
 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
T
T
g
d
p
 (
%
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
TTgdp where Dean1=1 TTgdp where Dean1=0
Scatterplot Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and Dean1 Dummy
0
5
1
0
1
5
T
T
g
d
p
 (
%
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
TTgdp where Dean2=1 TTgdp where Dean2=0
Scatterplot Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP and Dean 2 Dummy
63 | P a g e  
 
 
3.4 Regression Model 
 
This chapter uses an events framework like that employed in Greenaway et al. 
(2002) to assess if there is any discernible impact of trade liberalisation on total 
tax revenue and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP before and after trade 
liberalisation.  The three dummy variables used to measure the liberalisation 
event are indices developed by Dean et al. (1994), and Sachs and Warner 
(1995), and a World Bank dummy which is based on the date that a country 
signed a  Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) with the World Bank.  The Dean et 
al. (1994) measure is based on a subjective assessment of the timing of 
liberalisation taking into account changes in tariffs, quotas, export measures, 
and exchange rates which assesses when liberalisation occurred in their 
sample of thirty-two developing countries.  The Sachs and Warner index, 
developed for thirty-four countries, assesses whether an economy is open or 
closed based upon movements in non-tariff barriers and average tariff levels; 
whether or not the country is socialist; the existence of state monopolies over 
key exports; and the difference between the official and black market 
exchange rates.   
These event dummies are included in a model with other independent 
variables that are shown to have influence total tax revenue and trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP.  These variables include population size, the level 
of urbanisation, per capita income and the dependency ratio. 
The model explaining Total Revenue as a share of GDP is: 
TRgdpit = a0 + a1 lnpopit + a2 ln GDPpcit + a3depit + a4urbpopit + a5Dit + γFE +  
δFE + eit               (3)  
where 
TRgdpit  is the share of tax revenue in GDP 
lnpopit  is the natural log of population size 
ln GDPpcit  is the natural log of per capita GDP 
depit   is the age-dependency ratio 
urbpopit  is the degree of urbanisation 
Dit  is a dummy variable indicating a liberalisation event, either 
using the Sachs-Warner (SW), Dean et al. (D), or World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Loan (WB) indicator 
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γFE is the fixed effect estimate that captures unobservable country 
effects 
δFE is the time fixed effect that captures unobservable changes that 
occur over time 
In addition, the model for Total Trade Tax Revenue as a share of GDP is given 
below: 
TTgdpit =  a0 + a1lnpopit + a2lnGDPpcit + a3depit + a4urbpopit + a5Dit + 
a6Dtaxgdpit + a8ERit +γFE + δFE + eit   (4)  
where 
TTgdpit  is the share of trade tax revenue in GDP 
lnpopit  is the natural log of population size 
ln GDPpcit  is the natural log of per capita GDP 
depit   is the age-dependency ratio 
urbpopit  is the degree of urbanisation 
Dit  is a dummy variable indicating a liberalisation event, either 
using the Sachs-Warner (SW), Dean et al. (D), or World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Loan (WB) indicator  
Dtaxgdpit is domestic taxes on goods and services as % of GDP 
ERit  is the exchange rate 
γFE is the fixed effect estimate that captures unobservable country 
effects 
δFE is the time fixed effect that captures unobservable changes that 
occur over time 
The dummy variables in the model take two variations.  In the first variation, 
the dummies take the value of 0 in the years preceding trade liberalisation and 
1 for the year of liberalisation and all subsequent years (SW1, D1, WB1).  The 
coefficient on these dummy variables therefore captures the average post-
reform effect of trade liberalisation on the share of total tax revenue and trade 
tax revenue.  The second variation of the dummy variable only takes a value of 
1 in the year of liberalisation itself (SW2, D2, WB2), thus capturing the 
immediate impact on the share of trade tax and total tax revenue in GDP.  The 
dummies are also lagged by one and two years to assess if there are any short-
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term effects on trade tax and total tax revenue related to the liberalisation 
event.   
Robust standard errors are used as heteroskedasticity is present in both 
equations. 
A Priori Expectations 
There are many competing factors at play that affect the impact of tariff 
liberalisation on fiscal revenue, in large part due to the varying forms that trade 
reform can be implemented.  Reform can comprise the removal of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions up front or over a phased period.  Quantitative 
restrictions may also be changed to tariffs. Trade reform often comprises 
multiple facets that are implemented simultaneously or sequentially.  It is 
therefore difficult to predict the final impact; however, the analysis of a priori 
expectations can be framed in the context of the likely impacts of the measure. 
One can predict that the share of trade tax revenue in GDP is likely to have an 
inverse relationship with a country’s level of economic development.  As a 
country becomes more developed, tax systems mature, administrative 
experience and efficiencies are gained, and thus other sources of revenue 
become much more significant than trade tax revenue.  In addition, there may 
be greater need for cash transactions and a change in the composition of 
imports needed for production as an economy develops leading to a 
movement away from trade taxes to domestic import taxes (Greenaway 
(1980).  As country develops, it is also less likely to be heavily dependent on 
primary agricultural products.  At the early stages of development, countries 
are more likely to impose export taxes on primary products.  Under trade 
liberalisation, the removal of export taxes is expected to reduce tax yield but 
there may be positive effects on tax revenue as other export enhancing 
measures such as export credits are implemented as part of the reform 
package.   
It is also likely that there will be positive revenue effects of tariff liberalisation 
if the initial tariff rate is above the revenue maximising rate.  In this case, any 
reduction of the tariff is likely to increase trade tax revenue as the incentive 
for evasion is lessened by the decrease or removal of the tariff and positive 
changes in income may be induced.  Conversely, if the initial tariff rate is below 
the revenue maximising rate, then tariff reduction or elimination is likely to 
result in a reduction in government revenue from trade taxes as no positive 
changes in income are likely to be induced in this case (Khattry and Rao (2002)).  
The net impact of tariff changes will therefore depend on the location of tariffs 
relative to the tariff maximising rate, the magnitude of tariff changes, and cross 
price elasticities of demand of imports and supply of import substitutes.   
66 | P a g e  
 
 
In addition, the tariff liberalisation programme often simplifies the tariff 
structure, reduces the dispersion of tariff rates, and significantly lessens 
discretionary tax waivers.  Greenaway and Milner (1991) state that this should 
be revenue-neutral but there is the potential for positive revenue effects if the 
reform induces greater tax compliance.   An alternative framework to analyse 
this issue is to look at effective rates of protection (Ebrill et al. (1999)).  If 
reducing tariff dispersion negatively affects effective rates of protection, then 
there is likely to be an increase in imports and hence, increased revenue from 
trade taxes.  In addition, higher tariffs tend to be associated with goods that 
have higher price elasticities of demand and if these tariffs are lowered, then 
the positive revenue effect is likely to be reinforced through increased demand 
for these products.  
Another component of trade reform is the replacement of quantitative 
restrictions with tariffs, which may have positive revenue effects.  The extent 
to which this occurs depends on the impact of these tariffs on domestic prices 
and hence on domestic demand for the affected products.  The change to 
tariffs may result in lower consumer prices as supply is no longer restricted, 
which may lead to increased demand for the product.  Once supply is able to 
meet demand, there is likely to be increased revenue from additional imports, 
ceteris paribus.  As noted by Ebrill et al. (1999), other factors that influence the 
final income include the nature of the restriction itself and the administrative 
capabilities of the executing agencies of the reform.    
Domestic tax revenue is also impacted by trade liberalisation.  In many 
developing countries, taxes on imported goods and services are an important 
source of revenue.  Indeed, these taxes are often levied on the tariff-inclusive 
price.  The removal of tariffs is therefore likely to reduce tax yield if the base is 
eroded.  Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) note, however, that the ultimate impact on 
revenue yield has to take account of possible changes in import demand 
(positive) and demand for import substitutes (negative) due to lower prices on 
imports from removal of the tariff.   
In addition, one often sees some amount of exchange rate adjustment in trade 
reform packages.   Devaluation is likely to increase the price of imports but the 
extent to which this affects customs revenue depends on the price elasticity of 
demand for imports.  In addition, devaluation makes tradeables more 
expensive than non-tradeables.  This may have two divergent effects – a 
negative impact on customs revenue but a positive impact on domestic 
indirect tax revenues.  The precise effect depends on the relevant price 
elasticity of demand for imports and the price elasticity of supply for import 
substitutes.  If price elasticity of demand for imports is relatively inelastic then 
the government would expect to see increased revenue earnings from tariffs.   
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On the other hand, consumer goods and food items with domestic substitutes 
tend to have high elasticity.  Currency depreciation also has a positive effect 
on exports which may lead to increased revenue from taxes on income.  The 
net impact therefore depends on these competing considerations (Agbeyegbe 
et al. (2006)). 
A country’s level of urbanization and age-dependency ratio also may influence 
the share of total tax revenue in GDP.  In Lewis’ (1954) model of structural 
change, an economy becomes more urbanised as it develops.  This increases 
its revenue need and capacity to tax as the urban population demands 
provision of additional public services and provides a focused tax base.  In 
many developing countries where the rural economy tends to be the dominant 
sector, economic activity tends to be less concentrated and mostly informal in 
nature, which limits tax administration and collection.  Therefore, in some 
cases, governments levy taxes on agricultural exports.  In addition, the high 
age-dependency ratios in many countries mean that the tax base is smaller 
than in developed countries which tend to have lower age-dependency ratios.   
Finally, the sign on the dummy variable that captures the liberalisation event 
can be either positive or negative, depending on the combination of factors 
operating during the trade reform process.  If there is a positive effect on trade 
tax revenue and total tax revenue, one can expect the sign on the dummy 
variable coefficient (a5) to be positive, that is, revenue will be higher on 
average after the liberalization event relative to the pre-liberalization period.   
On the other hand, if trade tax revenue and total tax revenue are adversely 
impacted by trade liberalisation, then one can expect a negative sign on a5, 
that is, revenue is less on average for the period after liberalisation. 
Other impacts of trade liberalisation may also be seen on income and taxes on 
profits which are not explicitly explored in these models and may be explored 
in a CGE-type setting.  Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) note that short-run impacts can 
be observed through changes in profits of importers and producers of import 
substitutes.  Long-run impacts of trade liberalisation may be seen if there are 
changes in economic growth and by extension, incomes and income tax 
liabilities that may be attributed to the reform programme.   
To conclude, it is clear that the final impact of trade reform on fiscal revenue 
cannot be predicted with any great degree of certainty.  Factors such as the 
age dependency ratio, the level of urbanization, and per capita income account 
for structural characteristics in the economy that determine a country’s 
taxable base.  The inclusion of the exchange rate in the trade tax revenue 
model accounts for the possible impact of changes in monetary policy on 
exports and imports.  In addition, there are other factors that influence the 
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final reform outcome, such as the initial tariff structure, price elasticities of 
demand and supply for imports and domestic substitutes and the nature of 
trade reforms.  The next section formally outlines the model that will be used 
to analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on fiscal revenue within the 
framework of the variables discussed.    
Trade as a share of GDP is not included in these models as it likely to be 
collinear with the liberalisation event; ceteris paribus, trade liberalisation 
should lead to increased trade as a share of GDP.   
 
3.5 Regression Results 
 
Total Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP 
The level of urbanisation is shown to have a positive and significant 
relationship with total tax revenue as a share of GDP for all models that 
measure the average post-reform of effect of trade liberalisation over time 
(see Table 3-1).  This is consistent with Lewis’ (1954) argument that 
urbanisation provides a centralised population for taxation which is easier to 
manage than dispersed rural populations.  The Sachs-Warner event dummy 
itself (SW1) is significant at a 90% level and estimates that the share of total tax 
revenue in GDP is 0.87 percentage points more on average in the years after 
liberalisation.   Hence in this sample, liberalisation has a positive effect on total 
tax revenue.  In the vast majority of cases, trade liberalisation is a component 
of a broader reform program that may include structural changes in the 
economy that spur economic activity and leads to increased tax revenue.  The 
average post-reform effect as measured by the Dean et al. (1994) and World 
Bank dummies, although having a negative sign, is not significant.   
The dependency ratio is shown to have a negative relationship with total tax 
revenue as a share of GDP, significant in the case of the models with the Dean 
and World Bank dummies.  As the dependency ratio increases, there is likely 
to be a reduction on the tax base and this may lead to reduced tax collection, 
all things being equal.  Population size is not significant for all models with the 
liberalisation event, with no consistent sign.  Per capita income is significant 
for the model with the WB dummy where it is estimated that as per capita 
income rises, the share of total tax revenue in GDP is likely to rise.  The majority 
of the sample of countries for the World Bank dummy is upper middle income 
and so the difference in the income level of these countries, and their capacity 
to tax, with the few low-income countries is especially stark.   
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Table 3-1: The Determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP (TRgdp) – Average Post Reform Effect 
All countries (1972 – 2006)  
lnpop    -1.67 -0.32 0.52 
  (2.03) (2.88) (2.33) 
lnGDPpc   -0.32 0.37 1.96** 
  (0.87) (0.76) (0.82) 
Dep   -0.17 -5.09** -4.91** 
  (2.27) (2.50) (2.43) 
Urbpop    0.20* 0.14* 0.14* 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
SW1   0.87*** ---  
  (0.51) ---  
D1  -0.86  
   (0.55)  
WB   -0.02 
   (0.42) 
N 738 489 551 
No. of countries 29 18 21 
Adjusted  R2 0.79 0.63 0.79 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard  
errors. 
With respect to the models that capture the immediate and lagged impact of 
the liberalisation event (that is, in the year of liberalisation itself the dummy 
takes a value of 1), consistent relationships are found between the level of 
urbanisation and the dependency ratio, and total tax revenue as a share of 
GDP (see Table 3-2).  The level of urbanisation is found to have a significant 
positive impact of tax revenue as a share of GDP for all models – again 
confirming empirical findings and economic theory that urbanisation increases 
the need for and facilitates tax collection. In addition, the dependency ratio is 
shown to vary inversely with tax revenue as a share of GDP for all models, 
being significant in models with the Dean and WB dummies.   
As the dependency ratio rises, one is likely to see a fall of almost five 
percentage points in total tax revenue as a share of GDP in these models.  Per 
capita income is found to be a significant variable only for the model with the 
WB dummy where total tax revenue as a share of GDP is estimated to vary 
positively with level of income.  The sign on the per capita income is similar, 
but not significant, for the other models.  Population size is not estimated to 
be a significant variable in determining the share of total tax revenue in GDP 
in all models.   
The immediate impact of the liberalisation event itself is significant in the case 
of the Sachs-Warner dummy.  It should be recalled that this measure takes a 
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value of 1 only in the year of liberalisation.  By the Sachs-Warner measure, 
total tax revenue as a share of GDP is on average 1.72 percentage points less 
in the year of liberalisation.  A smaller negative effect is seen for the Dean 
dummy; however, it is not significant.  There is a small positive coefficient on 
the World Bank dummy; which is not significant.  In addition to estimating the 
immediate impact of the liberalisation event, lagged values are also used for a 
year and two years following liberalisation to assess if there are any significant 
delayed impacts on total tax revenue as a share of GDP.  None of these lagged 
values was found to be significant which suggests that there are no large 
effects on the share of total tax revenue within one to two years of the 
liberalisation event.  
The findings of the models are sensitive to the measure of trade liberalisation 
used and in particular, the dating of the liberalisation event and the sample 
chosen.  There is a significant average positive effect on total tax revenue as a 
share of GDP over time from trade liberalisation as measured by the Sachs and 
Warner dummy.  However, the immediate effect is estimated to be negative 
by that same measure, suggesting that there may be a negative impact in the 
very short-term but in the long-run the average effect is likely to be positive.  
In addition, trade liberalisation is often a part of a reform package where there 
may be broader economic and systemic reforms that have a positive effect on 
the economy and indirectly on total tax revenue.    
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Table 3-2: The Determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP (TRgdp) – Immediate Reform Impact 
All countries (1972-2006)   
lnpop    -1.58 -1.68 -1.70 -0.22 -0.20 -0.26 0.54 0.53 0.50 
  (2.02) (2.03) (2.03) (2.88) (2.88) (2.88) (2.34) (2.33) (2.33) 
lnGDPpc   -0.46 -0.41 -0.36 0.43 0.42 0.42 1.97** 1.96** 1.95** 
  (0.87) (0.87) (0.88) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) 
Dep   -0.25 -0.31 -0.32 -4.88** -4.87** -4.89** -4.92** -4.91** -4.91** 
  (2.27) (2.27) (2.28) (2.49) (2.49) (2.49) (2.44) (2.44) (2.44) 
Urbpop    0.20* 0.20* 0.21* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
SW2 -1.72* --- --- --- --- ---    
 (0.59) --- --- --- --- ---    
SW2,t-1  -0.45 --- --- --- ---    
  (0.57) --- --- --- ---    
SW2,t-2   0.43 --- --- ---    
   (0.56) --- --- ---    
D2    -0.18 --- ---    
    (0.62) --- ---    
D2,t-1     -0.47     
     (0.58)     
D2,t-2      -0.38    
      (0.64)    
WB2      --- 0.43   
      --- (0.43)   
WB2,t-1      ---  0.04  
      ---  (0.50)  
WB2,t-2      ---   -0.16 
         (0.55) 
N 738 738 738 489 489 489 551 551 551 
No. of countries 29 29 29 18 18 18 21 21 21 
Adjusted  R2 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.79 0.79 0.79 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Total Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP 
With respect to the models predicting the determinants of total trade tax 
revenue, per capita income has a consistent negative and significant 
relationship with the share of total trade tax revenue in GDP for all models 
estimating the average post-reform impact of the liberalisation event (see 
Table 3-3).  As per capita income rises, there is an estimated fall in trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP of between 0.84 and 2.12 percentage points.  
Domestic taxes as a share of GDP is also shown to vary inversely with the share 
of total trade tax revenue in GDP – falling by between 0.08 and 0.39 
percentage points, with significance for models with the Sachs-Warner and 
World Bank dummies.  This finding is supported by the empirical literature 
where it is observed that countries tend to increase the collection of domestic 
taxes and reduce the share of trade tax revenue as they grow due to an 
increase in administrative capacity over time and urbanisation, among other 
factors. 
Table 3-3: The Determinants of Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP (TTgdp) – Average Post Reform 
Effect 
All countries     
lnpop    0.36 -2.79** -0.12 
  (0.97) (1.30) (1.24) 
lnGDPpc   -1.78* -2.12* -0.84*** 
  (0.44) (0.37) (0.47) 
DTaxgdp -0.22* -0.08 -0.39* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
ER 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dep   4.07* -1.23 1.53 
  (1.32) (1.28) (1.39) 
Urbpop    0.02 0.05* 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
SW1   -0.08 ---  
  (0.23) ---  
D1  0.10  
   (0.24)  
WB   0.16 
   (0.23) 
N 680 469 532 
No. of countries 29 18 21 
Adjusted  R2 0.71 0.70 0.70 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
In addition, the level of urbanisation has a consistent positive sign across all 
models; however, it is significant only for the model with the Dean dummy.  
The exchange rate has a consistent positive relationship with total trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP; however, it is miniscule though significant.  The 
share of total trade tax revenue in GDP is likely to rise with an increase in the 
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dependency ratio for the models with the Sachs-Warner (significant) and 
World Bank dummies.  A negative but insignificant relationship is observed for 
the Dean dummy model.  Population size is only significant for Dean dummy 
model where it is estimated that total trade tax revenue as a share of GDP is 
likely to fall as population size increases.   
The liberalisation event dummies are not significant for any of the models.  This 
suggests that trade liberalisation did not have any effect on total trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP on average post-reform on the basis of the 
measures used.   
With respect to the models that capture the immediate and lagged impact of 
the liberalisation event (that is, in the year of liberalisation itself the dummy 
takes a value of 1), consistent positive relationships are found between the 
level of urbanisation and the exchange rate, and total trade tax revenue as a 
share of GDP (see Table 3-4).  In the case of the level of urbanisation, the 
relationship is significant only for the model with the Dean dummy.   Although 
the coefficient on the exchange rate is significant for all models, the magnitude 
of the effect is extremely small.    
Per capita income is shown to vary inversely with total trade tax revenue as a 
share of GDP; the relationship is only significant for the model with the Dean 
dummy.  In addition, Total Trade Tax revenue as a share of GDP is also shown 
to vary inversely with Domestic taxes as a share of GDP for all models, being 
significant for models with the Sachs-Warner and World Bank dummies.   This 
is consistent with empirical findings that developed countries have a larger 
proportion of total tax revenue from domestic sources than less developed 
countries.  It is also consistent with the finding of no effect on total tax revenue 
as domestic taxes are likely to replace lost trade tax revenue to some extent 
and therefore offset any negative impact on total revenue.   
The dependency ratio is also shown to vary positively with trade tax revenue 
as a share of GDP for the models with the Sachs-Warner (significant) and World 
Bank dummies.  For the model with the Dean dummy, the coefficient is positive 
and not significant.    Population size is estimated to be a significant variable 
only in the model with the Dean dummy, where it varies inversely with the 
share of trade tax revenue in GDP.  Although not significant, a similar sign is 
also seen in the model with the World Bank dummy.   
Similar to the model which estimates the average effect of trade liberalisation 
over time, the event dummies are not significant in the models estimating the 
immediate impact of the liberalisation event itself.  The one and two-year lags 
of the dummies are also not significant, which suggests that there is no 
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discernible impact of the share of trade tax revenue in GDP as a result of trade 
liberalisation using the event indicators under study.  
It is clear that the findings of the models are sensitive to the measure of trade 
liberalisation used and in particular, the dating of the liberalisation event and 
the associated sample.  However, the consistent finding of a lack of significance 
for all event indicators for the total trade tax revenue as a share of GDP model 
is noteworthy.   
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Table 3-4: The Determinants of Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP (TTgdp) – Immediate Reform Impact 
 All countries (1972 – 2006)  
lnpop    0.37 0.37 0.38 -2.81** -2.81** -2.83** -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 
  (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (1.30) (1.30) (1.30) (1.25) (1.25) (1.25) 
lnGDPpc   -1.79* -1.77* -1.75* -2.13* -2.14* -2.13* -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.87*** 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
DTaxgdp -0.23* -0.22* -0.22* -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ER 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dep   4.09* 4.07* 4.06* -1.25 -1.23 -1.25 1.51 1.51 1.51 
  (1.32) (1.32) (1.32) (1.28) (1.27) (1.28) (1.40) (1.40) (1.40) 
Urbpop    0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
SW2   -0.27 ---  --- ---     
  (0.26) ---  --- ---     
SW2,t-1  0.05  --- ---     
   (0.29)  --- ---     
SW2,t-2   0.47 ---      
   (0.30) ---      
D2    -0.15      
    (0.30)      
D2,t-1     -0.24     
      (0.24)     
D2,t-2      -0.13    
      (0.35)    
WB2       -0.03   
       (0.23)   
WB2,t-1        0.004  
        (0.32  
WB2,t-2         0.04 
         (0.27 
N 680 680 680 680 469 469 532 532 532 
No. of countries 29 29 29 29 18 18 21 21 21 
Adjusted  R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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When one compares the findings of the events analysis with those obtained 
from the models in Chapter 2 and by Khattry and Rao (2002) for the share of 
total tax revenue in GDP, it may be seen that a consistent relationship is not 
observed for any variable in all models (see Table 3-5).  The events analysis 
found a consistently positive and significant relationship between the level of 
urbanisation and total tax revenue in GDP; while a negative relationship was 
found in Khattry and Rao’s (2002) model with the openness index.  In addition, 
the dependency ratio was found to have a negative relationship with total tax 
revenue in GDP for the events analysis; the opposite was found in Khattry and 
Rao’s (2002) model.  This may be explained by the difference in the 
liberalisation measure used and sample size and composition.    The openness 
index used by Khattry and Rao (2002) measures the total trade taxes as a share 
of GDP as a share of total trade.  The sample covers a diverse array of countries 
with varying income levels.  In contrast, the events analysis focussed on 
developing countries that reformed (had a liberalisation event) between 1972 
to 2006 and would therefore have different characteristics from the Khattry 
and Rao’s (2002). 
 
Table 3-5: Comparison of Regression Results across Models for the Share of Total Tax Revenue in GDP 
Variables Khattry and 
Rao 
Coefficients 
Extended 
Regression 
Coefficients 
1972-2006 
WB 
regression 
coefficients 
WB2 
regression 
coefficients 
SW1 
regression 
coefficients 
SW2 
regression 
coefficients 
D1 
regression 
coefficients 
D2 
regression 
coefficients 
ttit +* +* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
lnpopit 
  
+* +* + + - - - - 
ln 
GDPpcit 
+ +** +** +** - - + + 
depit + + -** -** - - -** -** 
urbpopit - -* +* +* +* +* +* +* 
WB --- --- - --- --- --- --- --- 
WB2    -     
SW1 --- --- ---  +*** --- --- --- 
SW2   ---   -* --- --- 
D1   ---    - --- 
D2   ---     - 
 
Table 3-6 compares the results obtained from the events analysis with those 
found by Khattry and Rao (2002) for the determinants of total trade tax as a 
share of GDP.   It can be seen that consistent relationships among all the 
models are found between the share of domestic taxes in GDP and the 
exchange rate, and the share of international trade taxes in GDP.  In the case 
of the exchange rate, a positive relationship is found while in the case of 
domestic taxes as a share of GDP, a negative relationship is observed.  The 
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income variable while found to have a positive relationship with the share of 
trade taxes in GDP in Khattry and Rao’s (2002) model, has a negative 
relationship for all the models with event dummies.  As the equations with 
event dummies reflect a limited sample of developing countries, it may be the 
case that these countries import less with higher incomes due to an increased 
ability to produce import substitutes and hence, this may be reflected in a 
lower share of trade tax revenue in GDP.  Moreover, the results suggest that 
countries generally move away from trade taxes as a significant source of fiscal 
revenue as they develop over time.   
Table 3-6: Comparison of Regression Results across Models for the Share of Total Trade Tax Revenue 
in GDP 
Variables Khattry and 
Rao 
Coefficients 
Extended 
Regression 
Coefficients 
1972-2006 
WB 
regression 
coefficients 
WB2 
regression 
coefficients 
SW1 
regression 
coefficients 
SW2 
regression 
coefficients 
D1 
regression 
coefficients 
D2 
regression 
coefficients 
ttit +* +* ---  --- --- --- --- 
ttit2 -* -* ---  --- --- --- --- 
lnpopit 
  
+* +* - - + + -** -** 
ln 
GDPpcit 
+ +** -*** -*** -* -* -* -* 
Dtaxgdpit -* -* -* -* -* -* - - 
ERit + + +* +* +* +* +* +* 
depit + + + + +* +* - - 
urbpopit - -* + + + + +* +* 
WB --- --- +  --- --- --- --- 
WB2    -     
SW1 --- --- ---  - --- --- --- 
SW2   ---   - --- --- 
D1   ---    + --- 
D2   ---     - 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. 
Additionally, the level of urbanisation has a negative relationship with trade 
taxes in GDP in Khattry and Rao’s (2002) model but a positive relationship is 
found for all models with liberalisation dummies.  The dependency ratio has a 
positive relationship with the share of international trade taxes in GDP for all 
models with the exception of the model with the Dean et al. (1994) dummies. 
Importantly, the liberalisation dummy itself is found to be significant only in 
the case of the Sachs-Warner dummy for the model estimating the 
determinants of total tax revenue as a share of GDP.  There is an average 
increase of 0.87 percentage points in total tax revenue as a share of GDP in the 
years after liberalisation.  The immediate impact as measured by the Sachs-
Warner dummy is negative with total tax revenue in GDP estimated to fall by -
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1.72 in the year of liberalisation.  For their part, Khattry and Rao (2002) found 
a positive relationship between their openness index and total tax revenue in 
GDP; that is, as the economy becomes less open (an increase in the openness 
index), total taxes in GDP is likely to rise.   
In addition, it is important to remember that trade liberalisation is often a part 
of a reform package that covers broader economic and systemic reforms that 
may have a net positive or negative effect on the economy and indirectly on 
total tax revenue.   Indeed, it may be the case that the Sachs-Warner picks up 
this average effect on total tax revenue over time while there is no significant 
impact on trade tax revenue itself.  Countries may find different means to 
adapt; for example, by adjusting domestic taxes (a significant variable in the 
trade tax revenue equation), which will be reflected in the average revenue 
picture.  The study also shows that the findings are sensitive to the sample 
used, the measure of openness and the liberalisation event.   
Specification Tests 
The Hausman test was conducted on both models and found that there was 
no systematic difference in coefficients between the fixed effects and random 
effects estimators.  The choice of a fixed effects estimator is therefore 
appropriate. 
Heteroskedasticity is present in both models; hence, robust standard errors 
are used.  The Wooldridge test for serial autocorrelation in panel data sets 
revealed that both equations have serial autocorrelation.   
Given the diversity in the sample by development level and tax composition, 
the next section goes on to do further analysis on the models focussing on the 
developed vs developing country distinction and the use of export taxes in the 
pre-reform to see how these factors impacted total tax revenue and trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP.                                 
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3.6 Heterogeneity within the model 
 
The findings reported in the previous section masks differences in a country’s 
level of development.  As espoused by Lewis (1954), a country’s level of 
development is a key determinant of the capacity to tax.  In addition, the 
relationship between the dependency ratio, domestic taxes as a share of GDP, 
and the level of urbanization and tax revenue and trade tax revenue as a share 
of GDP is likely to be different for countries at varying income levels.  For 
example, high income countries are likely to have a much different tax 
structure than developing countries.   
The sample for the events analysis mainly comprises developing countries that 
would have liberalized within the period 1972-2006.  Most developed 
countries liberalized before that time period and therefore could not be 
included in the analysis.  The Sachs-Warner index was the only event measure 
that was significant.  The twenty-nine countries for this model comprise a 
majority of low income and lower middle income countries (62%).  Thirty-one 
per cent are upper middle income countries and a further 7% are high income 
countries that liberalized over the period.   
In addition to diversity with respect to income levels within the sample, there 
are also differences with respect to the treatment of different tax types.  
Import taxes are the traditional indicators used for assessing trade 
liberalisation impacts.  However, particularly in the context of developing 
countries, export taxes may also influence the structure and characteristics of 
the trade reform programme.   Countries with relatively higher rates of export 
tax dependence may have a different trade reform experience; for example, 
by reducing import taxes up front and slowing the pace of reduction of export 
taxes in the reform process when compared to other countries.   
This section first begins by further dissecting the models, specifically with 
respect to the Sachs-Warner indicator to see what income groups were 
affected by the liberalisation event.  Both models on the determinants of tax 
and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP will be broken down into two groups 
– high income and upper middle income countries, and low and lower middle 
income countries.  It should be noted that the sample sizes are small, with 13 
and 12 countries in the high income and upper middle income groups, and low 
and lower middle income groups, respectively.  The results therefore do not 
have as much power as models that utilise larger samples. 
It then goes on to assess how the structure of export taxes may influence trade 
reform and subsequently, total tax and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP.  
This is done by examining the ratio of export taxes to total trade taxes over the 
period 1972-1989, which is when most trade reforms occurred for developing 
countries under IMF and World Bank lending programmes.  The section then 
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explores the dependence on export taxes by assessing the ratio of export tax 
to total trade tax revenue over 1972-1975.  Finally, the regression models are 
run for these groups and findings discussed.  
 
3.6.1 Events Analysis by Income Group 
 
Table 3-7 assesses the determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP for two 
separate country groups: low income and lower middle income countries, and 
high income and upper middle income countries.  The relationship between 
population size and the level of urbanization, and the share of tax revenue in 
GDP is similar for both income groups.  In the case of population size, a 
negative relationship is observed; that is, as population size increases the share 
of tax revenue in GDP is likely to fall.  Many different factors could be driving 
this finding.  It could be that countries with larger populations tend to have 
higher GDP and so, the proportion of taxes is lower than countries with smaller 
populations although the absolute value of tax revenue is higher.  The level of 
urbanization has a positive relationship with the share of tax revenue in GDP 
further supporting Lewis’ theory that urban centres provide a target 
population from which taxes can be collected.   
Table 3-7: The Determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Income Group – Average Post Reform 
Effect 
 Low Income and Lower 
Middle Income Countries 
High Income and Upper 
Middle Income Countries 
lnpop    -1.97 -11.39** 
  (3.85) (5.37) 
lnGDPpc   0.80 -3.46*** 
  (1.23) (1.84) 
Dep   9.27* -16.92* 
  (2.73) (4.67) 
Urbpop    0.19* 0.33* 
  (0.05) (0.11) 
SW1   -0.14 1.63*** 
  (0.64) (0.91) 
N 455 283 
No. of countries 18 11 
Adjusted  R2 0.76 0.78 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Per capita income is shown to have an inverse relationship with tax revenue in 
GDP for high income and upper middle income countries but a positive 
relationship for low and lower middle income ones.  For the high and upper 
middle income country groups the share of tax revenue in GDP is likely to fall 
as per capita income rises and the converse is true of low and lower middle 
income countries.  This suggests that there may be a threshold effect where 
the share of tax revenue in GDP begins to fall at a certain level of income – as 
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GDP exceeds a certain point.  The dependency ratio also has opposite signs for 
both country groups.  As the dependency ratio rises, the share of tax revenue 
in GDP is likely to fall for high income and upper middle income countries and 
rise for low income and lower middle income countries.  This finding is related 
to the different demographic profiles of countries in both groups and its impact 
on the taxable base. A higher dependency ratio may mean a fall in the tax base 
for high income and upper middle income countries and hence lower trade tax 
revenue in GDP over time, all things being equal.  For low income and lower 
income countries, a fall in the dependency ratio may be related to external 
factors such as the infant mortality rate and food provision, that may have an 
adverse effect on the tax base.  If there are these negative external events, 
then a fall in the dependency ratio may lead to a reduction in the share of tax 
revenue in GDP for these countries. 
The Sachs-Warner event dummy is only significant for the high income and 
upper middle income country group where the average post-reform effect of 
trade liberalisation is positive.  Tax revenue as a share of GDP is estimated to 
increase by 1.63 percentage points on average after liberalisation. 
Table 3-8: The Determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Income Group –Immediate Reform 
Impact 
 Low Income and Lower Middle 
Income Countries 
High Income and Upper Middle 
Countries 
lnpop    -1.89 -1.99 -1.94 -12.29* -12.16 -12.11 
  (3.80) (3.84) (3.85) (5.33) (3.84) (3.85) 
lnGDPpc   0.77 0.77 0.81 -4.42** -4.19** -4.12** 
  (1.22) (1.23) (1.23) (1.87) (1.86) (1.87) 
Dep   9.31* 9.31* 9.21* -17.49* -17.52* -17.50* 
  (2.68) (2.68) (2.69) (4.62) (4.63) (4.63) 
Urbpop    0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 0.36* 0.35* 0.35* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
SW2 -2.12* --- --- -2.22** --- --- 
 (0.72) --- --- (1.11) --- --- 
SW2,t-1  -0.99 ---  -0.65 --- 
  (0.74) ---  (1.04) --- 
SW2,t-2   0.53   -0.06 
   (0.83)   (0.92) 
N 455 455 455 283 283 283 
No. of 
countries 
18 18 18 11 11 11 
Adjusted  R2 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.78 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
In terms of the immediate reform impact on tax revenue as a share of GDP, 
the liberalisation dummy has a negative coefficient for both country groups 
(see Table 3-8).  This finding suggests that trade liberalisation has a negative 
immediate short-term impact.  The lags of the dummy are not significant; 
however, when considered with the finding that there are positive revenue 
effects of trade liberalisation over time (SW1), one may conclude that although 
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trade tax revenue may decline initially, other sources, such as domestic taxes, 
will eventually be substituted to replace lost revenue.  
Similar to the average effects model in Table 3-7, the model also predicts that 
as the level of urbanization increases so will the share of tax revenue in GDP.   
Population size is shown to have a negative relationship with the share of tax 
revenue in GDP.  The dependency ratio has a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable for low income and lower middle income countries and a 
negative relationship for high and upper middle income countries.  Finally, per 
capita income is shown to vary inversely with tax revenue as a share of GDP 
for high and upper middle income countries and positively for low income and 
lower middle income countries. 
Table 3-9: The Determinants of Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Income Group – Average Post 
Reform Effect 
 Low and Lower 
Middle Income 
Countries 
High and Upper 
Middle Income 
Countries 
lnpop    5.49** -6.46* 
  (2.15) (1.46) 
lnGDPpc   -0.14* -2.16* 
  (0.58) (0.64) 
DTaxgdp -0.24* -0.14** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
ER 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Dep   3.26*** -7.18* 
  (1.87) (1.92) 
Urbpop    0.06** -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
SW1   -0.15 0.06 
  (0.33) (0.39) 
N 434 246 
No. of countries 18 11 
Adjusted  R2 0.67 0.85 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
For the model estimating the determinants of trade tax revenue as a share of 
GDP over time (see Table 3-9), per capita income and the share of domestic 
taxes in GDP are shown to have a negative relationship with the dependent 
variable for both income groups.  This is consistent with the a priori 
expectation that at higher income levels, countries show a preference for 
domestic taxes over border taxes due to ease of administration.  In addition, a 
fall in the exchange rate is likely to reduce the share of trade tax revenue in 
GDP as ceteris paribus, a fall in the exchange rate makes imports more 
expensive and exports less so.  The final effect depends on which effect 
dominates and elasticities of demand and supply.  It should be noted, however, 
that the coefficient on the exchange rate is very small and so, this effect is 
minimal.   
83 | P a g e  
 
Population size is shown to have a positive relationship with the share of trade 
tax revenue in GDP for low and lower middle income countries.  In contrast, 
trade tax revenue is likely fall as population size increases for high and upper 
middle income countries.  Although population size is a used as a rough 
indicator of the taxable base, it is clear that there is an interplay with a 
country’s level development which may determine the extent to which trade 
tax revenue can be collected.  The dependency ratio also has opposite signs 
for both income groups.   For low and lower middle income countries, the 
share of trade tax revenue in GDP is expected to fall as the dependency ratio 
falls; the converse is true for high and upper middle income countries.   
The level of urbanisation has a positive and significant relationship with trade 
tax revenue as a share of GDP for low and lower middle income countries while 
a positive, but insignificant relationship, is seen for high and upper middle 
income countries.  The liberalisation event dummies are not significant for 
both income groups, which suggests that there is no significant effect on trade 
tax revenue as a share of GDP, in the years after trade reform. 
 
Table 3-10: The Determinants of Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Income Group - Immediate 
Reform Impact 
 Low Income and Lower Middle 
Income Countries 
High Income and Upper Middle 
Countries 
lnpop    5.46** 5.49** 5.54** -6.47* -6.47* -6.47* 
  (2.15) (2.15) (2.15) (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) 
lnGDPpc   -0.15 -0.13 -0.11 -2.15* -2.16* -2.16* 
  (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) 
DTaxgdp -0.24* -0.24* -0.24* -0.14** -0.14** -0.14** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ER 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dep   3.24*** 3.21*** 3.17*** -7.20* -7.18* -7.19* 
  (1.87) (1.87) (1.87) (1.91) (1.91) (1.91) 
Urbpop    0.06** 0.06** 0.06** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
SW2 -0.56 --- --- 0.28 --- --- 
 (0.36) --- --- (0.35) --- --- 
SW2,t-1  -0.07 ---  0.23 --- 
  (0.44) ---  (0.38) --- 
SW2,t-2   0.55   0.24 
   (0.44)   (0.45) 
N 434 434 434 246 246 246 
No. of 
countries 
18 18 18 11 11 11 
Adjusted  R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.85 0.85 0.85 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
With respect to the immediate impact of trade liberalisation on trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP (see Table 3-10), the event dummies are also not 
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significant.  In the model, no evidence was found of a significant impact in the 
year of liberalisation and in the one to two-year period following liberalisation.  
However, recall that the model found a negative and significant relationship 
between share of total tax revenue in GDP and trade liberalisation on average 
post-reform for the high income and upper middle income country group 
(mainly upper middle income countries).    As trade liberalisation is part of an 
integrated process of broader economic reform, high and upper middle 
income countries may find it easier to incorporate changes to their tax system 
(such as increased use of domestic taxes) given that they have more advanced 
tax systems than their less developed counterparts.  In addition, over the long 
term, the effect of trade liberalisation on total tax revenue was found to be 
positive in the years after liberalisation.  This may be due to an increased ability 
of high and upper middle income countries to take advantage of the economic 
opportunities brought about by trade liberalisation. 
Similar to the model that assesses the average effect of trade liberalisation 
over time, domestic taxes as a share of GDP and per capita income are shown 
to vary inversely with the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for both country 
groups.  As the share of domestic taxes in GDP rises, the model predicts that 
the share of trade tax revenue will fall.  This suggests that countries do replace 
trade taxes with domestic taxes over time due to ease of collection and 
distributional concerns, among other factors.  In addition, as per capita income 
increases, the share of trade tax revenue is GDP is likely to fall.  As an indicator 
of the level of development, a rise in per capita income means that countries 
are becoming more developed and therefore, better able to diversify the tax 
base, in particular, extend the coverage of domestic taxes.  Also, another factor 
that may explain this relationship is that industries that may have benefitted 
from high tariffs on imports in the early stages of development may see those 
protective measures removed as they mature.   
In addition, the exchange rate has a positive relationship with the share of 
trade tax revenue in GDP.  An increase in the exchange rate (appreciation) 
makes imports less expensive and exports costlier.  The effect in the model is 
estimated to be extremely small, however, and to not be significant for high 
and upper middle income countries.  Population size is shown to have a 
negative relationship with the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for high and 
upper middle income but a positive one for low and lower middle income 
countries.  It may be the case that as population size increases for upper and 
middle income countries, there is an increase in the taxable base for 
alternative taxes, such as consumption taxes, which further reduce the trade 
tax revenue share in GDP.  The converse may occur in low income and lower 
middle countries that still have trade tax revenue as a major source of income 
and so, an increase in the population may mean increased consumption of 
imported products and therefore, an increase in trade tax revenue at a lower 
rate than the rate of GDP growth.     
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The level of urbanisation is found to vary positively with the share of trade tax 
revenue is GDP for low and lower middle income countries, suggesting that as 
these countries become more urbanised the share of trade tax revenue was 
likely to rise by about 0.06%.  In this case, the countries at this level of 
development are not likely to have a sufficiently developed tax system to 
replace trade taxes with domestic taxes; however, with urbanisation, they may 
be better able to centrally locate customs services, etc. and thus, improve the 
collection of trade tax revenue.  On the other hand, for high and upper middle 
income countries that are at a different level of development, a significant 
relationship is not found between the level of urbanisation and trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP.  Arguably, most of these countries would have 
already been urban throughout the sample period and one would therefore 
not expect any significant change in trade tax revenue as a result of changes in 
the level of urbanisation.    
In addition, the model predicts that a fall in the dependency ratio is likely to 
lead to a reduction in the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for low and lower 
middle income countries.  On the other hand, as the dependency ratio rises, it 
is likely to lead to a fall in trade tax revenue as a share of GDP in high income 
and upper middle income countries.  The variation in findings may be due to 
the different demographic characteristics of both income groups and its 
impact on the taxable base.  For high income and upper middle income 
countries, a higher dependency ratio may mean a fall in the tax base and hence 
lower trade tax revenue in GDP over time, all things being equal.  Health, social 
and environmental facts may influence a reduction in the dependency ratio in 
low income and lower income countries.  They may also have an adverse effect 
on the tax base and by extension, the share of tax revenue in GDP for these 
countries. 
The results of the events analysis suggest that there are significant differences 
between high income and upper middle income, and low income and lower 
middle income countries with respect to the interaction of key variables and 
the total tax and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP.  Importantly, the results 
suggest that the impact of trade liberalisation is at the aggregate tax revenue 
level.  While the overall average effect is estimated to be positive and 
significant for only high income and upper middle income countries, the short-
term impact (within a year of the liberalisation event) is negative for both 
country income groups.  There is also no evidence that there are significant 
lagged effects of trade liberalisation within one and two years of the reform 
date. 
In addition to the variation in the sample by country size, there are also likely 
to be differences in the implementation of the reforms themselves which are 
likely to be influenced by the existing trade tax structure.  The majority of 
analyses tend to concentrate on how the structure of import taxes affects the 
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trade reform process.  An equally interesting line of inquiry is how the 
existence of export taxes may have influenced the impact of reform on total 
tax revenue and trade tax revenue.  Did countries with higher export to total 
trade tax revenue ratios have lower total trade tax revenue as a share of GDP 
after trade liberalisation when compared with countries with lower ratios?  
The next section seeks to answer this question and begins by exploring the 
export tax to total tax ratios in the events study and their behaviour over time.  
It then goes on to analyse the determinants of total tax and trade tax revenue 
as a share of GDP splitting the sample according to the share of export tax in 
total tax revenue. 
3.6.2 Export Taxes to Total Trade Taxes (1972-1989) 
 
Figure 3-6 provides a graphic description of the trend of export taxes to total 
trade taxes over the period 1972-1990 which is the period within which the 
majority of liberalisation took place using the events measures.  As can be 
seen, the minimum ratio of export taxes to total trade taxes has fallen over the 
period.  Lower values of the ratio are seen in the latter half of the period.  
Figure 3-7 also confirms that the export tax ratio is lower at the end of the 
period than at the beginning in 1972.  In 1972, the five countries with the 
highest ratios are: Ghana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, 
Uruguay, and the Philippines. 
 
Figure 3-6: Minimum Ratio of Export to Total Trade Taxes (1972-1990) 
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Figure 3-7: Ratio of Export Taxes to Total Trade Taxes (1972 and 1989) 
 
 
Table 3-11 ranks countries by the highest value of the export tax to total tax 
ratio over the period 1972-1975.  The highest value is 0.84, which belongs to 
Ghana.    A little less than fifty percent of countries (12) in the sample have an 
export tax to total tax ratio below 0.081.  The countries with export taxes 
mainly comprise developing countries, ranging from low income to upper 
middle income countries. The rankings show broad heterogeneity across 
income groups.   
 
Table 3-11: Ratio of Export Taxes to Total Trade Taxes in Descending Order of the Highest Value over 
1972-1975 – Top 15 in Sample 
Country Highest value over 1972-1975 Average over 1972-1975 
Guyana 0.84 0.44 
Uruguay 0.78 0.49 
Ghana 0.67 0.65 
Malaysia 0.51 0.40 
Mauritius 0.41 0.29 
Pakistan 0.39 0.32 
Nicaragua 0.38 0.17 
Ecuador 0.36 0.29 
Sri Lanka 0.35 0.30 
Thailand 0.34 0.18 
Philippines 0.29 0.25 
The Gambia 0.22 0.17 
Mexico 0.21 0.17 
Morocco 0.19 0.13 
Tunisia 0.17 0.07 
 
 
Of the twenty-nine countries in the events study, twenty-two imposed export 
taxes over the period.  It would be instructive to note if there is a significant 
difference in the impact of trade liberalisation (as denoted by the Sachs-
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Warner liberalisation event) on total tax and trade tax revenue when export 
taxes are above and below the median point of 8% of Total Trade Tax revenue.    
Although the median ratio appears relatively low, it sets a base of comparison 
for countries with respect to the extent to which they would need to replace 
export tax revenue in the reform process.  It also allows one to assess if there 
is any difference in the impact of liberalisation on total tax revenue and trade 
tax revenue between the two groups.  
 
The regression models for the determinants of trade tax and total tax revenue 
as a share of GDP continue to be used for this section.  The models are run for 
countries with export tax to total trade tax revenue ratios above and below 
the median level.  
 
3.6.3 Events Analysis by Share of Export Tax to Total Trade Tax 
 
For the determinants of tax revenue as a share of GDP, there are clear 
differences in the results for countries above and below the median ratio.  For 
countries with export to total trade tax ratios below 0.08 in the initial five years 
of the study (1972-1975), an inverse and significant relationship is found 
between population size and the level of urbanization, and the share of total 
tax revenue in GDP (see Table 3-12).  A significant positive relationship is also 
found between per capita income and total tax revenue as a share of GDP.   
Table 3-12: The Determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Export Tax Revenue to Total Trade 
Tax Revenue Ratio – Average Post Reform Effect 
 Export Tax to Total Trade 
Tax Revenue Ratio<0.08 
Export Tax to Total Trade Tax 
Revenue Ratio>0.08 
lnpop    -5.88* 8.58* 
  (1.98) (3.22) 
lnGDPpc   6.33* -0.76 
  (1.02) (1.41) 
Dep   3.02 -1.88 
  (3.01) (2.65) 
Urbpop    -0.14* 0.15* 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
SW1   2.37* -2.49* 
  (0.69) (0.80) 
N 289 349 
No. of countries 12 13 
Adjusted  R2 0.91 0.76 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
On the other hand, a positive and significant relationship is found between 
population size and the level of urbanization, and the share of total tax revenue 
in GDP for countries with export to total trade tax ratios above the median 
level.  Per capita income is not found to be a significant variable for these 
countries.  For both groups, the dependency ratio is not a significant variable.   
These findings are likely driven by the diverse characteristics of countries in 
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both groups.  Both groups included countries from all income levels; for 
example, the group above the median export to total tax ratio, included South 
Africa, Mexico and The Gambia.  It would appear that more high and upper 
middle income groups appear to be in the group above the median total tax 
ratio and the result reported with respect to per capita income is consistent 
with the sign to obtained for the model with high income countries. 
With respect to the liberalisation event, the results show that there was a 
positive effect on total tax revenue for countries below the median ratio.  
However, countries with export tax to total trade tax ratios above the median 
level, were likely to see negative effects of the share of total tax revenue in 
GDP, falling by 2.49 percentage points on average in the period after trade 
liberalisation, as denoted by the Sachs-Warner event dummy. 
Table 3-13: The Determinants of Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Export Tax Revenue to Total Trade 
Tax Revenue –Immediate Reform Impact 
 Export Tax to Total Tax Revenue 
Ratio<0.08 
Export Tax to Total Tax Revenue 
Ratio>0.08 
lnpop    -5.74* -5.94* -6.03* 8.00** 8.00** 8.04** 
  (1.99) (2.01) (2.01) (3.24) (3.26) (3.26) 
lnGDPpc   6.58* 6.62* 6.69* -0.99 -0.96 -0.95 
  (1.05) (1.05) (1.06) (1.43) (1.43) (1.43) 
Dep   2.47 2.53 2.52 -2.02 -2.09 -2.11 
  (3.10) (3.12) (3.12) (2.66) (2.67) (2.67) 
Urbpop    -0.17* -0.16* -0.16* 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
SW2 -1.91 --- --- -2.28* --- --- 
 (0.73) --- --- (0.75) --- --- 
SW2,t-1  -0.01 ---  -1.13 --- 
  (0.72) ---  (0.76) --- 
SW2,t-2   1.15   -0.38 
   (0.81)   (0.67) 
N 289 289 289 349 349 349 
No. of 
countries 
12 12 12 13 13 13 
Adjusted  R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.76 0.76 0.76 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Regarding the immediate reform impact on tax revenue as a share of GDP (see 
Table 3-13), the liberalisation dummy is not significant for countries below the 
median export tax to trade tax ratio.  However, there is a significant negative 
effect on the share of total tax revenue in GDP within the first year of 
liberalisation for countries with trade tax revenue above the median ratio.  
There is no significant lagged effect on the share of total tax revenue in GDP 
within one and two years of liberalisation for countries in both groups.    
As found in the average effects model in Table 3-12, significant negative 
relationships are found between the population size and the level of 
urbanization and the share of total revenue in GDP for countries below the 
median export to total trade tax ratio.  For countries above the median ratio, 
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a positive relationship is observed for these variables.  The dependency ratio 
is not significant for either group of countries.  The share of total tax revenue 
in GDP is also predicted to increase as per capita income increases for 
countries below the median export to total tax ratio.  For countries above the 
median ratio, per capita income is not a significant variable, although a 
negative coefficient is observed.    
Table 3-14: The Determinants of Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Export Tax Revenue to Total 
Trade Tax Revenue – Average Post Reform Effect 
 Export Tax to Total 
Tax Revenue 
Ratio<0.08 
Export Tax to Total Tax 
Revenue Ratio>0.08 
lnpop    -2.65** 2.20 
  (1.05) (2.00) 
lnGDPpc   -0.74 -0.28 
  (0.51) (0.73) 
DTaxgdp -0.28* -0.14** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
ER 0.00 0.00* 
 0.00 (0.00) 
Dep   0.80 6.96* 
  (2.04) (1.80) 
Urbpop    -0.11* 0.14* 
  (0.03) (0.04) 
SW1   0.29 -0.46 
  (0.42) (0.35) 
N 274 339 
No. of countries 12 13 
Adjusted  R2 0.77 0.73 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
For the model estimating the determinants of trade tax revenue as a share of 
GDP (see Table 3-14), domestic taxes as a share of GDP is shown to vary 
inversely with the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for countries above and 
below the median ratio of export tax revenue to total tax revenue.  This is 
consistent with the finding that as countries develop over time, they tend to 
replace trade taxes with domestic taxes.  As part of the reform process, some 
countries may also rename export taxes and collect “charges” through 
commodity boards.  These new “charges” would now fall under the domestic 
tax category.  Population size and the level of urbanization have a negative and 
significant relationship with the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for countries 
below the median export tax revenue to trade tax revenue ratio. For countries 
above the median ratio, the share of total trade tax revenue is predicted to rise 
as the level of urbanization increases.   
The dependency ratio is also shown to vary positively (and significantly) with 
trade tax revenue for countries above the median ratio.  This means that as 
the proportion of children and the elderly fall, the share of trade tax revenue 
in GDP is likely to rise.  This may be due to an increase in the taxable base that 
comprises the working population who can make consumption choices of 
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traded goods.  However, the dependency ratio is not significant for countries 
above the median export tax to trade tax revenue ratio.   
Per capita income is not a significant variable for either country group.  It 
should also be noted that the exchange rate is shown to have a positive 
relationship with trade tax revenue in GDP, which is significant for countries 
above the median export tax to total trade tax revenue.  A reduction in the 
exchange rate is likely to reduce the share of trade tax revenue in GDP as 
ceteris paribus, a fall in the exchange rate makes imports more expensive and 
exports less so.  The final effect depends on which effect dominates and 
elasticities of demand and supply.  However, the effect on trade tax revenue 
as a share of GDP is minimal in the model.  With respect to the trade 
liberalisation event, there is no significant effect on trade tax revenue as a 
share of GDP on average in the years after liberalisation for either country 
group. 
 
Table 3-15: The Determinants of Trade Tax Revenue as a Share of GDP by Export Tax Revenue to Total 
Trade Tax Revenue - Immediate Reform Impact 
 Export to Total Tax Ratio<0.08 Export to Total Tax Ratio>0.08 
lnpop    -2.71* -2.69* -2.64** 2.06 2.08 2.10 
  (1.03) (1.04) (1.04) (1.99) (1.99) (1.98) 
lnGDPpc   -0.72 -0.70 -0.66 -0.31 -0.30 -0.30 
  (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.73) (0.73) (0.73) 
DTaxgdp -0.29* -0.29* -0.28* -0.14** -0.13** -0.13** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dep   0.77 0.80 0.76 6.91* 6.90* 6.91* 
  (2.04) (2.05) (2.06) (1.81) (1.80) (1.80) 
Urbpop    -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
SW2 -0.52 --- --- -0.22 --- --- 
 (0.46) --- --- (0.28) --- --- 
SW2,t-1  0.04 ---  0.12 --- 
  (0.52) ---  (0.32) --- 
SW2,t-2   0.83***   0.42 
   (0.43)   (0.41) 
N 274 274 274 339 339 339 
No. of 
countries 
12 12 12 13 13 13 
Adjusted  R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.73 
*- significance at 99% level; **- significance at 95% level; ***- significance at 90% level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
With respect to the immediate impact of trade liberalisation on trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP (see Table 3-15), the results of the model show that 
trade liberalisation had no immediate impact on trade tax revenue as a share 
of GDP within the year of the liberalisation for countries below the median 
export tax to total tax ratio.  There also is no impact on trade tax revenue seen 
within a year of liberalisation; however, there is some impact within two years 
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of liberalisation for these countries.  Trade tax revenue is predicted to fall by -
0.83 percentage points two years after trade liberalisation.  For countries 
above the median ratio, no immediate impact is seen in the year of 
liberalisation, nor within one and two years of the liberalisation event.    
However, it should be recalled that effects at the aggregate level on total tax 
revenue were seen.  This supports the theory that trade liberalisation often 
forms part of a comprehensive macroeconomic reform programme that may 
include reforms to domestic taxes and incentive structures. The overall impact 
of this process may therefore be more likely to be observed at the aggregate 
level rather than on trade tax revenue itself.    
Domestic taxes as a share of GDP is shown to have a negative relationship with 
the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for both country groups.  As the share 
of domestic taxes in GDP increases, the model predicts that the share of trade 
tax revenue will decrease.  This suggests that there may be some replacement 
of trade taxes with domestic taxes over time due to administrative efficiencies, 
among other factors.  In addition, the exchange rate has a positive relationship 
with the share of trade tax revenue in GDP, which is significant for countries 
above the median ratio of export tax to total trade tax revenue.  An 
appreciation of the exchange rate makes imports less expensive and exports 
more so; the final effect being determined by demand and supply elasticities.  
Again, the effect in the model is estimated to be extremely small.   
Population size and the level of urbanization are shown to vary inversely and 
significantly with the share of trade tax revenue in GDP for countries below the 
median export tax revenue to trade tax revenue ratio. On the other hand, a 
significant relationship is not seen for countries above the median ratio with 
respect to population size.  The share of trade tax revenue in GDP is likely to 
increase with an increase in the level of urbanization for countries below the 
median ratio.    
The dependency ratio is also shown to vary positively with the share of trade 
tax revenue in GDP for countries both country groups, with a significant 
relationship for countries above the median ratio.  This may be due to an 
increase in the taxable base that comprises the working population who can 
make consumption choices of traded goods.  Per capita income is not a 
significant variable for either country group.   
The results of the events analysis by export tax ratio suggest that there are 
significant differences among countries when split into groups by the ratio of 
export tax to total tax revenue.  The findings reaffirm that there are tangible 
differences between countries that require a tailored approach to 
liberalisation.  In addition, with respect to the question of whether there was 
any difference in the impact of trade liberalisation on countries based on their 
initial export tax to total tax ratio, countries above the median ratio were 
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predicted to see an average negative effect on the share of total tax revenue 
in GDP over time while those below the median ratio were likely to see a 
positive effect on total tax revenue as a share of GDP.   The short-term effect 
of trade liberalisation on total tax and trade tax revenue itself is not significant, 
with the exception of a two-year lag for countries that was found to be 
significant for countries with export tax to trade tax revenue ratios above the 
median level.  The effect of trade liberalisation, as denoted by the Sachs-
Warner event are therefore manifested over time at an aggregate level and 
therefore depend on the interplay of the entire economic reform programme, 
of which trade liberalisation is often just one component. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter explored an alternative framework to examine the impact of trade 
reform on total tax revenue and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP.   Trade 
liberalisation is often driven by external events and shocks such as a severe 
decline in the balance of payments and lack of access to global financial 
markets.  Countries (mainly developing) facing these constraints turned to 
multilateral lending institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, for 
assistance.  In most cases, trade reform was included as part of a 
comprehensive economic reform programme with strict conditionalities for 
continued financing under these loan agreements.  Since these “events” are 
the driving force behind reforms, it makes sense to utilise an events framework 
to analyse the impact of trade reform on total tax and trade tax revenue.  Three 
events measures were used based on work by Sachs-Warner (1995), Dean et 
al. (1994) and Greenaway et al. (2005).  In the first scenario, the setup of the 
event dummies sought to capture the average effect of trade reform on total 
tax revenue as a share of GDP.  The second variation of the event dummies 
captured the immediate impact of liberalisation on the dependent fiscal 
revenue variables.  The models were also run with lags of the event dummies 
to see if there are impacts within one and two years of liberalisation. 
In general, trade liberalisation as captured by events was not a significant 
determinant of changes in total or trade tax revenues; in the vast majority of 
cases the dummy variable was insignificant. There is weak evidence that trade 
liberalisation, as denoted by the Sachs-Warner dummy, was associated with 
an increase in the share of total tax revenue in GDP (by 0.87 percentage points 
on average in the years after liberalisation).   The average post-reform effect 
as measured by the Dean et al. (1994) and World Bank dummies, although 
having a negative sign, is not significant.  The immediate impact of the 
liberalisation is a reduction in total tax revenue as a share of GDP by 1.72 
percentage points in the year of liberalisation event, as measured by the Sachs-
Warner dummy.   The other event dummies are not significant; although, there 
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is a small negative coefficient for the Dean dummy and a small positive 
coefficient on the World Bank dummy.  The lagged values of the event 
dummies are not significant which suggests that there are no significant effects 
on the share of total tax revenue within one to two years of the liberalisation 
event.   
The results also suggest that there may be a negative impact on total tax 
revenue as a share of GDP within the year of liberalisation but the long-run 
average effect is likely to be positive.  This is not surprising as trade 
liberalisation is often a part of a comprehensive reform programme that 
includes other components such as exchange rate adjustment and broader tax 
reform.  If, for example, there are changes to domestic taxes and exchange 
rate adjustments, then the final impact will be shown at the aggregate tax 
revenue level after the reforms have worked through the economy, taking into 
account factors such as supply and demand of imports and domestic 
substitutes and the administrative capacity of the state to collect taxes.    Since 
the other event measures are not significant in the models, it is clear that the 
findings are sensitive to the measure of trade liberalisation used and in 
particular, the dating of the liberalisation event and the sample chosen.   
With respect to the share of trade tax revenue in GDP, none of the 
liberalisation event dummies is significant for any of the models.  This suggests 
that trade liberalisation did not have any significant effect on total trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP on average in the years following liberalisation.  The 
effect on trade tax revenue as a share of GDP depends on the nature of reforms 
and timing and sequencing, among other factors.  A gradual reduction in tariffs 
and replacement with indirect taxes are less likely to lead to significant 
changes in the share of trade tax revenue in GDP.  Another consideration is the 
pace of GDP growth.  Once a country’s rate of GDP growth exceeds growth in 
trade tax revenue as a share of GDP, one can expect that the trade tax revenue 
as a share of GDO will fall. 
Trade liberalisation does not have an immediate impact on the share of total 
trade taxes as a share of GDP as the event dummies are not significant.  The 
one and two-year lags of the dummies are also not significant, which suggests 
that there is no discernible impact of the share of trade tax revenue in GDP as 
a result of trade liberalisation using the event indicators under study.  
When the models are assessed based on country groups – high and upper 
middle income countries, and low and lower middle income countries, there 
are significant differences in the impact of trade liberalisation on total tax and 
trade tax revenue.  Trade liberalisation is shown to have an average positive 
effect on total tax revenue as a share of for the high income and upper middle 
income country group GDP, by the Sachs-Warner measure.  However, the 
immediate reform impact on tax revenue as a share of GDP is negative and 
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significant for both country groups.  The lags of the dummy are not significant, 
which means that the effect is not carried forward into subsequent years.   
These findings support the conclusion that while there may be a negative 
effect initially of trade reform on total tax revenue as a share of GDP on both 
country groups, the average effect is likely to be positive for high and upper 
middle income countries in the long run.  High and upper middle income 
countries have more developed economies and administrative systems that 
may make it easier to replace any income lost from liberalisation with revenue 
from other sources.  In addition, the composition and execution of a wider 
reform programme is likely to influence the final effect on total tax revenue as 
a share of GDP.  The study found no evidence that trade liberalisation impacts 
trade tax revenue as a share of GDP on average in the years after reform or in 
the short-term in both country groups.   
The results of the analysis by the share of export tax revenue in total tax 
revenue show that the impact of trade liberalisation on total tax and trade tax 
revenue as a share of GDP is different for those countries above and below the 
median threshold.  Countries with ratios above the median level were likely to 
see negative effects of the share of total tax revenue in GDP, as denoted by 
the Sachs-Warner event dummy.  No significant short-term impact is found for 
countries below the median export tax to trade tax ratio.  However, there is a 
significant negative effect on the share of total tax revenue in GDP within the 
first year of liberalisation for countries with trade tax revenue above the 
median ratio.  There is no significant lagged effect on the share of total tax 
revenue in GDP within one and two years of liberalisation for countries in both 
groups.    
There is no significant effect on trade tax revenue as a share of GDP on average 
in the years after liberalisation for either country group. The results also show 
that trade liberalisation has no immediate impact on trade tax revenue as a 
share of GDP within the year of the liberalisation for countries below the 
median export tax to total tax ratio.  There also is no impact on trade tax 
revenue seen within a year of liberalisation; however, there is some impact 
within two years of liberalisation for these countries.   
The overall impact of trade liberalisation on fiscal revenue is therefore more 
likely to be observed at the aggregate level rather than on trade tax revenue 
itself.  Trade liberalisation usually forms part of a reform programme that 
covers broader economic and systemic reforms that may have a net positive 
or negative effect on the economy and indirectly on total tax revenue.   The 
Sachs-Warner index captures some of these reforms and the average effect of 
trade liberalisation on total tax revenue as a share of GDP over time is shown 
to be positive and significant.   
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It is clear that the findings of the models are sensitive to the measure of trade 
liberalisation used and in particular, the dating of the liberalisation event and 
the associated sample.  There is much room for further analysis in this area to 
find better ways of measuring the net impact of liberalisation on government 
revenue.   In addition, other methods for events analysis could be explored 
that are applicable to a larger number of countries.  As the revenue effects 
observed are at the aggregate level, it would be useful to analyse the net effect 
of trade liberalisation by using a general equilibrium model that can take 
account of the complex relationships in the domestic economy, the 
adjustment of indirect taxes, and the impact of relative prices and demand for 
final and intermediate goods as a result of changes in the price level due to 
trade reform.    
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APPENDIX 3A - COUNTRIES AND YEAR OF LIBERALISATION EVENT IN 
EVENTS ANALYSIS 
  Year of Liberalisation Event  
Country World Bank Dean Sachs-Warner 
Algeria 1989   
Argentina 1987 1989 1991 
Bangladesh 1989   
Botswana   1979 
Brazil 1983 1987 1991 
Cameroon 1989 1989 1993 
Chile 1985 1985 1976 
Colombia 1985 1985 1991 
Costa Rica 1985 1985 1986 
Ecuador   1991 
Ghana 1987 1987 1985 
Guyana 1981  1988 
India 1991  1994 
Israel   1985 
Kenya 1980 1988 1993 
Korea 1982 1987 1968 
Malawi 1981 1988  
Malaysia  1988 1963 
Mauritius 1981  1968 
Mexico 1986 1985 1986 
Morocco   1984 
Nepal   1991 
Nicaragua   1991 
Pakistan 1982 1988  
Paraguay   1989 
Peru  1989 1991 
Philippines 1980 1986 1988 
South Africa  1990 1991 
Sri Lanka  1987 1991 
Thailand 1982 1989  
Tunisia 1987  1989 
The Gambia   1985 
Uruguay 1987  1990 
Zambia 1985  1993 
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4. REVENUE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
ON JAMAICA AND THE DESIGN OF WIRE TARIFF REFORM 
OUTCOMES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In October 2008, Jamaica signed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
as a member of the CARIFORUM1 group – CARICOM plus Dominican Republic 
and Cuba.  The EPA succeeded the Cotonou Agreement (2000) which provided 
non-reciprocal market access for African, Caribbean, and Pacific states to the 
EU2 market on more favourable terms than those granted to other countries.   
The Cotonou Agreement required a waiver from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) as it was contrary to Article 1 of the GATT, which guaranteed most 
favoured nation (MFN) treatment to all members, with exceptions for regional 
free trade agreements or economic integration agreements that meet the 
substantive criteria of Article XXIV of the GATT or Article V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).   In order to secure the waiver, EU and 
ACP states agreed to replace the Cotonou agreement with a WTO-compatible 
one by the end of 2007.    
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA is the first EPA to be completed between Europe and 
one of the six sub-regions of the ACP.  The Agreement is divided into six parts, 
with annexes and protocols: 
- Part I: Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development 
- Part II: Trade and Trade-related matters 
o Title I. Trade in Goods 
o Title II. investment, Trade in Services and E-commerce   
o Title III. Current Payments and Capital movements 
o Title IV. Trade-related issues 
- Part III: Dispute avoidance and Settlement 
- Part IV: General Exceptions  
- Part V: institutional Provisions 
                                                          
1 CARIFORUM comprises CARICOM plus The Dominican Republic and Cuba. The members of 
CARICOM are: Antigua and Barbuda; The Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; 
Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago. 
2 EU comprises Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. 
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- Part VI: General and final Provisions 
Under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the tariff liberalization regime was as follows: 
• 2009 - CARIFORUM would remove tariffs on 52.8 % of tariff lines (most 
already at 0% or near 0%).   
• 2013 - five years from the date of signature of the EPA (2013), 
CARIFORUM would remove tariffs on 56% of tariff lines; 
• 2018 – 61.1 % will be liberalised  
• 2023 - 82.7% will be liberalised; 
• 2028 –  84.6% will be liberalised 
• 2033 - 86.9% will be liberalised 
 
According to the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2009), the 
objectives of the Agreement from CARIFORUM’s perspective were to remove 
the barriers to trade between the EU and CARIFORUM and to improve the 
competitiveness of CARIFORUM goods and services.  The expected end result 
was an increase in employment and business opportunities for CARIFORUM 
countries.    
The EPA had its detractors, such as Girvan (2008), who argued that CARICOM 
states in particular made too many concessions under the agreement and that 
the benefits of the agreement would mainly accrue to the European Union.  
Girvan (2008) argued that CARIFORUM negotiated market access which was 
very different from “market presence”, in reference to capacity and technical 
barriers to trade which may limit the actual penetration of the EU market by 
CARIFORUM firms.   
In the current context, regional governments have expressed dissatisfaction 
that the promised benefits of the EPA have not materialised so far.3   The 
former Head of the Delegation to the EU, Paola Amedi also expressed her 
disappointment with the seeming inability of the Jamaican private sector to 
take advantage of the EPA.4  While noting that the problem is not market 
access as Jamaica has access to other foreign markets through the CSME 
(Caribbean Single Market Economy) and from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 
she stated that the EU was providing over €7 million to work on NTB issues 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other trade related 
assistance. 
                                                          
3  “Caribbean countries not fully satisfied with EPA accord”, Jamaica Observer, 21 
March 2016. 
4  “EU Laments Jamaica's Failure to Maximise EPA Benefits”, Jamaica Gleaner, 23 
October 2014.  
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Revenue Considerations of Tariff Liberalisation 
Whilst it is clear from Girvan and others that there were other concerns with 
the EPA mainly arising from the asymmetrical nature of the partnership with 
the two groups at different level of development, the primary focus of this 
essay is the revenue concerns of CARIFORUM, mainly the CARICOM grouping.  
As with other ACP regions that were, and are still, negotiating EPAs, one of the 
main concerns for CARICOM, and Jamaica, was the revenue impact of the 
agreement.   
In general, this is a concern that is not limited to the small island states of the 
Caribbean.  Kowalski (2005) note that trade tax revenues as a percent of GDP 
was 4% for low and middle income countries between 1995 and 2000 as 
against less than 1% percent for high income countries.  In the case of LDCs in 
Africa, import duties constituted approximately 34% of total government 
revenue over the period 1999-2001.  The picture has improved somewhat over 
the years.   Data from Chapter 2 show that Taxes on international trade as a 
percentage of GDP generally trend downwards for lower and upper middle 
income countries over the period 1972-2006.  For high income countries, there 
was an increase in the share of trade taxes in GDP from 2% in the late 1980s to 
5% for most of the 1990s, before falling in the late 1990s onwards.    
Bilal et al. (2012) note that average applied tariff rates in ACP countries were 
between one-third to one-half of 1980 levels in 2006/7.  Despite this progress, 
trade tax revenue as a share of total tax revenue was over 30% for 15 out of 
43 Sub-Saharan Africa countries in their sample.  Therefore, any drastic fall in 
trade tax revenues would have serious implications for social expenditure and 
the broader functioning of the state.  In the context of the small island states 
of the Caribbean, customs revenue as a percentage of total fiscal revenue 
ranges from a high of 25% and 18% for The Bahamas and Belize, respectively, 
to a low of 5% for Trinidad and Tobago.  For Jamaica specifically, customs 
revenue as a percentage of total taxes was approximately 8% in 2011 and 
2012, rising to 9% in 2013.5   
Singh et al. (2014) highlight that revenue considerations have been one of the 
factors in the reluctance for countries to enter into Economic Partnership 
Agreements with the EU.  In the case of CARIFORUM countries, 
implementation of the EPA has stalled in many countries partly due to the 
effects of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis which led to slowed economic 
activity in these countries.  Where tariff revenue constitutes a significant 
                                                          
5  IMF Government Financial Statistics Database. Available Online: 
http://data.imf.org/?sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405. Date accessed: 
May 24, 2016 
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portion of fiscal revenue and governments are contemplating tariff 
liberalisation, there has to be some consideration of measures that would 
offset lost revenue from tariff reform with alternative sources.  Notably, for 
Jamaica where there is a high rate of discretionary waivers, revenue 
considerations may not necessarily be driven by the EPA.  In 2011, the trade 
weighted average MFN tariff rate (in the tariff schedule) was 9.8% and the 
collected tariff rate (what is actually collected at the border weighted by the 
amount of imports per tariff line) is 3.6%.  This suggests that the government 
collected less than half of the value of statutory tariffs. Concerns about 
revenue fall-off post-EPA could therefore be addressed by reducing the 
amount of duty waivers and exemptions.  
Building on the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 explores issues of trade 
liberalisation, fiscal revenue and welfare for a small open economy, Jamaica, 
in the context of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).  
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA provides for, inter alia, the liberalisation of trade in 
goods across participant countries over a maximum period of 25 years.  This 
chapter explores the tariff revenue, trade creating, trade diverting and welfare 
effects of full liberalisation under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA at the product level 
for Jamaica.  It also examines the different effects of utilising statutory tariff 
rates versus collected tariff rates in the analysis, which is especially relevant 
where a country has a high level of exemptions or discretionary waivers.  In 
addition, this chapter analyses how Jamaica may apply statutory tariffs on 
ROW imports after implementation of the EPA in order to address concerns 
about tariff revenue depletion and welfare loss, for example.  It also examines 
the extent to which revenue considerations influenced the phasing schedule 
and exclusions list of the EPA, with particular reference to Jamaica’s schedule 
of commitments.  It then examines the feasibility of achieving welfare 
increasing and revenue enhancing (WIRE) outcomes for tariff adjustments on 
ROW imports post-EPA. 
The chapter starts by reviewing the literature on varying approaches to trade 
liberalisation and the theories that have been developed to try to understand 
the effects of liberalisation with a focus on Hatta (1977) as a basis for analysis.  
The literature review also examines empirical studies on the welfare and 
revenue effects of trade reform. It then goes on to assess the different 
methodological tools that are available to assess the impact of tariff reforms 
and analyses the 2011 trade and tariff data for Jamaica that will be used in the 
reform scenarios.  Then utilising the welfare increasing and revenue enhancing 
concept discussed in Falvey (1994), various tariff liberalisation scenarios will 
be conducted for Jamaica to assess the conditions under which tariff reforms 
will and will not enhance tariff revenue and welfare within the context of the 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA.   
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The next section presents the theoretical and empirical issues in the analysis 
of the tariff revenue and welfare impacts of tariff reform. 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
There is extensive research and analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation on 
revenue as this issue is of prime concern to governments, especially those from 
developing countries that are contemplating trade reform.  Much of the 
discussion surrounds how reform measures can be structured to have positive 
revenue and welfare effects and where that is not possible, to promote overall 
revenue and welfare neutral outcomes.  In this regard, issues that present for 
deeper analysis include appropriate timing and sequencing of reforms (see 
Falvey and Kim (1992)), the coverage of reforms, and the impact of interest 
groups on the reform process.   In addition, there is the question of how 
governments can make up for lost revenue through consumption taxes, for 
example, in both perfectly competitive as well as imperfectly competitive 
markets, and in asymmetrical trading arrangements.  In this context, Abe and 
Naito (2008) find that even in imperfectly competitive markets, trade 
liberalisation when combined with consumption taxes can increase revenue 
and welfare.  Similarly, Conway et al. (1989) find that under some conditions 
entering into preferential trading arrangements yield superior welfare gains, 
particularly when the union is with “non-competitive” countries. 
One can therefore analyse varying approaches to trade liberalisation, and in 
particular tariff reform; for example, the concertina approach, and “one-off”, 
immediate tariff reductions which can either be applied across the board or 
selectively, and their impact on welfare and revenue. The Literature Review 
summarises the theoretical approaches that have evolved in an effort to 
understand the effects of liberalisation on welfare and revenue as well as 
empirical research in the area. 
4.2.1. Theoretical Issues 
 
This section outlines one of the main models utilised to analyse the impact of 
tariff reform on welfare – Hatta (1977) – and the main variations of this model.  
It then broadens the discussion to include the utility of domestic tax reform to 
mitigate some of the negative welfare and revenue effects of tariff reform.  
Finally, the review concludes by summarising the empirical studies on the 
welfare and revenue effects of trade reform, with special emphasis on the 
Caribbean region, and identifying knowledge gaps where the essay can make 
a contribution to the economic literature. 
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Modelling the welfare and revenue effects of trade liberalisation 
 
The theoretical research on welfare and revenue effects of trade liberalisation, 
and tariff reform specifically, includes analyses for markets with varying levels 
of competition – perfectly competitive markets, and imperfectly competitive 
markets such as oligopolies and monopolies – as well as for traded and non-
traded goods.  As expected, the theoretical conclusions are sensitive to the 
underlying set of assumptions of the model.  The focus of most theories in this 
field is on the conditions under which tariff reforms improve welfare in single-
good and multi-good settings.  Contributors to this literature include Hatta 
(1977), Hatta and Fukushima (1979) and Fukushima and Kim (1989).  The basic 
model assumes a two-commodity multi-country world where: 
I. Each country faces a strictly concave production possibility curve. 
II. There is only one consumer who has well-behaved compensated 
demand functions for both goods in each country. 
III. Producer prices are maximised with prices as given.  
IV. Consumers and producers face the same prices. 
V. Each country is small and is a price taker of the two goods. 
VI. No country imports or exports both goods, has only tariffs as 
trade barriers, and where there is no inferior good. 
VII. An ad valorem tariff is place on each imported good by each 
country. 
Under these conditions, global welfare is judged to improve if the utility 
possibility set of the world grows.  Hatta (1977) and Hatta and Fukushima 
(1979) find that tariff reform that reduces the highest tariffs to the level of the 
second highest will increase welfare if there are no inferior goods, the good on 
which the highest tariffs is imposed is a substitute for all other goods and non-
traded goods are substitutes for all other goods.  In addition, unilateral trade 
liberalisation improves welfare if the country with the highest tariff unilaterally 
reduces its tariff to that of the second highest or if all countries reduce their 
tariffs proportionately.  Fukushima and Kim (1989) extend the analysis above 
by generalising to a multi-good framework where each country now has 
specific tariffs as well as subsidies on each good.  In this setting, a proportional 
reduction in tariffs/subsidies increases global welfare, noting that 
international lump-sum transfers need to occur for the Pareto improvement 
to be realised. 
The framework outlined above may be modified to allow for greater 
generalisation of findings as well as to include alternate measures of welfare 
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effects.  In this regard, building on the work of Fane (1991), Falvey (1994) uses 
the basic framework developed by Hatta and combines that framework with 
the concept of compensated radial elasticities (CREs) to assess the conditions 
under which a welfare improving and revenue enhancing (WIRE) reform will 
exist, with the underlying proposition that these types of reform are more 
likely to be sustained after the reform.  CREs measure the proportionate 
reduction in the tax base due to a proportionate radial increase in all tax rates.  
Falvey (1994) finds that WIRE reforms exist where CREs of tariffs under reform 
are different and, where CREs are the same, there may still be welfare 
improvement if taxes are above their revenue maximum.  In the case of single 
tax reform, reforms that increase taxes at their lowest level or reduce subsidies 
at their highest will have positive effects on welfare and revenue. 
There are also models that take into account domestic distortions and non-
traded commodities in a multi-household framework by extending the Hatta 
(1977) framework.  The results of these models vary from those which are 
focussed on single households with no distortions.  For example, Diewert et al. 
(1991) propose that strict Pareto improvements will occur from tariff reform 
if: (i) the reform leads to prices that are closer to world prices, (ii) if all tariffs 
are reduced proportionally or linearly and the gains are transferred to 
households by a lump sum, (iii) if a tariff on a single good is reduced, provided 
that the good has the highest tariff rate, domestic commodities are zero and 
traded goods are net substitutes.  Welfare improvement in this instance is 
judged on the basis of Pareto optimal changes achieved through lump sum 
transfers to households of gains realised from tariff reform.  It should be noted 
that as the analytical assumptions are relaxed and domestic distortions are 
allowed in the models, the findings are not easily generalizable.  For example, 
Anderson and Neary (1992) use the concept of “implicit separability” to derive 
sufficient conditions for welfare enhancing tariff reforms under specific 
assumptions.  However, their findings are quite sensitive to the assumptions 
made.  More recently, Anderson and Neary (2016) utilise Hatta’s (1977) 
framework to propose conditions under which tariff reform leads to a rise in 
welfare with no loss of tariff revenue.  They posit that trade reform that 
comprises a mean-preserving reduction in tariff dispersion and convex 
combinations of uniform absolute tariff reductions is beneficial to an economy 
when the marginal cost of revenue from the tariff is exceeds the marginal cost 
of revenue from alternative sources.  In addition, they show that when 
households have different preferences for the same set of goods, tariff 
dispersion within different groups is not efficient.   
Hatta and Ogawa (2007) also show that the optimal tariff in a revenue 
constrained environment is close to uniformity when the goods imported are 
close substitutes.  In the context of non-traded commodities, there can be 
specific focus on public production.  In this case, the publicly produced good is 
substituted for the non-traded private goods in Hatta’s model and it is 
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assumed that the non-traded publicly produced good is complementary to 
some traded private goods in order for welfare to improve as a result of tariff 
reform and that the government utilises the revenue gained from levying 
specific tariffs on private goods to produce a non-market provided good rather 
than transferring the revenue as a lump-sum payment to consumers.  A key 
contributor to this literature is Abe (1992) who finds that the reduction of the 
highest tariffs will improve welfare if the publicly produced good is 
oversupplied initially; the highest tariff rate is applied to private goods that are 
complements to the publicly produced good; no private goods are inferior; and 
the private goods on which the highest tariffs are applied are net substitutes 
for all the other private goods.  Conversely, a uniform change of all tariffs will 
reduce welfare if the publicly produced good is initially undersupplied, there is 
no substitutability among private goods, there is no inferior good, the market 
is in stable local equilibrium, and the price of the publicly produced good is less 
than the world price of private goods.  If the publicly produced good is initially 
oversupplied and the other conditions hold, a uniform change of all tariffs 
toward any target will improve welfare.  Abe (1992) posits that tariff reform 
may be harmful to the small economy where tariff revenue limits the 
production of the publicly produced good and renders it scarce and where 
price elasticities of demand and supply are relatively inelastic. 
The preceding analyses are based in a partial equilibrium setting. Other 
models, such as Heady and Mittra (1986), use a general equilibrium approach 
to analyse the welfare and revenue effects of tariff reform.  Heady and Mittra 
(1986) point to the critical role of the characteristics of the social welfare 
function (which includes the elasticity of substitution between factors and the 
taxation power of the government) in determining optimal tariffs.  However, 
as this essay will utilise a partial equilibrium approach, the literature review 
will focus on this line of research.   
The analyses above provide insight into how trade liberalisation, and in most 
instances tariff reform, affects welfare and revenue.  The rules suggest that 
unilaterally lowering the highest tariff to the next level can increase welfare.  
However, as expected, the welfare and revenue effects are dependent on the 
characteristics of the market and the nature of the goods in question (for 
example, whether they are privately or publicly produced; or finished or 
intermediate goods).  While most studies show analytical rigour in the 
development of the theory, there is a dearth of empirical verification of the 
rules suggested.  This essay explores the potential to apply these theories and 
verify their propositions.  Specifically, there is room to extend Falvey’s use of 
compensated radial elasticities to empirical application where data is 
available.  In addition, one can further explore the significance of assumptions 
relating to the degree of homogeneity of goods being traded on the analysis 
of the welfare effects of unilateral tariff liberalisation. 
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The literature cited above focuses on mainly the welfare effects of trade 
reform but there is complementary analysis of the interplay between trade 
liberalisation and domestic tax reform and specifically, how domestic taxes can 
limit the impact of a reduction in trade tax revenue on the fiscal account.  The 
next section delves further into this issue and reviews studies that have 
analysed welfare and revenue effects of combined tariff and domestic tax 
reform. 
Tariff and Domestic Tax Reform  
 
Empirical studies have analysed how trade liberalisation and domestic tax 
reform interact.   Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) show how a uniform decrease 
in trade taxes plus an increase in consumption taxes can improve welfare and 
increase government revenue.  In this case, a general equilibrium model is 
developed for a small open economy with trade and consumption taxes and 
limited factor mobility internationally. A uniform decrease in tariffs plus a 
simultaneous increase in consumption taxes are welfare and revenue-raising 
if either all tariffs and consumption taxes are harmonised or the consumption 
tax is equal to the tariff on each good.  Additionally, they propose that if the 
country’s initial position subsidises producers then holding consumer prices 
constant by reducing the tariff but increasing the consumption tax by the same 
amount will improve welfare and increase government revenue.   
Erbil (2004) also uses a CGE model to examine whether trade taxes or output 
taxes are costlier in welfare terms.  The comparison is based on the “marginal 
cost of funds” as the welfare defining tool, where countries with higher 
marginal cost of funds for tariffs than output taxes would be better off after 
tariff reform.  They find that tariffs are the more expensive distortion for most 
countries in their study (26 out of 32 countries) and posit that these countries 
would be better off reducing tariffs and replacing them with indirect taxes.  
However, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) argue that the 
replacement of tariffs with indirect taxes such as consumption taxes does not 
necessarily lead to increased access of imports to the market of the country 
undertaking the reform.  In addition, they show that the welfare effect of 
reforming only tariffs is greater than when the reform package also increases 
consumption taxes.   
In contrast, Keen and Ligthart (2005) explore the same theme but in the 
context of imperfect competition and find that matching tariff reductions with 
proportional increases in consumption taxes reduces domestic welfare.  Abe 
and Naito (2008) also analyse welfare effects under imperfect competition but 
for a country that imports final and intermediate goods.  They find that trade 
liberalisation and domestic tax reform can still enhance welfare in this context 
but the inclusion of the intermediate good in the analysis is crucial to this 
result. 
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Konan and Maskus (2000) assert that the benefits of trade liberalisation 
depend on the current tax structure and the extent to which other taxes are 
reformed.  Applying a similar general equilibrium framework to Egypt, they 
examine the welfare effects of various scenarios, including unilateral tariff 
elimination, tariff unification, and removal of the consumption tax. They 
conclude that the replacement tax imposed by the government is important in 
determining welfare effects and that it is important to consider joint trade and 
domestic policy reform in the face of economic distortions.  
Domestic tax revenue is also impacted directly by trade liberalisation.  In many 
developing countries, taxes on imported goods and services are an important 
source of revenue and are levied on the tariff-inclusive price.  The removal of 
tariffs is therefore likely to reduce tax yield if the base is eroded.  Agbeyegbe 
et al. (2006) note, however, that the ultimate impact on revenue yield has to 
take account of possible changes in import demand (positive) and demand for 
import substitutes (negative) due to lower prices on imports from removal of 
the tariff.  Moreover, there may be long-term effects on the tax base if 
liberalisation has a positive effect on economic growth.  
In addition to the revenue and welfare effects of trade liberalisation, there are 
also issues relating to the timing and sequencing of reforms that in and of 
themselves may impact welfare and revenue gains/losses.  Kubota (2000) 
argues that trade reform should occur after governments undertake 
“efficiency-enhancing and revenue-increasing” tax reform    The issue may also 
be assessed in the context of overall market liberalisation reforms; for 
example, Papageorgiou et al. (1990) find that liberalisation tends to be less 
successful in cases where capital market liberalisation precedes trade 
liberalisation.  It is argued that reforms in the capital market are likely to be 
felt immediately while trade reforms tend to take longer to have an effect.  
Therefore, in order to synchronise the re-allocation effects of reforms, it may 
be best to implement trade reforms first.  Falvey and Kim (1992) provide a rich 
assessment of the various issues surrounding timing and sequencing, ranging 
from the place of tariffication of quantitative restrictions in the reform 
programme to the appropriate speed of reform.   
There is therefore room to marry analyses of welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation with an analysis of the feasibility of replacing lost revenue with a 
VAT, for example.  Additionally, one can analyse the role that timing and 
sequencing plays in determining welfare and revenue effects and, for countries 
with high dependence on trade tax revenue, the conditions under which the 
proposed reform can be welfare improving and revenue enhancing if revenue 
replacement by consumption taxes is not possible. 
This essay will explore these issues empirically and report on best practices or 
possible rules that may be applicable in a small country context.  However, 
before launching into the empirical analysis, it is necessary to review other 
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studies that have sought to quantify the welfare and revenue effects of trade 
reform.   The next section assesses these studies and outlines the main 
modelling approaches used and their findings with a view to develop and 
refine the approach to be used in this study. 
4.2.2. Empirical Studies on Quantifying Welfare and Revenue Effects 
 
Several researchers have quantified the welfare and fiscal effects of trade 
liberalisation in the context of multilateral trade negotiations in the World 
Trade Organisation, bilateral trade agreements, unilateral trade liberalisation 
and regional trade agreements.   It should be noted that the number of 
theoretical papers on the welfare effects of trade reform far exceed the 
number of empirical papers - which leaves much room for further empirical 
research in this field.  This section reviews existing research on assessing 
welfare and revenue effects, particularly with respect to the Caribbean. 
There are two main approaches to modelling the welfare and revenue effects 
– a general equilibrium framework (normally a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model) or a partial equilibrium framework.   While the 
general equilibrium framework assesses the impact of liberalisation on the 
economy as a whole and allows the linkages across sectors to be incorporated, 
the analysis is conducted at a very high level of aggregation which limits the 
applicability of findings to specific goods or services.  The partial equilibrium 
approach, on the other hand, allows detailed analysis at a fairly disaggregated 
level; however, it does not capture effects on the economy as a whole and 
cannot be used to explore inter-sector linkages (see Busse and Lüehje (2007), 
Busse and Grossmann (2007) and Milner et al. (2005)).  As this essay will focus 
on the impact of trade liberalisation at the highest level of detail available for 
Jamaica and CARICOM and given the paucity of data that would do justice to a 
CGE framework, a partial equilibrium approach will be used to assess how 
liberalisation ought to occur to maximise welfare and minimise revenue loss.   
In the context of the Caribbean, the most recent studies on the impact of trade 
liberalisation on fiscal revenue and welfare refer to the Economic Partnership 
Agreements.  Singh et al. (2014) assess the impact of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
five years after the agreement was signed in 2008.  Their assessment covers all 
the aspects of the EPA, including trade in goods, services, trade facilitation and 
development cooperation.  Of particular interest to this study is the 
methodology used to assess the trade in goods and revenue impact of the EPA. 
Singh et al. (2014) assess three scenarios: 
1. An “EPA Review” scenario that estimates the impact of the tariff 
reduction commitments made by both the EU and CARIFORUM 
countries during the review period (2008-2013); 
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2. A “full EPA” scenario that estimates the impact of tariff reduction 
commitments over the full implementation period of the EPA; and 
3. A “no-EPA” counterfactual scenario where there is no EPA and 
CARIRIFOUM states maintain pre-EPA tariffs on imports from the EU 
and CARIOFORUM imports are subject to GSP preferences by the EU. 
They utilise a partial equilibrium framework in the form of the World Bank’s 
TRIST, with elasticity estimates based on World Bank data, their own 
judgement and assumptions to simplify the model.  Import elasticity of 
demand estimates are based on World Bank data and their judgement.  Supply 
elasticity is assumed to be infinitely elastic and elasticities of substitution are 
assumed at various levels based on expert judgement.  In the model, they 
specify an importer and a set of exporters.  The simulation involves tariff 
changes by the importer which then lead to a change in the pattern of trade 
and the quantities demanded for individual products.  They find that in the 
early years of implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA over the period 2008 
to 2013, customs revenue fell by 2% for CSME countries (-US$30.7 million) 
compared with a projected loss of -13.27% when the full EPA is implemented.  
This is not surprising as Singh et al. (2014) note that CARIFORUM countries 
scheduled the high revenue products for later phases of liberalisation and so 
the revenue impact of the EPA on CARIFORUM states is ‘muted’ in the short-
term. 
Additionally, Milner et al. (2005); Morrissey et al. (2007); Busse and Lüehje 
(2007); and Gasiorek and Winters (2004) have also conducted studied on the 
impact of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.  Most of these studies are also set in a 
partial equilibrium framework which allows for analysis at a relatively detailed 
level.  Greenaway and Milner (2006) apply this framework to examine the 
welfare and revenue effects for CARICOM states of an EPA between the 
European Union (EU) and CARIFORUM, reciprocal liberalisation with both the 
EU and the United States (US), and multilateral liberalisation.  The model 
allows for different assumptions about the degree of substitutability between 
locally produced goods and imports – perfect substitution and imperfect 
substitution with increasing costs for local producers.  In the perfect 
substitution case, Greenaway and Milner (2006) note three effects of 
introducing a discriminatory tariff in a regional trade agreement where EU 
prices are higher than those in the rest of the world: 
I. A trade creation effect as a result of increased consumption (due to 
price reduction from high cost local/CARIFORUM suppliers to lower 
cost EU suppliers). 
II. An extra-regional trade diversion effect where goods that were 
previously imported from suppliers in the rest of the world (ROW) are 
now imported from less-efficient EU suppliers.  It should be noted that 
this cost also includes tariff revenue foregone from ROW suppliers. 
110 
 
III. A trade creation effect caused by the replacement of intra-regional 
suppliers with more efficient EU suppliers. EU suppliers may not be 
more efficient than ROW suppliers; however, to the extent that they 
have replaced less efficient regional suppliers, there is a positive 
“source substitution effect” of the EPA. 
The net welfare effect depends on the relative strength of the trade creation 
and diversion effects which are also dependent on the shape of the EU supply 
curve.  In the case of imperfect substitution, there are similar trade creation 
and diversion effects; however, the net welfare effect is even more difficult to 
predict.  Using imperfect substitution in their model, Greenaway and Milner 
(2006) find that overall welfare effects represent only a small percentage of 
GDP but there is substantial redistribution of rents from producers and 
governments to consumers.  As expected, they find that multilateral trade 
liberalisation yields the greatest welfare gains for CARICOM states, followed 
by reciprocal free trade agreements with both the EU and the US, and then an 
EPA.  Using a general equilibrium framework, Bussolo (2002) finds a similar 
ordering of policy options for Jamaica.  It therefore appears that though the 
models have differing uses and applicability, the core conclusions are the same 
– unilateral trade liberalisation yields the greatest improvement in welfare; 
however, the adjustment costs are significant.  This conclusion is also 
supported by Busse and Lüehje (2007) who find that although there will be 
significant gains from the EPA, the adjustment effects require a gradual 
approach to liberalisation, providing adequate time for governments to reform 
their tax systems, for example. 
Other studies such as Gasiorek and Winters (2004) highlight that it is the 
degree to which the EU price is below the ROW tariff-inclusive price that 
determines the magnitude of trade creation effects.  They also note that the 
welfare effects ultimately depend on the group that is the main supplier of 
goods to the market (EU or ROW), demand and supply elasticities, the level of 
the tariff, and the extent to which tariff reductions are passed on to 
consumers.   
Similar analyses have been conducted for African countries.  Bilal et al. (2012) 
conduct a review of studies undertaken on trade liberalisation and fiscal 
adjustments for African countries in the process of negotiating an EPA.  While 
finding that there is much variation of the findings of different studies, 
depending on the assumptions made in the model, Bilal et al. (2012) note that 
there are some common factors that seem to influence the fiscal impact of an 
EPA.  These factors include the country’s trade structure (for example, whether 
domestic production mainly comprises finished goods that compete with 
imports or is reliant on imports as inputs into the production process), demand 
for imports from the EU, the effective tariff rate, and the price elasticity of 
demand and substitution.  In addition, e that the implementation schedule of 
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the agreement is also very important in assessing the fiscal impacts of an EPA 
as an extended period for implementation may mitigate potential negative 
fiscal effects as the impact will be spread over time.  Indeed, the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA adopted this approach and high revenue items were 
scheduled for liberalisation during the last phase.  It is also noted that a 
country’s ability to identify alternative sources of financing is a key 
determinant of the fiscal impact of an EPA.  They also note that most studies 
tended to overestimate the fiscal impact of an EPA due to methodological 
errors as well as a lack of information on the commitments made for the 
agreement. 
Vollmer et al. (2009) apply the same model developed by Greenaway and 
Milner (2006) to assess the effects of interim agreements between the EU and 
nine Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, using the actual tariff rates that were 
negotiated based on the agreement’s phasing schedule.  Here, the comparison 
is between the short-run and long-run welfare effects of an EPA and full 
liberalisation. They find that four countries - Botswana, Cameroon, 
Mozambique and Namibia - seem likely to have net positive welfare effects 
from the agreement while the other five countries are predicted to have 
minimal trade effects.  Vollmer et al. (2009) estimate that the EPA is likely to 
have high trade creation and low trade diversion effects for these countries.  
Of interest, they estimate bilateral elasticities of import demand from 
disaggregated trade data and input them into the import demand function.  
Busse and Grossmann (2005) also use a partial equilibrium framework to 
analyse the impact of an EPA on West African countries and conclude that the 
adjustment costs associated with the EPA require a gradualist approach to 
trade liberalisation.  This point is supported by Morrissey et al. (2007) in their 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the trade and welfare implications of EPAs 
for ACP countries, and the specific case of an EPA between the East African Co-
operation (EAC) and the EU.  They conclude that the net welfare effects of an 
EAC-EU EPA are not consistent across sectors and depend on the costs of 
producing imports between the EU, and ROW and domestic sources.  Their 
analysis also suggests that it is more likely that the static effects of an EPA will 
be negative for ACP countries and that LDCs especially are not likely to have 
additional gains from an EPA by virtue of the fact that they would enjoy 
preferential access by virtue of the Everything But Arms initiative under the EU 
Generalised System of Preferences. 
Common themes in the empirical literature are the role of appropriate timing 
and sequencing in trade liberalisation, particularly where trade tax revenue 
constitutes an important source of fiscal revenue.  Additionally, there is the 
impact of dislocation of local and/or regional suppliers on the economy 
through job losses and also a loss of domestic tax revenue previously garnered 
from these suppliers.  The net welfare effect of trade liberalisation within the 
context of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is the result of three phenomena – a 
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change in consumption, trade diversion, and trade creation.  The first effect is 
the direct result of price changes on consumers and the trade diversion effect 
is the welfare loss realised from diverting trade from more efficient ROW 
suppliers to less efficient intra-regional suppliers (in the case of a Free Trade 
Agreement, for example).  On the other hand, trade creation occurs where 
domestic production is replaced by more efficient products from suppliers 
within the FTA.  Most studies suggest that the net welfare effects are small as 
a percentage of GDP in the long run.   However, in the short run, there are 
likely to be significant adjustment costs, and there may even be a welfare loss, 
as less efficient producers are forced to exit from the market resulting in job 
losses and reduced fiscal revenue for the government.  These short term 
effects prove especially challenging politically and present the greatest threat 
to the sustainability of reforms. 
This essay analyses the possibility of achieving WIRE reform outcomes within 
the context of full liberalisation of EU imports into Jamaica under a 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA under various scenarios.  These scenarios include the 
application of statutory tariff rates vis-à-vis the collected tariff rate on ROW 
imports; and the introduction of different tariff reform measures, for example, 
a linear cut in the collected tariff rate and a reduction of maximum tariff rates.  
In order to conduct the analysis, the study will utilise tools that have already 
been developed to analyse the impact of tariff reform scenarios – notably, 
work by the World Bank.  Before delving into the methodology of the study, 
the next section describes Jamaica’s trade and tariff structure in order to 
provide the context for the tariff reform scenarios that will be conducted.   
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4.3 Jamaica – Trade and Tariff Profile 
 
With an estimated population of 2.8 million, the Jamaican economy is very 
open and its trading pattern mirrors both its geographic location as well as its 
colonial past.  Data from the World Bank show that, in 2011, GDP amounted 
to $14.4 billion (current US$).6  In that same year, total merchandise exports 
amounted to US$1.5 billion while imports totalled US$6.4 billion; therefore, 
the economy had a merchandise trade deficit of almost $5 billion.    
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Trade Policy Review (TPR) 2010 notes 
that Jamaica imposes no restrictions or taxes on exports.  While exports are 
not taxed, the revenue generated from exports and the multiplier effect of 
increased income and production in the economy is usually reflected in higher 
total tax earnings from all tax categories.  Trade tax revenue constitutes a 
significant portion of overall fiscal revenue (amounting to between 27% - 28% 
of total revenue (WTO TPR (2010)), with the majority earned from General 
Consumption Tax and Special Consumption Tax on imports and customs 
duties.  The figure would be higher but for the large number of discretionary 
waivers and exemptions that are granted.  Given the economic difficulties that 
the country is facing and its current unsustainable level of public debt (at 142% 
of GDP for FY 2011/20127), trade tax revenue is seen as critical in supporting 
the government’s fiscal consolidation efforts.  Additionally, as one of the 
structural benchmarks under the IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) signed in 
May 2013, the Jamaican Government committed to reducing the number of 
discretionary waivers in an effort to increase treasury inflows. 
4.3.1. Trade Structure 
 
Data reported by the World Bank show that, in 2011, over 92% of Jamaica’s 
exports went to high-income economies while these economies accounted for 
61% of the country’s total merchandise imports.  As Jamaica does not maintain 
any export taxes or charges, there are no direct fiscal implications of further 
liberalisation that can be analysed with respect to exports.   The analysis here 
will therefore focus on Jamaica’s imports in 2011.  From UN COMTRADE data 
Jamaica’s main imports (goods) in 2011 were oil (accounting for over 36% of 
total imports), boilers and machinery, beverages and vehicles (Figure 4-1).   The 
country’s main source of imports in 2011 was the United States (see Figure 4-
                                                          
6  World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx. Date accessed: 
August 21, 2013.   
7 See IMF Country Report No. 13/126, ‘Jamaica Request for an Extended Arrangement 
Under the Extended Fund Facility’. 
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2), comprising 34% of total imports, followed by Venezuela at 15% of total 
imports.  In both these cases, the main import is petroleum and petroleum by-
products.  CARICOM partner Trinidad and Tobago is third with 13% of total 
imports and is followed by Brazil, China, Mexico and Japan. It is thus evident 
that the EU is not a major source of imports and the net welfare effect of an 
EPA is not likely to be positive.  Trade diversion is likely to exceed trade 
creation in this case as the EU is unlikely to displace petroleum imports from 
the United States and Venezuela. 
Figure 4-1: Jamaica's Top Ten Imports in 2011 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Jamaica’s Main Trading Partners in 2011 
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Trade with the EU 
 
Imports from the EU to Jamaica have declined from US$369 million in 2009 to 
US$354 million in 2010, then grew to US$426 million in 2011 and fell to US$385 
million in 2012.  In 2011, Jamaica’s imports from the EU totalled $436 million 
or approximately 7% of total imports, which represented an increase of 
approximately $74 million over the 2010 figure.  As shown in Figure 4-3, five 
industrial categories account for over 50% of imports from the EU – 
Manufacture of motor vehicles (14%); manufacture of other chemicals (13%); 
manufacture of general purpose machinery (13%); manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles (6%).  The majority of these items are subject to 
import duties.  However, it should be noted that 70% of non-agricultural tariff 
lines were duty-free and a further and 27% had applied rates of between 0%-
25% (see WTO TPR (2010)).   
 
Figure 4-3 Jamaican Imports from EU 2011 
 
 
With respect to exports (Figure 4-4), total exports from Jamaica to the EU was 
US$328 million in 2011.  Exports are concentrated in a few products – artificial 
corundum/aluminium oxide (62%), cane or beet sugar (15%) and undenatured 
ethyl alcohol (3%).  These products already face low tariffs and so, there would 
appear to be few benefits for existing Jamaican exports under an EPA.   
 
Total Imports from EU 2011
341 - Manufacture of motor vehicles
242 - Manufacture of other chemical products
291 - Manufacture of general purpose machinery
343 - Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines
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Figure 4-4 Jamaican Exports to the EU 2011 
 
Trade Agreements 
 
Jamaica is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) since its 
inception in 1973 and is in the process of further deepening integration 
through the implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy.  
Goods entering the country from CARICOM states enter the country duty-free, 
provided they meet the rules of origin, and the same applies to the country’s 
exports to other member states.   
The WTO Trade Policy Review (2010) outlines the bilateral agreements 
negotiated by the Community, to which Jamaica is a party, which includes 
preferential trade agreements with the Dominican Republic (1998), Cuba 
(2000), Colombia (1995), Costa Rica (2004) and Venezuela.   
The CARICOM/Costa-Rica and the CARICOM/Dominican Republic free trade 
agreements provide for reciprocal tariff concessions for goods from CARICOM 
More Developed Countries (MDCs), and Costa Rica and the Dominican 
Republic, respectively.  At the time of the Review, none of these two 
agreements was fully implemented.  The CARICOM/Venezuela Agreement is 
non-reciprocal and provides preferential access for most of CARICOM’s 
exports to the Venezuelan market.   The CARICOM/Colombia Agreement not 
only covers market access but also includes provisions for trade promotion and 
investment, and the phasing out of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs).  The 
CARICOM/Cuba agreement provides duty-free markets access for an agreed 
set of goods and includes provisions for trade promotion, services, intellectual 
Jamaican Exports to the EU 2011
Artificial corundum, whether or not chemically defined; aluminium oxide; aluminium
hydroxide.
Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form.
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property rights and other broad trade areas.  The latter agreement is being 
implemented provisionally by Jamaica. 
In addition to these agreements, Jamaica, as a CARICOM member, benefits 
from preferential trade agreements with major trading partners such as the 
United States, Canada and the European Union.  However, some of these 
arrangements have had to be modified to comply with WTO rules.  Jamaica’s 
trade with the European Union is currently governed by the CARIFORUM-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement (2008) which provides for reciprocal duty-
free treatment of exports from both groups.  Jamaica has begun to implement 
the phased reduction as detailed in the phasing schedule for the CARIFORUM-
EU EPA.  The Agreement goes beyond market access for goods to include 
provisions for services, public procurement, intellectual property rights, NTBs, 
and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures, among other areas.   
With respect to the United States, Jamaica benefits from the Caribbean Basin 
Trade Partnership Act (2000) which provides preferential access to the US 
market for certain goods detailed under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
and additional items that were excluded under the CBI such as footwear and 
petroleum products.  The WTO TPR (2010) reported that over 90% of Jamaica’s 
trade with the United States fell under the CBI according to Government of 
Jamaica sources.  Jamaica is party to negotiations with the United States for a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas; however, according to the Caribbean Office 
of Trade Negotiations (OTN), this process is considered dormant. 
Jamaica’s products have duty-free access to the Canadian market under 
CARIBCAN, an agreement between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Canada 
(1986).  The agreement provides duty-free access to over 97% of Jamaica’s 
exports to Canada, provided they meet the requisite rules of origin.  Excluded 
products include garments and footwear.  CARICOM and Canada are currently 
negotiating a WTO-compatible reciprocal trade agreement.  On November 30 
2011, the WTO General Council approved a new waiver for CARIBCAN until 
December 31 2013 whilst the parties move towards finalising a Trade and 
Development Agreement.  
 
4.3.2. Tariff Profile 
 
The WTO Trade Policy Review (2010) notes that Jamaica, as a member of 
CARICOM, has implemented the Common External Tariff (CET) which 
harmonizes tariff rates among members in the community. The CET is 0%-20% 
for industrial goods and 0%-40% for agricultural products. There is differential 
implementation of the CET among members of the Community, with member 
states being allowed to maintain a sensitive list to which CET rates would not 
apply and particular exceptions for members of the Organization of Eastern 
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Caribbean States (OECS) and Haiti.  According to the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas Article 83 (1), changes to the Common External Tariff have to be 
agreed by the CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development 
(COTED). Article goes on to state that COTED may alter or suspend the CET 
where: 
1. The product is not being produced in CARICOM 
2. The quantity of the good produced is not sufficient to meet the 
demand from the Community 
3. The quality of the good produced in the Community is below 
CARICOM standard or a standard authorised by COTED 
There are therefore instances where the CET is not uniform across the 
Community as member states seek derogations based on the exceptions 
outlined above. 
With respect to Jamaica itself, the WTO reports that the average tariff in 2011 
for agricultural products was 17.9% and 6% for non-agricultural products.  In 
its Trade Policy Review for Jamaica 2010, the WTO Secretariat noted the 
significant variation between the country’s applied and bound tariff rates.  In 
the case of agricultural products, for example, over 96% of goods in that 
category have duties bound between 50%-100% but only 1.5% of agricultural 
products have these rates applied to them at the border.  In fact, 41% of 
agricultural products in 2011 had duty-free status while a further 46% had 
applied rates of between 15% and 50%.  The case is slightly different for non-
agricultural products – 82% of which had lower average bound rates of 
between 25% and 50%.  Duty-free treatment was applied to 70% of non-
agricultural tariff lines and 27% had applied rates of between 0%-25%.   
The profile suggests that while the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) maintains 
relatively low applied rates when compared to its bound rates, it still retains 
the flexibility to increase tariff rates whenever it sees fit.  Indeed, applied rates 
were increased for certain categories of motor vehicles in 2013 in an attempt 
to garner increased revenue to improve the country’s primary surplus (a 
conditionality of the country’s Extended Fund Facility with the International 
Monetary Fund).  The applied rates vary by product category and Table 4-1 
outlines the main product groups and their average tariff rates.  The highest 
applied MFN tariff rates are found on: Fish and fish products (28.8%); animal 
products (26.5%); dairy products (25.2%); fruits, vegetables, plants (23%); and 
beverages and tobacco (23%).  The lowest applied MFN rates are found on 
imports of cotton (0%); non-electrical machinery (1.5%); and chemicals (2.6%).  
Petroleum products and chemicals constitute the larger share of imports 
valuing 27.3% (40.4% duty-free) and 13% (64.2% duty-free), respectively. 
Jamaica has high proportion of discretionary waivers, which can only be 
granted by the Minister of Finance and Planning.  The WTO TPR (2010) states 
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that the cost of exemptions and waivers amounted to greater than 50% of total 
trade tax revenue in 2007-2008 and fell to over 25% in 2009/2010.  There is 
therefore room to increase fiscal revenue simply by reducing the number of 
exemptions and waivers. 
 
Table 4-1: Jamaica Tariff Profile 
   
Tariffs and imports: Summary and duty ranges 
  
Summary   Total Ag Non-Ag     
Simple average MFN 
applied 
  
2011   
7.6   17.9   6.0   
 
 
  
 
Trade weighted average   2010   10.1   16.4   8.5     
                      
Frequency distribution  
Duty-
free 
0 <= 5 5 <= 10 10 <= 15 15 <= 25 25 <= 50 
50 
<=100 
> 100 NAV 
Tariff lines and import values (in %)  in % 
Agricultural products             
MFN applied 2011      41.6     4.6     1.5     4.0    14.3    32.3     1.5 0 0.2 
 Non-agricultural 
products 
            
MFN applied 2011      69.5     1.5     3.5     4.3    17.4     3.8       0 0  0.0 
           
Source: WTO Tariff Profile for Jamaica found at http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/JM_e.htm. Date Accessed: 
September 13, 2013. 
Applied Tariffs and Imports by product 
groups 
MFN applied duties 
(Tariff Lines) 
Imports 
(Value) 
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free 
  
in % 
 
in % in % 
Animal products 26.5 9.5 100 1.6 28.2 
Dairy products 25.2 11.7 75 0.8 8.1 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 23.0 34.2 100 1.6 23.9 
Coffee, tea 15.6 22.9 40 0.2 15.6 
Cereals & preparations 12.4 47.5 40 6.7 50.8 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 17.6 52.8 40 1.5 48.9 
Sugars and confectionery 19.0 37.5 40 1.6 3.3 
Beverages & tobacco 23.0 13.6 40 5.1 32.3 
Cotton 0.0 100.0 0 0.0 100.0 
Other agricultural products 5.6 82.5 40 0.9 81.3 
Fish & fish products 28.8 18.8 40 1.8 34.6 
Minerals & metals 4.1 74.6 50 8.4 63.0 
Petroleum 4.8 33.5 25 27.3 40.4 
Chemicals 2.6 84.7 40 13.0 64.2 
Wood, paper, etc. 7.0 58.3 20 6.0 48.4 
Textiles 3.1 84.0 25 1.4 40.6 
Clothing 19.8 0.9 20 1.1 0.1 
Leather, footwear, etc. 6.7 63.5 30 1.8 19.1 
Non-electrical machinery 1.5 91.8 25 6.6 78.0 
Electrical machinery 6.6 65.9 40 4.7 51.5 
Transport equipment 7.5 70.1 50 5.3 21.3 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 11.9 39.8 50 2.6 38.1 
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The data for this essay were obtained from Jamaica Customs and were cleaned 
to remove free zone imports and government purchases which do not attract 
duties and would therefore, have overestimated the taxable base if they were 
included in the data set.  Table 4-2 outlines the structure of the data.  It shows 
that of total trade taxes collected of $610 million in 2011, the General 
Consumption Tax (GCT) comprises 57% of the total taxes collected on imports, 
with tariff collections and the Special Consumption Tax comprising 28% and 
third 13%, respectively.  Total trade taxes collected from the EU amounted to 
$64.9 million, of which 54% was collected as GCT, 31% for tariffs, 8.4% for SCT, 
and 7% for Additional Stamp Duty.  It should be noted that GCT and SCT also 
apply to domestic products at the same rates; however, Additional Stamp Duty 
is only applied to imports. The trade weighted average MFN tariff rate is 9.8% 
and the collected tariff rate (what is actually collected at the border weighted 
by the amount of imports per tariff line) is 3.6%.  This suggests that the GOJ 
collects less than half of the value of statutory tariffs.  
 
Table 4-2: Jamaica TRIST Summary Data 
Summary of Jamaica Trade and Tariff Data for TRIST 
 
# of tariff lines 5091     
# of partners 127 
    
Total Imports 
(US$) 
6,226,419,840 
    
      
 
Statutory tariff Collected tariff Additional 
Stamp Duty 
General 
Consumption Tax 
Special Consumption 
Tax 
Total Value 
(US$) 
610,098,835 224,600,926 16,200,605 452,944,249 107,482,013 
Share Of Total   28.0% 2.0% 56.5% 13.4% 
Simple 
Average 
10.2% 7.7% 0.6% 15.1% 0.3% 
Weighted 
Average 
9.8% 3.6% 0.3% 7.0% 1.7% 
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4.4 Methodology 
 
There are several tools that may be used to analyse the impact of tariff reform 
on revenue and welfare.  Two of those tools developed by the World Bank are 
the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and the Tariff Reform Impact 
Simulation Tool (TRIST) which are partial equilibrium models developed to 
analyse the short-term impacts of tariff reform.  This section analyses the uses, 
structure and methodology of both tools with a view to determining the most 
suitable software for simulating the impact of tariff reform for Jamaica.  It then 
goes on to discuss the estimation of suitable elasticity values for the analysis 
and the calculation of the welfare effect. 
 
4.4.1. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
 
The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software was developed by the 
World Bank, working closely with various International Organizations such as 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
International Trade Centre (ITC), United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The software accesses and retrieves 
information on trade and tariffs from the UN COMTRADE Data Base, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis 
Information System (TRAINS), and the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 
Integrated Data Base (IDB). In addition, there is the Consolidated Tariff 
Schedule Data Base (CTS) that contains WTO bound tariffs, Initial Negotiating 
Rights (INR) and other indicators. It also provides an analytical tool – the Single 
Market Partial Equilibrium Tool (SMART) – which assesses the impact of tariff 
reform on revenue, welfare and trade flows. 
Methodology 
 
WITS allows the user to simulate different effects of various trade liberalization 
measures through the SMART tool.  The theoretical basis of the tool is the 
Armington model which assumes imperfect substitution between goods from 
different sources.  On the demand side, the model assumes a representative 
agent that chooses a composite good that maximises its welfare at a given 
general price level. The import demand elasticity determines changes in the 
consumption of the good based on changes in price.  The makeup of the 
composite good itself depends on the relative price of each good and the 
relationship between the relative price of the goods and their consumption is 
the Armington substitution elasticity. 
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On the supply side, SMART assumes infinite export supply elasticity, that is, 
exporters are price takers on the world market.  This means that in a perfectly 
competitive market in equilibrium, changes in demand will only affect the 
quantity supplied and not price.  This assumption can be changed, however, 
and the software can assume varying degrees of elasticity. 
SMART analyses trade policy impacts in terms of trade diversion, trade 
creation, price effect, and effects on tariff revenue, consumer surplus and 
welfare changes.  For SMART, trade diversion occurs where imports from one 
country increase as a result of a change in relative prices vis-à-vis other 
countries that export the same product but are not part of a preferential 
grouping such as a Free Trade Area (FTA).  Trade creation is the increase in 
imports as a result of a reduction in prices due to the removal of or decrease 
in a tariff rate.  Amjadi et al. (2011) note that SMART assumes infinite elasticity 
of supply by default but can also simulate cases where the supply curve of an 
imported good is characterised by finite elasticity.   
The software calculates the tariff revenue impact as the final ad valorem duty 
times the final import value minus the initial ad valorem tariff times the initial 
import value.  Amjadi et al. (2011) point out that the result is not automatic 
but depends in the elasticity of demand of the imported good.  They also note 
that SMART does not calculate the final consumer surplus. The welfare change 
is generally given as the reduction in deadweight loss as a result of the tariff 
reduction and comprises the effects of the changes in tariff revenue and 
consumer surplus as a result of increased imports.  The change in tariff revenue 
itself reflects two competing effects – a reduction in tariff revenue at the pre-
reform import quantity and an increase in tariff revenue from the post reform 
increase in imports.  Amjadi et al. (2011) note that in most cases, given the 
import demand elasticity assumptions of SMART, the simulation provides a net 
negative tariff revenue effect. 
In addition to SMART, WITS allows the user to simulate tariff cuts using 
prescribed formulas such as specification of new rate or new maximum rate, 
linear percentage cut or Swiss formula. Any number of different formulas, and 
variations of a given formula, may be applied for different products and 
countries. Both pre- and post-tariff cut rates are reported for every importer-
exporter combination and for each product at HS 6-digit level.   
The software also features a global simulation model (partial equilibrium) that 
analyses global trade policy changes at the industry (product) level. The 
framework employs national product differentiation, and allows for the 
simultaneous assessment of trade policy changes, at the industry level, on a 
global, regional, or national level. Results allow the assessment of importer 
and exporter effects related to trade values, tariff revenues, exporter 
(producer) surplus, and importer (consumer).  
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4.4.2. Tariff Reform Impact Simulation Tool (TRIST) 
 
TRIST was also developed by the World Bank and uses Microsoft Excel to 
perform trade policy simulations at a very detailed level; typically at the HS-8 
digit level.  According to Brenton et al. (2009), the main advantages of TRIST 
lie in its simplicity, transparency of formulas used, inexpensiveness, flexibility, 
and policy relevance due to the use of actual tariff revenue rather than 
simulated data based on statutory tariffs.  The tool also explicitly includes 
other taxes levied on trade such as value added taxes in the analysis of the 
impact of tariff reform on tax revenue, in general.  Other features, subject to 
data availability, include the ability to assess sensitive sectors in the short-run 
in terms of possible negative domestic employment and output effects, and 
the impact on household expenditure of price changes that result from trade 
reform.  Like SMART and other partial equilibrium models, TRIST does not 
assess the long-run economy wide impact of trade reform which would be 
more appropriate for general equilibrium models.   
Methodology 
 
TRIST uses two Excel files – the Data Aggregation Tool and the Simulation Tool 
– to perform trade policy simulations.  Brenton et al. (2009) note that the 
model has five main features: 
1. Using standard economic theory, elasticities determine the magnitude 
of the change in demand as a result of price changes due to tariff 
reform.   
2. The Armington assumption of imperfect substitution between similar 
goods applies; that is, consumers differentiate goods by source. 
3. There is no direct substitution between different products.   
4. There is an infinite supply of the import good.  This means that 
domestic changes in demand due to trade reform have no impact on 
global supply of the good in question. 
5. As a partial equilibrium tool, there is no capacity to analyse sectoral 
linkages and economy-wide impacts. 
 
The model assumes that a given change in the tariff is fully transmitted to the 
consumer and that there is no resulting change in the world price.  For a change 
in the tariff (with VAT and excise taxes remaining the same), TRIST utilises the 
following formula to calculate the percentage change in the price of good i 
from exporter j: 
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∆𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 =
⌊
𝑝𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑃𝑤𝑙𝑑
⌋ − [
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑃𝑤𝑙𝑑
]
[
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑃𝑤𝑙𝑑
]
=
(1 + 𝑡𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤)(1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑗)(1 + 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑗) − (1 + 𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)(1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑗)(1 + 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑗)
(1 + 𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)(1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑗)(1 + 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑗)
 
       =
𝑡𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤−𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑
(1+𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)
                                            (1) 
 
Where 
∆𝑝𝑗 – change in price of imports from country j 
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 – price of imports from j before tariff change 
𝑝𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 – price of imports from j after tariff change 
𝑃𝑤𝑙𝑑  – world market price 
𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑  – tariff rate applied to imports from country j before tariff change 
𝑡𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 – tariff rate applied to imports from country j after tariff change 
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑗- excise tax rate applied to imports from country j 
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑗  – VAT rate applied to imports from country j 
 
TRIST utilises a three-step process to calculate the effects of trade reform on 
fiscal revenue, demand for imports, and domestic production.  In the first 
instance, the model estimates an exporter substitution effect, for a user-
assumed export substitution elasticity, which shows how consumers substitute 
between imports from different trading partners as a result of changes in 
relative prices due to a preferential trading regime, for example.   Imports are 
held constant at this stage.  Brenton et al. (2009) highlight that the value of the 
export substitution elasticity determines the extent to which changes in 
relative prices lead to changes in relative imports from various sources.  The 
formula, provided below, utilised by TRIST at this stage deflates imports from 
each supplier post-substitution effects by the ratio of total imports for the 
particular product pre-tariff reform to the sum of total imports of the product 
from all suppliers post-substitution effect.   
 
𝑞𝑗
𝐸𝑆 = [
∆𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝛾𝑗
𝐸𝑆 + 1] 𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗
∑ (𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑗=1,…,𝑛
∑ {[
∆𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑∗𝛾𝑗
𝐸𝑆+1]𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑}𝑗=1,…,𝑛
        (2) 
Where: 
𝑞𝑗
𝐸𝑆 – imported quantity from country j after exporter substitution step 
𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 – imported quantity from country j before tariff reform 
𝛾𝑗
𝐸𝑆 – exported substitution elasticity for imports from country j 
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Provided that data on domestic production is available, the model then 
estimates the domestic substitution effect, for a user-assumed domestic 
substitution elasticity.  This effect captures the extent to which consumers 
substitute between imports and domestic production as a result of changes in 
relative prices of goods from these two sources.   The change in total imports 
from this step is distributed across all importers based on their share of the 
import market.  As the weighted average of the prices of imports from 
individual countries change, there is a change in total imports relative to 
domestic products.  The extent of this change is determined by the elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and imported products (eds).  The resulting 
change in total imports is then distributed across all sources of imports based 
on their share in total imports.  The model assumes that any change in total 
imports is matched by an equal change in domestic output in the opposite 
direction; hence, aggregate consumption is held constant at this stage.  
Formally, the model estimates the following equation: 
 
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝐷𝑆 = [
∆?̅?𝑖𝑚𝑝
?̅?𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝛿
𝐷𝑆 + 1] 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑        (3) 
𝑞𝑗
𝐷𝑆 = 𝑞𝑗
𝐸𝑆 + [𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝐷𝑆 − 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ] ∗ [
𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑
∑ (𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑗=1,…,𝑛
]      (4) 
Where: 
 
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑  – is initial total imports 
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝐷𝑆  – is total imports after substitution with domestic products 
𝑞𝑗
𝐷𝑆 – is quantity imported from supplier j after substitution between imports  
and domestic output 
𝛿𝐷𝑆 – is domestic substitution elasticity for imports from country j 
∆?̅?
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
= ∑ [
𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑
∑ (𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑗=1,…,𝑛
∗
∆𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑]𝑗=1,…,𝑛  is the change in the price of total imports 
 
Finally, the model calculates an overall demand effect which captures the 
change in demand, and ultimately domestic consumption, as a result of the 
change in prices of imports (equal to the change in the total price of imports 
weighted by their share in domestic consumption).   The change in 
consumption from this stage is distributed across imports and domestic 
production based on their initial shares of total consumption of the good.  The 
change in imports is then distributed across individual import suppliers based 
on their share in total imports.  The formula used by TRIST is: 
 
𝑄𝑇𝐷
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = [
∆?̃?
?̃?𝑜𝑙𝑑
∗ 𝜇𝐷 + 1] 𝑄𝑇𝐷
𝑜𝑙𝑑        (5) 
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝐷𝑆 + [𝑄𝑇𝐷
𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑄𝑇𝐷
𝑜𝑙𝑑] ∗ [
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑 +𝑄𝑑𝑜𝑚
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ]     (6) 
𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑞𝑗
𝐷𝑆 + [𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝐷𝑆 ] ∗ [
𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑
∑ (𝑞𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑗=1,…,𝑛
]     (7) 
Where 
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𝑄𝑇𝐷
𝑜𝑙𝑑 – is initial total demand for product i 
𝑄𝑇𝐷
𝑛𝑒𝑤 – is total demand after the change in the price of product i 
𝑄𝑑𝑜𝑚
𝑜𝑙𝑑  – is the initial quantity demanded for domestic products 
𝑄𝑑𝑜𝑚
𝑛𝑒𝑤  – is the final demand for domestic products 
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑛𝑒𝑤 – is the final demand for imports for product i 
𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 – is the amount imported form supplier j after all three effects from  
changes in the price of imports (exporter substitution, domestic 
substitution and the demand effects) 
𝜇𝐷 – is the elasticity of demand for product i 
∆?̃?
?̃?𝑜𝑙𝑑
= [
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑝
𝑜𝑙𝑑 +𝑄𝑑𝑜𝑚
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗
∆?̅?
?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑
] is the change in price of total domestic consumption 
 
 
The responsiveness of imports to price changes is determined by the elasticity 
of demand for imports which is assumed by the user of the tool.  TRIST provides 
default values of all these elasticities.  However, if the user chooses not to use 
these values, Brenton et al. (2009) point to the possibility of using import 
demand elasticities estimated in Kee et al. (2008), SMART, and local sources 
where available. 
 
4.4.3 Choice of Tool 
 
TRIST and SMART are both partial equilibrium models that assess the short-
term impact of trade reform.  TRIST operates at a more detailed level (HS-8) 
than SMART (HS-6) and the former utilizes actual collected revenue data while 
the latter simulates effects based on imports and the statutory applied tariff 
rate.  TRIST also explicitly includes additional duties and charges in its analysis 
of the impact of trade reform.  The theoretical framework for the two models 
is similar. Both use standard consumer demand theory and incorporate the 
Armington assumption.  The choice of tool depends on the level at which the 
analysis will be conducted and the ease with which other duties and charges 
on imports can be accommodated in the analysis.  Singh et al. (2014) note that 
the WITS/SMART framework is limited as it is not set up to include domestic 
production in the analysis of adjustments due to tariff reform.  While domestic 
production data is often not available at a similar level of detail to import data, 
it would be useful to have this as an option for modelling purposes.  In contrast, 
TRIST allows for the inclusion of domestic production data where available.   
This essay utilizes TRIST as the main analytical tool as it allows for analysis at 
the most detailed tariff line level and for the inclusion of additional duties and 
charges in the model, which are a significant source of government revenue 
for small island developing states such as Jamaica.   
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Both models have their limitations as reflected in the assumptions that 
underpin the framework.  Importantly, the models will not estimate a change 
in imports for a product from a source where the original import value is zero.  
This means that, for example, where Jamaica did not import cars from the EU 
before the EPA, the model will not show that there will now be imports of cars 
from the EU when the EPA is fully implemented.  This may not be a realistic 
assumption for all products.  However, as noted by Singh et al. (2014), TRIST 
and SMART are unable to factor the possible entry of new imports in their 
analysis as this would itself require a modelling approach to estimate the 
demand for these new products (and assuming infinite supply).  While this is a 
limitation, it does not diminish the value of these models to estimate the likely 
effects of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and other FTAs, given existing trade flows. 
4.4.4 Setting Elasticity Values for TRIST 
 
TRIST utilises elasticities to determine the responsiveness of alternative 
suppliers (both domestic and international) and demand to changes in price.  
Elasticities determine the final estimated effects of tariff reform.  In the 
“Elasticity Management” panel, TRIST provides the user with the option of 
choosing two default elasticity values for individual products – those used in 
the World Bank SMART simulation tool or values obtained from Kee et al. 
(2008).  The WITS user manual (2011) which outlines the SMART tool, however, 
states that the import demand elasticity values used in SMART are also based 
on estimates Kee et al. (2008).  With respect to the values for substitution 
elasticity, SMART uses 1.5 as the default value but it is recognised that a higher 
substitution elasticity value may be appropriate for primary products as 
compared to industrial products whose complexity of production suggests that 
there may be supply rigidity issues. 
This study will utilise the import demand elasticity values estimated by Kee et 
al. (2008) for Jamaica, given the rigour of the study and its ability to facilitate 
cross-country comparisons as the estimates of import demand elasticities for 
various countries are calculated using the same methodology.  The estimated 
import demand elasticities are defined by Kee et al. (2008) as the percentage 
change in the quantity demanded of an imported good when the price of this 
good increases by 1 percent, holding external prices, productivity levels, and 
endowments constant. 
With respect to Jamaica, Kee et al. (2008) estimate a simple average import 
elasticity of demand of -1.16 and an import weighted average import demand 
elasticity of -1.05.  The median value is -1.08 and the standard deviation is -
1.1.  This compares with the highest average import elasticity of demand in the 
study of -4.05 which belongs to Japan and the lowest average of -1.02 which is 
Suriname’s. For their study on the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Singh et al. (2014) 
utilize two variants of import demand elasticities in their model.  In the 
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“original elasticities” model, they use elasticity values based on World Bank 
(Kee et al. (2008) values), adjusted in a few cases with expert judgement. In 
the “simplified elasticities” model, an import demand elasticity of -1.16, which 
is the simple average import demand elasticity estimated by Kee et. al (2008) 
for some of the CARIFORUM countries studied, is used for all products.  
With respect to values for the elasticities of domestic and export substitution, 
there are fewer detailed empirical studies when compared to studies on 
import demand elasticity estimates.  In their review empirical studies on trade 
elasticities in Latin America, Fullerton et al. (1999) note that Gafar (1995) 
derives a relative price elasticity of imports to domestic products for Guyana 
of -0.32 (significant at the 5% level).  This estimate is in line with the general 
finding of Fullerton et al. (1999) that imports tend to be highly price inelastic 
in the Latin American region, with most of the values of relative price 
elasticities between 0 and -0.60.  They also note that estimates across import 
categories are similar; for example, in the case of agricultural and consumer 
goods in Brazil conducted by Zini (1988) and Weiskoff (1979).   
Another review conducted by McDaniel and Balistreri (2003) mainly focusses 
on US estimates of Armington elasticities at varying levels of aggregation of 
the SIC.   They note that higher estimates of substitution elasticity are usually 
observed as the level of disaggregation increases.   In this regard, Gallaway et 
al.’s (2003) average long-run Armington elasticity estimate of about 2 at the 4-
digit SIC level is much lower than Hummels’ (1999) 7 at the 3-digit SIC level.   
In their analysis of the impact of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Singh et al. (2014) 
utilise two alternative value of the elasticity of substitution.  In the first 
instance, they use a value of five for imports in categories HS01 to HS24 and 
1.5 for HS25 to HS92 and HS94 to HS97.  In the second instance (‘simplified 
elasticities” model, they utilise an elasticity of substitution value of 1.5 that is 
applied to all products.  This mirrors the default value in SMART/WITS. 
Due to the lack of agreement on set values for the elasticity of substitution, 
this study will apply the default value of 1.5 as used in SMART, which assumes 
that some source substitution is possible as a result of tariff reform.  However, 
I will also run the models with two alternative values for the elasticity of 
domestic substitution – eds=1 and eds=2 – to examine the sensitivity of model 
estimates to changes in this parameter. 
 
4.4.5. Calculating the welfare effect 
 
As discussed in the Literature Review, the net welfare effect depends on the 
relative strength of the trade creation and diversion effects which is also 
dependent on the shape of the supply curve.  Although the TRIST tool does not 
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calculate the welfare effect directly, it calculates trade diversion estimates for 
each scenario.  Using this information, the trade creation and ultimately, the 
welfare effects can be derived.  The welfare effect is calculated using the same 
methodology as Greenaway and Milner (2006) to analyse the effect of a 
Regional Economic Partnership Agreement between CARICOM and the EU in 
the case of perfect substitution.  The perfect substitution scenario, illustrated 
in Figure 4-5, is chosen as it is similar to the framework within which the 
scenarios are conducted in TRIST.  There are other approaches, such as Laird 
and Yates (1986) and Zafar (2005) to modelling the welfare effect; however, 
some, such as Kowalski (2005) do not apply to the CARIFORUM EPA where 
there is differentiated trade liberalisation, that is, tariffs will continue to be 
imposed on ROW imports while imports from the EU and CARICOM countries 
will enter duty-free. 
Figure 4-5: Effect of an EPA with Perfect Substitution – Greenaway and Milner (2006) 
 
 
Where 
DH represents the demand curve for a small home country in the regional 
agreement 
SP is the supply curve for producers in the home country 
 SEU is the supply curve for producers in the EU 
SROW is the supply curve for producers in the Rest of the World 
Greenaway and Milner (2006) start with an initial scenario of a tariff inclusive 
price, Pt, where the home country imports OM2, with OM1 coming from 
domestic suppliers and M1M2 from ROW sources.  In this simple case, there is 
assumed to be no domestic production (also true for the tariff simulations in 
TRIST due to lack of data) and therefore, the welfare effect is given by the 
triangle ABPtROW plus tariff revenue on extra-regional imports (a + b).  When 
goods from the EU are allowed duty-free while tariffs are applied to ROW 
imports, the ROW supply curve shifts upwards (StROW) and imports from the EU 
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now replace ROW imports and constitute the area OM3.  Greenaway and 
Milner (2006) note three effects, shown in Figure 4-5, of introducing a 
discriminatory tariff in a regional trade agreement where EU prices are higher 
than those in the rest of the world: 
I. A trade creation effect (M2M3) as a result of increased consumption 
(due to price reduction from high cost local/CARIFORUM suppliers to 
lower cost EU suppliers). 
II. An extra-regional trade diversion effect (M1M2) where goods that 
were previously imported from suppliers in the rest of the world 
(ROW) are now imported from less-efficient EU suppliers.  It should be 
noted that this cost also includes tariff revenue foregone from ROW 
suppliers (a + b).   
III. A trade creation effect (OM1) caused by the replacement of intra-
regional suppliers with more efficient EU suppliers (shown by c in 
Figure 4-5).  Consumer surplus increases by c + d which represents 
resource saving and the loss of producer surplus.  
 
In the final analysis, the welfare effects are unclear and depend on the weight 
of the consumption and trade creation effects (welfare increasing) and the 
trade diverting effects.  Formally, the change in welfare is given by: 
 
∆W= (c+d+e) – b       (8) 
 
The perfect competition case is highly stylised.  Where the price of EU imports 
is close to ROW sources, the trade diverting effects under the EPA are 
minimized.  However, governments may be concerned about revenue loss 
where it is shown that the EPA is likely to lead to a significant reduction in 
revenue from tariffs on ROW imports.  Additionally, the case presented 
assumes no domestic production; however, where this assumption does not 
hold (as is likely the case), the EPA will likely result in adjustment costs for the 
domestic market which will need to be addressed.   
 
It should also be noted that the assumptions for the elasticity values are likely 
to have a significant impact on the reform outcome.  Where the import 
elasticity of demand is low, one may expect to see less trade diversion effects 
than at higher elasticity of demand values.  Similarly, where the elasticity of 
export substitution is low, one may observe very limited replacement of ROW 
imports with EU imports, for example, and thus limited revenue and trade 
creation effects as a result of the EPA.  These issues are analysed fully in the 
next section where the tariff liberalisation scenarios under the EPA are 
presented and discussed. 
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4.5 Tariff Liberalisation Scenarios 
 
This section examines two tariff reform scenarios for the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
and their implications for tariff revenue, total tax revenue and welfare.  As 
cited by Singh et al. (2014), revenue concerns have been one of the main 
factors influencing the delay in implementing commitments made under the 
EPA.  In the case of Jamaica, however, revenue considerations may not 
necessarily be driven by the EPA as there is a high rate of discretionary waivers.  
In 2011, the government collected less than half of the value of statutory 
tariffs. It may therefore be possible to address revenue concerns post-EPA by 
reducing the amount of duty waivers and exemptions.  
The first two scenarios assess the revenue and welfare impacts of a highly 
stylized outcome of full liberalisation of all EU imports into Jamaica.  The 
scenarios serve as a yardstick to measure the most extreme revenue impacts 
possible and can therefore be used to judge the extent to which the end term 
EPA mitigates fiscal concerns.  For these scenarios, the model is estimated with 
both statutory and collected tariff rates to illustrate the impact of discretionary 
waivers (collected tariff rates) and to explore the possibility of mitigating 
negative revenue effects of the EPA (through applying statutory tariffs).  
Subsequently, the model estimates the revenue and welfare impact of the 
actual EU-CARIFORUM EPA to assess if Jamaica addressed revenue concerns in 
the final tariff commitments made.  A model is not estimated for the short-
term implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA as Singh et al. (2014) already 
highlight, based on the estimates from their model, that the revenue impact is 
quite small over the five-year period (2008-2013) and that the fiscal impacts 
are estimated to be much higher in the long run where tariffs on high revenue 
imports are slated for reduction.   
Additionally, the models assume that consumption tax rates stay constant.  
Based on the tariff revenue data available, the GCT already comprises the 
majority of total trade tax revenue at 57% in 2011.  The scenarios therefore do 
not envisage further increases in GCT at this time.  In fact, the GCT rates were 
reduced in 2012 from 17.5% to 16.5% and so, it would not be realistic to model 
an increase in GCT across the board.  A differentiated GCT structure is also not 
attractive due to the added inefficiencies that would attend the processing of 
transactions and returns. 
4.5.1. Full liberalisation of EU imports with Collected and Statutory Tariff 
Rates on ROW Imports 
 
TRIST may be used to estimate trade diversion as a result of full liberalization 
with the EU.  From this step, one can then estimate the welfare changes of a 
given tariff reform scenario, in addition to the revenue effects.  It should be 
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recalled that the formula used by TRIST to calculate trade diversion to the EU 
is: 
TDEU = MxsEU – M0EU      (9) 
where MxsEU = (M0EU + [M0EU*(-exs)*ΔPrm]*TM0/TMxsp) 
MxsEU is imports from the EU after the exporter substitution effect is applied. 
M0EU is the initial level of EU imports. 
exs is the elasticity of exporter substitution. 
ΔPrm is the change in the relative price of imports from the EU vis-à-vis other 
imports. 
TM0 is total initial imports of commodity i. 
TMxsp is total imports of commodity i after the substitution effect and change 
in relative price. 
The trade creation estimate is obtained from the following formula: 
TC = ΔMEU - TDROW      (10) 
For the tariff reform simulation exercise, two scenarios are examined: 
1. Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no 
(collected) tariff change for imports from CARICOM and the Rest of 
the World. 
2. Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff 
change for CARICOM imports; and the application of statutory tariff 
rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
 
For both scenarios, the value of the elasticity of domestic substitution is 1 and 
the elasticities of demand are Kee et al. (2008) estimates for Jamaican imports.  
Key results for Scenarios 1 and 2 with an elasticity of export substitution (Ees) 
value of 1.5 are summarized in Table 4-3.  Sensitivity analysis of changes in the 
Ees, with three alternative values of 1, 1.5, and 2, were conducted for all three 
scenarios and are reported in Table 4-5.   While the approach of applying a 
single Ees value to all products greatly simplifies the modelling approach, there 
are obvious limitations to the analysis.  These include the reality that different 
products have varying elasticities of export substitution, with some not having 
any real option of substitutability, particularly where there are not competing 
suppliers.  In a limited sense, the TRIST framework does account for some of 
that effect by not creating trade where initial imports are zero for that tariff 
line.  Nonetheless, the results have to be interpreted with the caveat that 
source substitution will actually take place at varying extents for different tariff 
lines. 
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In defining the first scenario, the “all duty free” option is selected for the EU 
and “no tariff change” for CARICOM and the Rest of the World (ROW).  The 
elasticity of export substitution is estimated at 1.5; the elasticity of domestic 
substitution at 1, and the elasticities of demand are Kee et al. (2008) estimates 
for Jamaican imports.   Total initial imports in 2011 amounted to US$6.2 billion, 
with $436 million from the EU, over $1 billion from CARICOM member states 
and $4.8 billion from ROW suppliers. In 2011, over 71% of total imports from 
CARICOM comprised petroleum products.  The remaining 29% comprised 
mainly imports of grain, beverages, meat, other food, paper and chemical 
products.  The TRIST simulation estimates that imports will increase by 0.4% or 
US$22.6 million as a result of full liberalization under the EU-EPA.  Revenue 
loss is estimated at 9% for collected tariff and 2.4% for total taxes on imports 
(includes the General Consumption Tax, Additional Stamp Duty and other 
duties) from the pre-EPA full liberalization level.  The fall in import duties of 
$20 million is close to Busse and Lüehje’s (2007) estimated reduction in 
revenue from import duties of $22.2 million using 2002 data.  When there is 
no change in the tariffs applied to petroleum products under an EPA, the 
estimated reduction in import duties is slightly less at $19 million.  There is 
minimal impact on petroleum imports in the model as the UEU is not a 
significant source of petroleum imports for Jamaica. 
For scenario 2, statutory tariff rates are applied to imports from the Rest of the 
World while there is no change in the tariff regime for imports from CARICOM, 
and EU imports are now duty-free.  Similar to the first scenario, the elasticity 
of export substitution is assumed to equal 1.5; the elasticity of domestic 
substitution at 1, and the elasticities of demand are Kee et al. (2008) estimates 
for Jamaican imports.  As outlined in Table 4-3, with the application of 
statutory tariff rates to ROW imports, total imports fall by over $338 million or 
5.4% from the pre-EPA level.  However, there are strong positive revenue 
effects as collected tariff revenue increases by 54.7% or $123 million.  Total tax 
revenue (which includes tariff revenue as well as revenue from General 
Consumption Tax (GCT), Additional Stamp Duty, and Special Consumption Tax) 
increases by 13.5% or $108 million.  It is noted that the increase in total tax 
revenue is less than the increase in tariff revenue.  This is due to the fact that 
revenue from other duties and charges fall because of the reduction in value 
of ROW imports (ROW imports fall by over $345 million) compared to a much 
smaller rise in imports from the EU (almost $33 million).  It should be recalled 
that other duties and charges are levied on the tariff inclusive price, that is, the 
tariff is added to the value of imported good.  As an illustration, under scenario 
2, Additional Stamp Duty calculated for tariff line 020130100 (additional beef 
cuts of high quality) fell from $2,186 pre-reform to $2,037 post-reform 
because ROW imports of this line item fell and even though tariff revenue 
increased, it was not enough to offset the reduction in the value of goods 
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imported.  Practically, this means that the effect of tariff reform on total 
revenue is very important as while an increase in the tariff is likely to increase 
tariff revenue, depending on elasticity assumptions, the effect on other duties 
and charges is not as straightforward.  The change in other duties and charges 
is dependent on the same elasticities that determine the change in value of 
imports in response to tariff reform as the value of imports is the main basis 
on which these charges are levied. 
 
Table 4-3: Trade and Revenue Impact of Full Liberalisation for Jamaica under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
Impact on imports:  Scenario 1 
(Ees=1.5) 
Scenario 2  
(Ees =1.5) 
Imports pre $6,226,419,840 $6,226,419,840 
Imports post $6,249,067,713 $5,888,048,811 
     
Change in imports $22,647,873 -$338,371,029 
% change in imports 0.4% -5.4% 
     
Impact on Revenue:   
 
Collected Tariff revenue pre $224,600,926 $224,600,926 
Collected Tariff revenue post $204,336,619 $347,481,019 
     
Change in collected tariff revenue -$20,264,307 $122,880,092 
% change in collected tariff revenue -9.0% 54.7% 
     
Total Tax Revenues on Imports   
 
Total revenue pre $801,227,793 $801,227,793 
Total revenue post $782,208,856 $909,223,928 
     
Change in Total revenue -$19,018,937 $107,996,135 
% change in Total revenue -2.4% 13.5% 
     
Collected Tariff rate:   
 
Collected applied tariff rate pre 3.6% 3.6% 
Collected applied tariff rate post 3.3% 5.9% 
% change in collected applied tariff rate -9.4% 63.6% 
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
 
Table 4-4 summarises the changes in the pattern of trade as a result of 
liberalisation under the EPA under both scenarios.  Using calculations from the 
four-step TRIST calculation, imports from the ROW and CARICOM decrease and 
are replaced by EU imports after accounting for the exporter substitution 
effect under Scenario 1.  The demand effect then leads to an increase in 
imports from the EU and much smaller reductions in imports from CARICOM 
135 
 
and the ROW.  For Scenario 2, the reduction in imports from CARICOM and the 
ROW is much larger (over $26 million and $340 million, respectively).  This 
suggests that there is much greater displacement when statutory tariffs are 
applied and therefore, the trade diversion estimates are expected to be 
greater under Scenario 2. 
Table 4-4: Change in Pattern of Imports – Scenarios 1 and 2 
Change in Pattern of Imports Scenarios 1 
and 2 (US$ million) 
      
  EU CARICOM ROW Total 
Initial Imports          436.24           1,035.79           4,754.39           6,226.42  
Scenario 1         
Imports after Exporter 
substitution effect 
         450.66           1,034.93          4,740.83          6,226.42 
Imports after demand 
effect 
         460.77           1,035.77           4,752.53           6,249.07  
Scenario 2         
Imports after exporter 
substitution effect 
         477.93           1,078.50          4,669.95           6,226.38 
Imports after demand 
effect 
         469.21          1,009.65          4,409.19           5,888.05  
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
4.5.2. Trade Diversion, Trade Creation and Net welfare effects 
 
Table 4-5: Revenue and Welfare Effects of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA for Jamaica - Scenarios 1 and 2 
Ees 
Value 
 Trade 
Creation (US$)  
 Trade Diversion  
(US$) 
 Net Welfare 
Effect (US$)  
% change in 
total tax 
revenue 
% change in 
tariff revenue 
Scenario 1: ROW and CARICOM No tariff change; EU duty-free 
  
1 10,376,670  9,187,788  19,616.55  -2.30% -8.70% 
1.5 10,967,103 13,560,794  -42,795.90 
 
-2.40% -9% 
2 11,539,276 17,805,628 -103,394.81 
 
-2.50% -9.30% 
Scenario 2: Statutory rates ROW and No tariff change CARICOM; EU duty free 
1 18,294,176 52,631,792    -995,790.86 
   
14.00% 56.90% 
1.5 32,973,222 84,442,734   -1,492,615.85 
 
13.50% 54.7% 
2 
 
58,728,530 141,191,937  -2,391,438.80 
 
12.70% 51.50% 
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
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For Scenario 1, trade diversion effects of the EPA (with Ees = 1.5) are estimated 
as $14.4 million in TRIST, with $13.56 million and $862,000 diverted from the 
ROW and from CARICOM, respectively (see Table 4-5 and Figure 4-6)).  In line 
with Milner et al.’s (2005) estimation of welfare effects under an EPA, trade 
creation also occurs where Jamaican imports from CARICOM move from less 
efficient CARICOM producers to more efficient EU producers.   
 
  
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
 
Sensitivity analysis of estimates to changes in the value of the elasticity of 
export substitution were conducted for Ees = 1 and Ees = 2.  Higher elasticity 
of export substitution values should mean that it is easier for consumers to 
switch between alternative sources; that is, there is increased competition 
based on price (assuming that the products are sufficiently similar).  The 
converse is also true.  Lower elasticity of export substitution values should 
mean that it is more difficult for consumers to switch suppliers and thus, lead 
to lower trade diversion estimates.  At the same time, in the case of a regional 
trade agreement, an increase in the tariff may have limited welfare effects as 
consumers may have to pay a higher price for goods from the extra-regional 
supplier if there is no regional supplier.  These effects are illustrated by using 
alternative values of the elasticity of export substitution.   
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Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
 
Figure 4-8: Scenario 1 Net Welfare Effects 
 
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
 
When the Ees is reduced to 1, there is a marginal fall in the change in tariff and 
total tax revenue of 0.1 percentage point and 0.3 percentage point, 
respectively (see Figure 4-7).  The trade diversion and trade creation estimates 
are also lower when compared to the values obtained for Ees = 1; however, 
the change in the trade diversion is more substantial, falling by over $4 million.  
This result suggests that based on the relatively low source substitution 
parameter (Ees=1) and the elasticity of demand for imports estimates, there is 
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Figure 4-7: Scenario 1 Change in Tariff and Total Tax Revenue 
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less trade diversion as consumers change the source of imports from ROW 
suppliers to EU suppliers to a smaller extent when compared to an Ees value 
of 1.5.   
The net welfare effect is small and positive in the case of Ees = 1 and negative 
in the case of Ees = 1.5 (Figure 4-8).  As expected, when the Ees is increased to 
2, the values of trade creation and trade diversion are higher, as well as the 
percentage change in total tax and tariff revenue.  The welfare effect is also 
small and negative in this case.  However, when one examines the range of 
values for trade creation and those for trade diversion, it is clear that trade 
diversion estimates are the most sensitive to changes in the Ees.   
The trade diversion and trade creation effects are much higher under Scenario 
2 which is expected given the effective removal of tariff exemptions for 
imports from the ROW under this scenario (see Fig 4-9).  The trade diversion 
effects of the EPA are estimated at $84 million in TRIST. The trade creation 
effect is estimated at $1.5 million which is the change in EU imports after the 
consumption effect.  This therefore means that there is a welfare loss (-$1.5 
million) when imports from the EU enter the Jamaican market duty-free and 
statutory rates are applied to ROW imports.  It should be recalled, however, 
that under this scenario, there were large positive revenue effects (over $123 
million increase in tariff revenue) which may offset the welfare loss. 
 
Figure 4-9: Scenario 2 Trade Diversion and Trade Creation Estimates 
 
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
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Figure 4-10: Scenario 2 Change in Tariff and Total Tax Revenue 
 
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
 
Similar to Scenario 1, sensitivity analysis of estimates to changes in the value 
of the elasticity of export substitution were conducted for Ees = 1 and Ees = 2.  
When the Ees is reduced to 1, there is a 2.2 percentage point increase in total 
tariff revenue.  This compares to a fall of 3.2 percentage points when the Ees 
is increased to 2 (see Figure 4-10).  As expected, the net welfare loss increases 
as the elasticity of export substitution increases, moving from -$995 million at 
Ees = 1 to -$2.4 billion at Ees = 2 (see Figure 4-11).  
 
Figure 4-11: Scenario 2 Net Welfare Effect 
   
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
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4.5.3 Analysis by International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
Given that both Scenarios 1 and 2 apply changes to different tariff rates, it is 
expected that both scenarios would have different impacts on the collected 
tariff rate for various industries.  As an example, Figure 4-12 illustrates the 
collected applied tariff rates by ISIC after the implementation of tariff reform 
under both scenarios.  Results are shown for the top 10 industries with the 
largest reduction in imports under Scenario 2 where imports from the EU and 
CARICOM enter the Jamaican market duty-free and statutory tariff rates are 
applied to imports from the Rest of the World.  An Ees of 1.5 is assumed for 
both scenarios.  It should also be noted that the value of the elasticity of 
substitution is a major determinant of the final changes in imports from 
various sources.  In reality, Scenario 2 would have to be implemented based 
on careful analysis of individual products as applying statutory tariffs to ROW 
imports on products such as petroleum could have a deleterious effect on the 
economy.  Other trading partners may also demand similar treatment to the 
EU and resist any perceived increase in the effective tariff.  
 
Figure 4-12: Collected Applied Tariff Rate by ISIC Sector Scenarios 1 and 2 
 
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
Scenario 2: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market; no tariff change for CARICOM 
imports; and the application of statutory tariff rates to imports from the Rest of the World. 
The industries that experience the highest reduction in imports under Scenario 
2 are: 
• 232 - Manufacture of refined petroleum products 
• 151 - Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, oils and fats 
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• 341 - Manufacture of motor vehicles 
• 154 - Manufacture of other food products 
• 369 - Manufacturing n.e.c. 
• 252 - Manufacture of plastics products 
• 261 - Manufacture of glass and glass products 
• 269 - Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 
• 251 - Manufacture of rubber products 
• 242 - Manufacture of other chemical products 
 
In most cases, the collected applied tariff rate more than doubles from its 
initial value; for example, the collected applied tariff rate for the manufacture 
of refined petroleum products and for the manufacture of motor vehicles 
move from 0.46% and 10.40% to 3.87% and 20.09%, respectively (see Table 4-
6).  In the case of motor vehicles, imports from the EU increased by over $14 
million under scenario 2, with the share of EU imports in total motor vehicle 
imports increasing from 17.3% pre-reform to 24% post-reform.  It should also 
be noted that, as TRIST does not estimate changes for tariff lines with an initial 
value of zero, where there are no initial imports from the EU in a particular 
tariff line, the demand effect is especially strong as consumers face higher 
prices to purchase the same goods due to the application of statutory tariff 
rates. 
In contrast, the change in the collected applied tariff rate is much lower under 
Scenario 1.  For petroleum products and motor vehicle industries, the collected 
applied tariff rates move from the initial levels of 0.46% and 10.4% to 0.45% 
and 8.58%, respectively.  Both scenarios therefore yield very different trade 
diversion and trade creation effects and consequently, varied net welfare 
effects.  For Scenario 1, the Top 10 industries with the largest increases in 
import value are: 
• 341 - Manufacture of motor vehicles 
• 155 - Manufacture of beverages 
• 151 - Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, oils and fats 
• 011 - Growing of crops; market gardening; horticulture 
• 242 - Manufacture of other chemical products 
• 269 - Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 
• 152 - Manufacture of dairy products 
• 154 - Manufacture of other food products 
• 343 - Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines 
• 101 - Mining and agglomeration of hard coal 
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Table 4-7 shows the changes in the collected applied tariff rate for these 
industries under both scenarios at an Ees of 1.5.  In the case of scenario 1, 
these rates are reduced and this has a positive overall effect on demand and 
consequently increases imports from these industries.  In the case of motor 
vehicle imports, the share of imports from the EU increases from 17.3% to 19% 
- less than the increase observed under Scenario 2.  Motor vehicle imports 
from the EU increase by over $7.3 million while ROW imports of motor vehicles 
fall by approximately $800,000.  This is not surprising as the lower change in 
tariffs on ROW imports means that there is less source substitution and 
consequently, only a minor reduction in ROW motor vehicle imports.  
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Table 4-6: Top 10 Industries by Imports Value Change for Scenario 1 
RESULTS BY ISIC SECTOR 
          
 
Protection (Collected applied tariff rate) Price Change for Imports Initial Value of  Value Change 
 
% Change in imports 
ISIC Initial Rates Post Scenario 1 Post Scenario 2  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 Imports Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
341 - Manufacture of motor 
vehicles 
10.40% 8.58% 20.09% -1.56% 10.67% 351,471,551 6,566,486 -45,990,003 1.87% -13.08% 
155 - Manufacture of beverages 4.30% 3.03% 1.92% -1.15% -2.10% 198,669,622 3,485,620 5,643,207 1.75% 2.84% 
151 - Production, processing and 
preservation of meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, oils and fats 
5.27% 4.72% 7.54% -0.48% 4.25% 365,045,414 2,434,779 -50,218,001 0.67% -13.76% 
011 - Growing of crops; market 
gardening; horticulture 
3.54% 2.33% 3.01% -0.99% 0.01% 194,933,187 2,227,563 -1,670,690 1.14% -0.86% 
242 - Manufacture of other 
chemical products 
5.18% 4.83% 5.86% -0.31% 0.81% 297,990,725 1,040,387 -3,710,465 0.35% -1.25% 
269 - Manufacture of non-
metallic mineral products n.e.c. 
11.85% 10.21% 13.30% -1.34% 1.83% 73,528,592 1,024,782 -5,868,754 1.39% -7.98% 
152 - Manufacture of dairy 
products 
6.71% 5.27% 10.73% -1.26% 4.59% 57,341,256 926,671 -2,601,924 1.62% -4.54% 
154 - Manufacture of other food 
products 
6.48% 6.12% 16.12% -0.31% 10.84% 221,741,816 751,089 -39,203,217 0.34% -17.68% 
343 - Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
10.79% 9.84% 10.08% -0.78% -0.55% 59,781,915 624,243 450,419 1.04% 0.75% 
101 - Mining and agglomeration 
of hard coal 
4.99% 0.00% 0.01% -4.76% -4.75% 7,459,043 319,202 318,853 4.28% 4.27% 
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Table 4-7: Top 10 Industries by Imports Value Change for Scenario 2 
RESULTS BY ISIC SECTOR 
          
 
Protection (Collected applied tariff rate) Price Change for Imports Initial Value of  Value Change 
 
% Change in imports 
ISIC Initial Rates Post Scenario 1 Post Scenario 2  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 Imports Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
232 - Manufacture of 
refined petroleum 
products 
0.46% 0.45% 3.87% -0.01% 3.60% 1,347,858,663 214,137 -125,683,773 0.02% -9.32% 
151 - Production, 
processing and 
preservation of meat, 
fish, fruit, vegetables, oils 
and fats 
5.27% 4.72% 7.54% -0.48% 4.25% 365,045,414 2,434,779 -50,218,001 0.67% -13.76% 
341 - Manufacture of 
motor vehicles 
10.40% 8.58% 20.09% -1.56% 10.67% 351,471,551 6,566,486 -45,990,003 1.87% -13.08% 
154 - Manufacture of 
other food products 
6.48% 6.12% 16.12% -0.31% 10.84% 221,741,816 751,089 -39,203,217 0.34% -17.68% 
369 - Manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
5.37% 4.98% 20.75% -0.33% 20.69% 73,638,004 79,813 -28,219,927 0.11% -38.32% 
252 - Manufacture of 
plastics products 
5.66% 5.52% 12.13% -0.13% 6.30% 129,883,222 197,448 -10,666,467 0.15% -8.21% 
261 - Manufacture of 
glass and glass products 
1.51% 1.46% 10.34% -0.05% 9.08% 48,459,700 30,618 -6,864,365 0.06% -14.17% 
269 - Manufacture of 
non-metallic mineral 
products n.e.c. 
11.85% 10.21% 13.30% -1.34% 1.83% 73,528,592 1,024,782 -5,868,754 1.39% -7.98% 
251 - Manufacture of 
rubber products 
11.01% 10.78% 15.52% -0.19% 4.20% 72,973,826 159,077 -3,836,731 0.22% -5.26% 
242 - Manufacture of 
other chemical products 
5.18% 4.83% 5.86% -0.31% 0.81% 297,990,725 1,040,387 -3,710,465 0.35% -1.25% 
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4.5.4. Scenario 1 Summary Results by Product 
 
It would be useful to examine Scenario 1 in more detail in order to set a basis 
for examining alternative scenarios of tariff reform that may increase revenue 
while enhancing welfare at the same time.  It should be recalled that in 
Scenario 1, the “all duty free” option is selected for the EU and “no tariff 
change” for CARICOM and the Rest of the World (ROW).  The elasticity of 
export substitution is estimated at 1.5; the elasticity of domestic substitution 
at 1, and the elasticities of demand are Kee et al. (2008) estimates for Jamaican 
imports.   The TRIST simulation estimates that under this scenario imports will 
increase by 0.4% or US$22.6 million as a result of full liberalization under the 
EU-EPA.  Revenue loss is estimated at 9% for collected tariff and 2.4% for total 
taxes on imports (includes the General Consumption Tax, Additional Stamp 
Duty and other duties) from the pre EPA full liberalization level.  With respect 
to the net welfare effect, the simulation showed a small net welfare loss of -
$42,796 at an elasticity of export substitution value of 1.5.  The sensitivity 
analysis showed that the net welfare effect is small and positive in the case of 
Ees = 1 and negative in the case of Ees = 2 at a value of (-$103,395), which led 
to the conclusion that the Ees value had a very strong effect on the trade 
diversion estimate as diversion increased substantially as the Ees value was 
raised.  It would appear that at lower Ees values, the EPA would result in less 
consumers switching from ROW to EU suppliers. 
Table 4-8: Average Collected Applied Rates 
Average Collected Applied Tariff Rates 
  
 
Pre 
Scenario 1 
Post 
Scenario 1 
Import Weighted Average Collected Applied Tariff 
Rate 
3.6% 3.3% 
Import Weighted Average ROW Collected Applied 
Tariff Rate 
4.284% 4.281% 
Simple ROW Average Collected Applied Rate 7.43265% 7.43121% 
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
 
Table 4-8 provides summary statistics on the average import weighted applied 
tariff for imports in general and ROW imports specifically.  It shows that the 
average collected applied tariff rate (weighted by imports) declines by 9.4% as 
a result of full trade liberalisation of EU products.  The average applied tariff 
for ROW imports declines marginally from 4.284% to 4.281%.  In real terms, 
while total imports increase by $22.6 million after full liberalisation of EU 
imports under the EPA, ROW imports decline by -$1.9 million.  This explains 
the marginal change in the import weighted average ROW collected applied 
tariff as the change in ROW imports is relatively small.  However, the change 
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in revenue is much greater.  Under this scenario, collected applied tariff 
revenue declines by $20.3 million and total fiscal revenue (tariff revenue plus 
value added taxes, and stamp duties, etc.) declines by $19 million.   
In order to assess the main products that would generate the revenue loss, 
Table 4-9 lists the Top 25 tariff lines with the highest revenue loss (see 
Appendix 4A for tariff line descriptions).  These 25 lines constitute 59% of the 
total loss in collected applied tariff revenue and 61% of the loss in ROW tariff 
revenue.  Of the 25 lines, 10 are related to motor vehicle imports of varying 
engine sizes.  The product with the highest revenue loss is onions.  Motor 
vehicles of engine size between 2000cc and 3000cc; other potatoes, prepared 
or preserved; tiles, cubes, etc; and Motor vehicles of engine size between 
2500cc and 3200cc round out the Top 5.    For these products, the net welfare 
loss/gain varies.  For example, although onions have the highest revenue loss 
for any tariff line, there is a small welfare gain as a result of full liberalisation 
with the EU under an EPA.   
Like other free trade agreements, trade liberalisation is considered to take 
place within the trade agreement once substantially all trade is not subject to 
import duties (see Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994).  In practice, for the EPA, ‘substantially all trade’ has been interpreted to 
mean that at least 80% of trade in goods between CARICOM and the EU would 
have to be liberalized.  Table 4-10 provides the share of these top 25 tariff lines 
in total EU imports.  In order to avoid negative revenue effects, Jamaica may 
simply exclude the majority of these lines from import liberalisation as their 
exclusion would still mean that substantially all trade has been liberalized.  If 
the condition used is 20% of EU trade before the tariff reform scenario is 
implemented, then 21 out of the 25 products could be excluded as they 
comprise 19% of total EU imports into Jamaica.  If the condition is 20% post-
scenario, then 19 of these lines could be excluded, comprising 20% of total EU 
imports.  It would be therefore instructive to compare these results with the 
actual end term EU-CARIFORUM EPA that was negotiated with excluded 
products. 
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Table 4-9: Top 25 Tariff lines by Revenue Loss with Change in Imports and Welfare (US$) 
 Tariff Line ROW Post 
collected applied 
tariff 
Change in 
Collected Applied 
Tariff Revenue 
(US$) 
Change in Collected 
Applied Tariff 
Revenue from ROW 
Imports (US$) 
Change in Total 
Fiscal Revenue 
(US$) 
Change in Total 
Fiscal Revenue 
from ROW Imports 
(US$) 
Total Change in 
Imports (US$) 
Change in Imports 
from ROW (US$) 
NET WELFARE 
LOSS/GAIN (US$) 
Total   -20,264,307 -256,600 -19,022,713 -622,762 22,644,920 -1,862,552 -42,796 
0703101000 35.8% -1,616,022 1,089 -1,562,488 2,450 1,766,240 3,045 23,915 
8703234030 8.2% -1,245,245 -16,054 -1,088,750 -58,484 1,416,168 -194,600 -11,219 
2004109000 18.3% -1,073,052 -15,663 -1,064,370 -38,354 1,115,259 -85,775 2,250 
6908901000 17.9% -925,794 -42,613 -948,134 -100,073 813,958 -237,630 -11,347 
8703339030 10.3% -911,467 -14,559 -831,948 -44,710 926,348 -140,909 -1,560 
8703233030 10.5% -887,791 -16,533 -823,399 -49,590 1,009,035 -156,809 -12,640 
0701900000 40.0% -657,645 -19,132 -657,661 -19,148 426,827 -47,838 3,634 
2202909030 20.0% -654,169 8,669 -473,863 29,943 1,095,390 43,344 10,830 
2204100010 28.4% -477,708 -16,385 -504,596 -65,708 432,384 -57,634 -1,112 
8703232031 12.4% -389,798 -6,998 -350,777 -21,121 434,668 -56,651 -3,748 
2701190000 5.0% -372,402 -1 -384,372 -6 319,202 -21 5,265 
8703322031 10.0% -289,262 -251 -274,088 -646 346,855 -2,520 5,129 
0402210010 0.0% -278,521 0 -278,521 0 317,057 -2,410 2,820 
2208700020 11.7% -226,193 193 -203,105 592 297,421 1,653 2,692 
8703234010 20.6% -219,463 -5,125 -177,125 -7,509 235,835 -24,912 -3,144 
2005519000 16.6% -202,296 7,550 -151,801 17,910 433,603 45,386 4,111 
8703249032 15.9% -197,737 187 -138,589 851 274,620 1,177 2,256 
8418300000 19.5% -184,821 -5,945 -186,308 -13,970 177,517 -30,414 -1,440 
8703233011 17.0% -181,066 -3,602 -171,504 -3,707 195,756 -21,235 -2,568 
2208201020 0.9% -168,588 192 -101,414 1,996 433,916 21,536 5,982 
8703339011 16.4% -166,800 -4,643 -143,684 -6,832 160,679 -28,281 -1,673 
2106909010 17.8% -164,587 -5,322 -172,060 -12,687 142,141 -29,882 386 
8703232030 13.3% -158,822 -3,717 -158,371 -9,737 182,550 -27,938 -1,515 
1904100000 18.7% -156,050 -3,147 -159,115 -7,633 142,420 -16,796 932 
2004909000 20.0% -154,524 5,600 -126,573 13,160 278,760 28,007 1,784 
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Table 4-10: Proportion of EU imports in each tariff line in total EU imports Pre and Post Scenario 1 
 
Tariff Line Change in 
Collected 
Applied 
Tariff 
Revenue 
(US$) 
Pre-Scenario 1 
Proportion of 
Tariff line Imports 
in total EU 
Imports 
Pre-Scenario 
1 
Cumulative 
Proportion  
Post-
Scenario 1 
Proportion of 
Tariff line in 
total EU 
Imports 
Post-Scenario 
1 Cumulative 
Proportion 
0703101000 -1,616,022 0.93% 0.93% 1.26% 1.26% 
8703234030 -1,245,245 3.49% 4.42% 3.65% 4.91% 
2004109000 -1,073,052 1.26% 5.67% 1.45% 6.36% 
6908901000 -925,794 1.11% 6.78% 1.28% 7.64% 
8703339030 -911,467 2.02% 8.80% 2.14% 9.78% 
8703233030 -887,791 2.35% 11.15% 2.48% 12.26% 
0701900000 -657,645 0.37% 11.51% 0.45% 12.71% 
2202909030 -654,169 1.43% 12.94% 1.58% 14.29% 
2204100010 -477,708 0.39% 13.33% 0.48% 14.77% 
8703232031 -389,798 0.78% 14.11% 0.84% 15.61% 
2701190000 -372,402 1.71% 15.82% 1.69% 17.30% 
8703322031 -289,262 0.77% 16.59% 0.80% 18.10% 
0402210010 -278,521 0.23% 16.82% 0.29% 18.39% 
2208700020 -226,193 0.30% 17.12% 0.35% 18.74% 
8703234010 -219,463 0.23% 17.35% 0.28% 19.02% 
2005519000 -202,296 0.24% 17.59% 0.31% 19.33% 
8703249032 -197,737 0.46% 18.05% 0.49% 19.82% 
8418300000 -184,821 0.21% 18.25% 0.24% 20.06% 
8703233011 -181,066 0.20% 18.45% 0.24% 20.29% 
2208201020 -168,588 0.40% 18.85% 0.47% 20.76% 
8703339011 -166,800 0.17% 19.02% 0.20% 20.96% 
2106909010 -164,587 3.34% 22.36% 3.20% 24.16% 
8703232030 -158,822 0.91% 23.27% 0.91% 25.07% 
1904100000 -156,050 0.18% 23.45% 0.21% 25.28% 
2004909000 -154,524 0.18% 23.63% 0.23% 25.51% 
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4.5.5. Full Liberalisation of trade with the EU vis-à-vis the end term EU-
CARIFORUM EPA with Excluded Products 
 
In order to compare the revenue and welfare effects of full liberalisation of all 
EU imports under the EPA and the actual end term EU-CARIFORUM EPA with 
excluded products, the 2011 tariff structure is taken as the base situation for 
both scenarios.  In both scenarios, ROW and CARICOM tariffs are unchanged.  
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA provides for phased scheduling of certain products 
over five to twenty-five years with some products being totally excluded from 
the agreement.  For CARIFORUM countries and specifically, Jamaica, the 
number of tariff lines excluded as a proportion of total tariff lines is estimated 
at 15%.  The list of excluded products includes high revenue products such as 
onions, alcoholic beverages, malts and milk; and products in ‘sensitive’ 
industries such as dairy, fisheries, essential oils and furniture.  For the countries 
of the European community, only products that fall in Chapter 93 (arms and 
ammunition) are excluded from duty-free treatment. 
Singh et al. (2014) highlight that the end-term fiscal effects of the EPA are likely 
to be much greater than the short-term impacts as CARIFORUM countries 
scheduled tariff lines with higher revenues and greater possibility for trade 
diversion in the higher phasing baskets or excluded these items altogether.   So 
far, this proposition is supported by data as Singh et al. (2014) calculate that 
that over the five-year period since the EPA was signed (2008-2013), revenue 
for the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME)15 region has fallen by 
only about 2%.   
 
Table 4-11: Full Liberalisation of EU Imports vs End term EPA with Excluded Products 
  Trade 
Creation (US$ 
million)  
 Trade 
Diversion  
(US$ million) 
 Net Welfare 
Effect (% of 
GDP)  
% change in 
total tax 
revenue 
% change in 
tariff 
revenue 
Scenario 1 10.97  13.56 -0.00030% -2.40% -9% 
End term EU-
CARIFORUM 
EPA 
5.48 9.83  -0.00051% -1.50% -5.7% 
Scenario 1: Duty-free access of EU exports to the Jamaican market, with no (collected) tariff change for 
imports from CARICOM and the Rest of the World. 
 
Table 4-11 summarizes the different results under both scenarios.  Not 
surprisingly, the end term EPA results in a lower decline in tariff revenue and 
                                                          
15  CSME comprises Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; 
Jamaica; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
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total tax revenue when compared with the full liberalisation of EU imports into 
Jamaica.  The 5.7% decline in tariff revenue is not as high as the 12% decline 
estimated for Jamaica under the EPA by Busse and Lüehje (2007).  In absolute 
terms, the model estimates a lower reduction in tariff revenue of $12.8 million 
for the End-term EU-CARIFORUM EPA than those estimated by Stevens et al. 
(2009) for the Overseas Development Institute (€26.8 million or $39.5 million) 
and Fontagné et al. (2009) for CEPII (€14.1 million or $20.7 million). 
Additionally, trade creation and trade diversion levels are less for the end term 
EPA than under full liberalisation of EU imports.  This is expected given that full 
liberalisation removes duties on all EU imports thereby increasing the potential 
for trade diversion from ROW products and increasing opportunities for trade 
creation by diverting more expensive imports from ROW and CARICOM 
producers to more efficient EU producers.  It should also be noted that the 
welfare loss is greater for the end term EPA; however, both levels are less than 
one-thousandth of a percent of Jamaica’s 2011 GDP.  The reduction in welfare 
is much lower than the 4.5% welfare loss estimated for Jamaica by Greenaway 
and Milner (2006) in the case where CARICOM grants reciprocal market access 
to the EU only (EU reciprocity case).  Indeed, since the signing of the EPA in 
2008, the global financial crisis of 2007/8 and inadequate initial trade links 
between CARIFORUM and the European Union have meant that some of the 
projected benefits and costs of the EPA have not materialised.  Singh et al. 
(2014) note that, in 2012, imports from the EU for Jamaica had fallen back to 
close to 2004 levels.  It is clear therefore that in line with Ambassador 
Amedi’s16 comments, there are other factors that influence competitiveness 
and market penetration besides market access. 
While the approach outlined above is useful and expedient for policy purposes, 
a more holistic approach to tariff reform is recommended, which might 
generate both positive changes in revenue and welfare.  In addition, where 
welfare and revenue concerns intersect, the issue is often posed as a trade-off 
– increased tariff revenue often means lower welfare and vice versa.  The next 
section also explores whether this is necessarily the case.  Indeed, it may not 
be possible to achieve both and the final decision will be made by policymakers 
based on their judgement of what is most appropriate for their economies at 
a given point in time.     
  
                                                          
16 “EU Laments Jamaica's Failure To Maximise EPA Benefits”, Jamaica Gleaner, 23 
October 2014 
151 
 
4.6 Welfare Increasing and Revenue Enhancing (WIRE) Tariff Reform 
Outcomes 
 
Policymakers are often confronted with the trade-off between increased 
welfare and lower fiscal revenue when contemplating tariff reform.  As a 
member state of CARICOM, reform of Jamaica’s tariff under the scenarios 
proposed would likely require amendment to the common external tariff (CET) 
of the group.  A review of the theoretical literature reveals that there is very 
little research on setting the CET in second best conditions. Yi (1996) examines 
the formation of customs unions in imperfectly competitive markets.  
However, his analysis focuses on the extent to which the existence of 
limitations on membership of the customs union affects global welfare.  
Srinivasan (1997) examines two approaches to setting the CET within the 
context of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which 
allows for the formation of customs union as an exception to the MFN 
principle.    In the framework of Ricardian theory with Cobb-Douglas social 
utility functions, he illustrates that an average of pre-union tariffs and 
subsidies weighted by consumption expenditure in each member country can 
be used to determine a CET that maintains the welfare of non-member states 
at the pre-customs union level.   
Syropoulos (2003) also examines rules on the determination of the CET in a 
customs union based on how tariff revenues are distributed among members 
of the customs union and its influence on the strategic voting of member 
countries.  While there is some consideration of the relationship between 
setting the CET and welfare and revenue effects in these papers, there is none 
that analyses the issues simultaneously in the context of optimal tariff reforms 
that have both positive welfare and revenue impacts post-customs union.   This 
section analyses the extent to which it is possible for a member country 
(Jamaica) to achieve both outcomes, i.e. welfare increasing and revenue 
enhancing outcomes, after the formation of a free trade area (full liberalisation 
under the EPA).   
Scenario 1 (duty-free access to all imports from the EU while tariffs on imports 
from the ROW remain) is chosen as the base scenario for WIRE reforms as it is 
close to what will obtain after the full implementation of the EPA.  In this 
context and utilising existing tariff rates, the WIRE reform scenarios examined 
are based on three often cited methods of reducing tariffs (see Kowalski 
(2005)) – setting a uniform tariff, a linear cut, and setting a maximum tariff.  A 
uniform tariff is simple to implement and may lead to greater efficiency in the 
tax collection process as tax officials do not have to contend with varying tax 
rates for different goods.  Alternatively, setting a maximum tariff may smooth 
out the tariff schedule and eliminate tariff peaks.  This is particularly applicable 
in cases where tariff levels are above their revenue maximising level; setting a 
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maximum tariff level that is below this level may in fact increase tariff revenue 
and welfare.  Finally, a linear cut is one of the most frequently used methods 
for reducing tariff rates.  Falvey and Kim (1992) note a general rule that a 
proportional reduction in all tariffs raises welfare.  In order to select 
appropriate values for the three scenarios, different values were utilised in 
TRIST to illustrate the possibilities of WIRE reforms empirically.  After reviewing 
the results of the simulations, the ones presented here are judged to be the 
most appropriate for the dataset and scenarios.  From the outset, it should be 
noted that as a member of CARICOM, Jamaica implements the CET, with some 
derogations.  In presenting these scenarios, it is understood that Jamaica 
would need to seek derogations or amendments to the CET from 
CARICOM/COTED to give effect to some of these proposals. 
Taking Scenario 1 (duty-free access to all imports from the EU while tariffs on 
imports from the ROW remain) as the initial scenario, the three additional 
scenarios are: 
I. Scenario 3 – A linear cut of a) 5% and b) 10% on ROW duties, with 
duties on imports from the EU and CARICOM being duty-free provided 
that they meet the rules of origin. 
II. Scenario 4 – A maximum tariff of a) 15% and b) 20% c) 30% and d) 
32% applied to ROW imports, with duties on imports from the EU and 
CARICOM being duty-free. 
III. Scenario 5 – A uniform tariff of a) 7.4% and b) 4.5% c) 4.3% and d) 
3.3% applied to ROW imports, with duties on imports from the EU and 
CARICOM being duty-free 
 
It is important to frame the results in the context of the existing tariff structure 
in order to understand the impacts of each tariff reform scenario.  From the 
data analysis section, Jamaica’s simple average tariff in 2011 for agricultural 
products was 17.9% and 6% for non-agricultural products.  Forty-one percent 
of agricultural products in 2011 had duty-free status while a further 46% had 
applied rates of between 15% and 50%.  Duty-free treatment was applied to 
70% of non-agricultural tariff lines and 27% had applied rates of between 0%-
25%.  The highest applied MFN tariff rates were found on: Fish and fish 
products (28.8%); animal products (26.5%); dairy products (25.2%); fruits, 
vegetables, plants (23%); and beverages and tobacco (23%).  The lowest 
applied MFN rates were found on imports of cotton (0%); non-electrical 
machinery (1.5%); and chemicals (2.6%).  Petroleum products and chemicals 
constituted the larger share of imports valuing 27.3% (40.4% duty-free) and 
13% (64.2% duty-free), respectively.   
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Figure 4-10:  Comparison of Initial Applied Tariff Rates and Statutory Tariff Rates 
 
Figure 4-13 shows the variation between the collected applied tariff rate and 
the statutory tariff rate, that is, the difference in what is authorised (the 
statutory rate) and what is in fact collected by the tax authorities (the initial 
applied tariff rate) after full liberalisation of EU imports under the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA, with ROW and CARICOM tariffs unchanged.  While a 
statutory tariff rate of less than 10% applies to 60% of all tariff lines, a tariff of 
less than 10% is collected in 71% of tariff lines.  Additionally, a statutory tariff 
of between 26% - 50% applies to about 8% of tariff lines; however, tariff rates 
of between 26% - 50% were actually collected in only about 4% of tariff lines.  
This suggests that there is some revenue loss that occurs through the 
discretionary application of the statutory tariff.  The analysis of the scenarios 
that follow use the collected applied tariff rate as this presents a more realistic 
picture of the likely outcome of tariff reform than if the statutory tariff rates 
were utilised. 
Moving from an initial second-best scenario of full liberalisation with the EU 
and CARICOM, and ROW tariffs remaining unchanged, the welfare effects are 
positive while there is a small reduction in tariff revenue when the collected 
applied tariff rate on ROW imports is reduced by 5% and 10% (Scenarios 3a 
and 3b in Table 4-12, respectively). In the case of a 5% reduction, there is a 
positive welfare gain of $125,771 and tariff revenue falls by 4%.  When the 
collected applied tariff rate is reduced by 10% (as shown in Figure 4-14), the 
welfare gain is almost double the amount observed at a 5% reduction, valuing 
$246,385.  Tariff revenue also falls by 8%.  Thus, under this scenario, as the 
rate of reduction increases, tariff revenue falls but welfare gains increase.  
 
 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
0%-5% 6% - 10% 11% - 15% 16% - 25% 26% - 50% 51% - 100%P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
Ta
ri
ff
 L
in
es
Tariff Rates
Comparison of Initial Applied Tariff Rates and 
Statutory Tariff Rates
Scen 1 Initial Applied Tariff Rate Scen 1 Statutory Tariff Rate
154 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Comparison of the Initial Applied Tariff Rate and Revised Rates under Scenario 3b  
 
Scenario 3b: A linear cut 10% on ROW duties, with duties on imports from the EU and CARICOM duty-
free. 
 
In Scenario 4, maximum tariffs are applied on ROW imports that effectively cap 
the collected applied tariff rate at given values (see Table 4-13).  Under the 
base scenario, the maximum collected applied tariff for ROW imports is 100% 
which applies to five tariff lines.  It should be noted that Scenario 4 yields 
positive welfare gains with the magnitude of the welfare effect decreasing the 
higher the maximum tariff applied.  In the case of a 15% maximum tariff, tariffs 
that are greater than 15% are reduced on 23% of tariff lines when compared 
with the initial tariff structure under the base scenario.  Welfare increases by 
$367,578 and tariff revenue declines by 14.1%.   When the maximum tariff is 
increased to 20% (Scenario 4b), the decline in revenue of 3% is lower than that 
observed at the 15% maximum tariff and there is a small welfare gain of 
US$75,889.    At maximum collected applied tariff rates of 30% (Scenario 4c) 
and 32% (Scenario 4d), the welfare effect remains positive and the decline in 
revenue is very small at 0.75% and 0.55%, respectively.  As can be seen from 
Figure 4-15, as the maximum tariffs are set at higher levels, the welfare gain 
decreases because the percentage of tariff lines affected falls.  For example, at 
a maximum tariff rate of 15%, 23% of tariff lines with rates higher than 15% 
are reduced.  In contrast, when rates of 20% and 30% are set, approximately 
16% and 3% of tariff lines are affected, respectively.  This means that the higher 
the rates are set, the smaller is the revenue loss.  
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Figure 4-12: Initial Applied Tariff Rates and Maximum Rates under Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 4: Maximum tariffs are applied on ROW imports that cap the collected applied tariff rate at 20% 
(4b) and 30% (4c) 
 
Scenario 5 examines the effect of applying a uniform tariff on ROW imports 
after full liberalisation of imports from the EU and CARICOM.  In Scenario 5a, 
where the simple average collected applied tariff of 7.4% is set as a uniform 
tariff, there is an increase in tariff revenue of 37.6%; however, there is a net 
welfare loss of -US$835,660 (see Table 4-14). This net welfare loss should be 
anticipated as a uniform tariff of 7.4% increases the tariff rate on 
approximately 65% of tariff lines that previously had tariff rates below 7.4% 
under the initial scenario (see Figure 4-16).  When the uniform tariff rate is 
lowered, it is expected that there will be a reduction in the net welfare loss 
and also a decrease in tariff revenue.  This is observed in Scenario 5b where 
the uniform tariff is set at 4.5% and the net welfare loss is now -US$110,978.  
It should be noted that in this case, however, the new tariff revenue is above 
the initial level by US$6.8 million.  Scenario 5c utilizes the import weighted 
ROW collected applied tariff rate of 4.3% while Scenario 5d applies the import 
weighted collected applied tariff rate from all sources of 3.3%.  In comparison 
to applying the simple average collected applied tariff rate of 7.4%, the welfare 
loss is significantly less when the import weighted average tariff is used – 
US$886,818 in the case of the former compared to US$70,549 and US$23,895 
when the import weighted ROW and all source average tariffs are used, 
respectively.  In all cases, there is a decline in total imports, with the smallest 
decline and lowest welfare loss in the case of Scenario 5d.  This is expected as 
Scenario 5d applies the lowest uniform tariff.  However, as the welfare loss 
decreases with the reduction in the uniform tariff, the revenue loss increases.  
This is illustrated by the variation in the change in revenue between Scenario 
5a and Scenario 5d where there is an increase in tariff revenue of 62% when 
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the simple average tariff of 7.4% is used compared to 23% reduction in tariff 
revenue when the import weighted average of 3.3% is applied. 
Figure 4-13: Applying a uniform tariff rate to the collected tariff rate structure 
 
It should be noted that all uniform tariff scenarios lead to welfare losses while 
both linear cut scenarios and maximum tariff scenarios see positive changes in 
welfare.  At lower levels of the maximum tariff, higher welfare values are 
observed; however, they are associated with lower tariff revenues. Based on 
the results of the various scenarios, it may be said that there are certain 
conditions that increase the likelihood of WIRE reforms.  Of all the scenarios, 
Scenario 4d seems the most likely to yield a WIRE reform.  After applying a 
maximum tariff of 32%, there is a welfare gain of $15,128.42 and there is a fall 
in revenue of 0.55% that could be seen as a neutral effect.  The results of the 
various scenarios suggest that the pre-existing tariff structure is a major 
determinant of a WIRE reform outcome.  Countries with high tariffs and large 
variations between tariffs are more likely to have positive welfare effects as a 
result of tariff reform and especially in the case where a uniform tariff is 
applied, may see an increase in tariff revenue, depending on the assumptions 
relating to the elasticities of demand, and exporter substitution.
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Table 4-12: Revenue and Welfare Impacts of Linear Cuts in the Collected Applied Tariff Rate (US$ million) 
 
Total Imports  Imports from 
the EU 
Imports from 
ROW 
Imports from 
CARICOM 
Percentage Change 
in Tariff Revenue 
Percentage Change in 
Total Tax Revenue 
Welfare Change (% of 
GDP) 
Scenario 1 (base values) 6,249.06 460.77 4,752.53 1,035.77 204.30 780.93 
 
Post Scenario 3a - Linear cut 
of 5% in the collected applied 
tariff rate 
6,260.71 460.59 4,764.12 1,036.00 -4.1% 
 
-1.0% 0.00087% 
Post Scenario 3b - Linear cut 
of 10% in the collected 
applied tariff rate 
6,272.46 460.42 4,775.69 1,036.35 -8.3% -2.0% 0.00171% 
Table 4-13: Revenue and Welfare Impacts of Maximum Collected Applied Tariff Rates (US$ million) 
 Total Imports  Imports from the EU Imports from ROW Imports from 
CARICOM 
Percentage Change 
in Tariff Revenue 
Percentage Change 
in Total Tax 
Revenue 
Welfare Change 
Scenario 1 (base values) 6,249.06 460.77 4,752.53 1,035.77 204.30 780.93 
 
Post Scenario 4a - Maximum 
tariff of 15% for the collected 
applied tariff rate 
6,285.85 460.40 4,789.50 1,035.95 -14.1% -3.5% 0.00255% 
Post Scenario 4b - Maximum 
tariff of 20% for the collected 
applied tariff rate 
6,256.43 460.70 4,760.00 1,035.73 -2.9% -0.7% 0.00053% 
Post Scenario 4c - Maximum 
tariff of 30% for the collected 
applied tariff rate 
6,251.06 460.77 4,754.55 1,035.74 -0.7% -0.2% 0.00014% 
Post Scenario 4d - Maximum 
tariff of 32% for the collected 
applied tariff rate 
6,250.56 460.77 4,754.04 $1,035.74 -0.5% -0.1% 0.00010% 
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Table 4-14: Revenue and Welfare Impacts of Uniform Collected Applied Tariff Rates (US$ million) 
 
 
Total Imports  Imports from the EU Imports from 
ROW 
Imports from 
CARICOM 
Percentage Change in 
Tariff Revenue 
Percentage 
Change in Total 
Tax Revenue 
Welfare Change (% 
of GDP) 
Scenario 1 (base values) 6,249.06 460.77 4,752.53 1,035.77 204.30 780.93 
 
Post Scenario 5a - Uniform 
tariff of 7.4% applied to 
Imports from ROW 
5,947.14 462.59 4,470.32 1,014.23 62.4% 15.7% -0.00614% 
Post Scenario 5b - Uniform 
tariff of 4.5% applied to 
Imports from ROW 
6,156.68 460.65 4,671.35 1,024.68 3.3% 0.9% -0.00077% 
Post Scenario 5c - Uniform 
tariff of 4.3% applied to 
Imports from ROW 
6,171.19 460.53 4,685.26 1,025.40 -1.0% -0.1% -0.00049% 
Post Scenario 5d - Uniform 
tariff of 3.3% applied to 
Imports from ROW 
6,243.83 459.91 4,754.87 1,029.05 -22.8% -5.6% -0.00017% 
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter sought to examine different tariff reform scenarios for Jamaica 
under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and analyse the possibility of achieving WIRE 
outcomes with tariff liberalisation. The specific aims introduction were to: 
I. explore the tariff revenue, trade creating, trade diverting and welfare 
effects of full liberalisation under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA at the 
product level for Jamaica.   
II. examine the different effects of utilising statutory tariff rates versus 
collected tariff rates in the analysis  
III. analyse how Jamaica may adjust its tariffs on ROW imports after 
implementation of the EPA in order to address concerns about tariff 
revenue depletion and welfare loss, for example.   
IV. examine the feasibility of achieving welfare increasing and revenue 
enhancing (WIRE) outcomes for tariff adjustments on ROW imports 
post-EPA. 
  
With respect to points (i) and (ii), it is shown that Jamaica can mitigate negative 
fiscal effects of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA with the application of statutory tariff 
rates rather than collected tariff rates.  However, there is a trade-off between 
revenue and welfare, as in the case of the application of statutory tariff on 
ROW imports, there is a significant increase in total tariff revenue but a net 
welfare loss.  This essay also showed that the effects of tariff liberalisation 
under the EPA vary by industry and product.  In particular, where there are no 
imports from the EU to replace imports from the ROW, the demand effect is 
especially strong as consumers face higher prices to purchase the same goods, 
particularly when statutory tariff rates are applied. 
With respect to point (iii), in order to mitigate negative revenue effects of tariff 
reform, the essay showed that Jamaica may exclude high revenue products 
from the EU-CARIFORUM EPA as their exclusion would still mean that 
substantially all trade has been liberalized under the GATT definition.  For 
completeness, the results from the scenario of full liberalisation of EU imports 
under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA were compared with the provisions of the end 
term EU-CARIFORUM EPA that was signed in October 2008 which excludes 
approximately 15% of tariff lines.  It was observed that the end term EPA 
resulted in a lower decline in tariff revenue and total tax revenue when 
compared with the full liberalisation of EU imports into Jamaica.  The welfare 
loss was also found to be greater for the end term EPA.  This finding suggests 
that the Jamaican authorities included high revenue products on the list of 
excluded products and this reduced the potential revenue loss from the EPA 
by 37%.  
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With respect to point (iv), the essay showed that it is challenging to design 
WIRE reforms.  For Jamaica, applying a maximum tariff of 32% to ROW imports 
post-EPA is most likely to yield welfare increasing and revenue enhancing 
outcomes.  All uniform tariff scenarios post-EPA led to welfare losses while 
both linear cut scenarios and maximum tariff scenarios post-EPA see positive 
changes in welfare.  The results also suggest that the pre-existing tariff 
structure is a major determinant of a WIRE reform outcome; that is, where 
countries have high tariffs and large dispersion between tariffs, they are more 
likely to observe positive welfare effects as a result of tariff reform and 
particularly where a uniform tariff is applied, may see an increase in tariff 
revenue.  It should be noted that Jamaica would have to seek derogations or 
amendments to the CET from COTED/CARICOM for changes in statutory tariff 
rates that are outside of the CET.   
This essay has enriched the economic literature on tariff reform and the effects 
that it may have on welfare and fiscal revenue.  While much of the theoretical 
literature on WIRE reforms is established in a first-best framework of non-
preferential liberalisation, this essay explores these effects in the second-best 
context of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, using an empirical approach and is a useful 
addition to the literature on WIRE reforms.  In a first-best scenario, one can 
see that it is easier to establish clearer rules for achieving WIRE outcomes 
(Falvey (1994)).  In the second-best context, it is not clear that lowering the 
tariff is necessarily welfare raising, particularly where the free trade agreement 
creates trade diversion.  Ultimately, there may not need to be a choice 
between welfare and revenue as in the end, policymakers will make a decision 
based on their judgement of the needs of their economies.   
The essay is also of direct relevance to policymakers in Jamaica and the wider 
CARICOM region.  It offers a detailed analysis of multiple liberalisation 
scenarios, utilising statutory vs. applied tariff rates on ROW imports post-EPA, 
which may be used to inform future policy decisions on tariff reform.  As 
Jamaica has already made provision for high revenue products in its schedule 
of commitments under the EPA by placing those items in the later phases of 
the agreement, the application of statutory rates, that is, limiting the number 
of discretionary waivers and exemptions is one relatively easy way of 
increasing tariff revenue.   The research will also prove useful for those ACP 
regions that have not yet negotiated a final EPA agreement with the EU by 
highlighting the possible effects on fiscal revenue and welfare and how they 
may be mitigated, in the event that these effects are likely to be negative. 
As with all partial equilibrium models, the findings of this essay are limited to 
impact effects that do not take into account changes in relative prices and 
income due to changes in tariff rates.  This provides an opportunity for future 
research on economy-wide implications of tariff reform for countries such as 
Jamaica, in the context free trade agreements, using a computable general 
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equilibrium model, for example.   In addition, there is scope for further 
research on WIRE reforms for larger, more developed countries in a similar 
second-best environment of a free trade agreement. 
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APPENDIX 4A – TARIFF LINE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Tariff Line Description 
0703101000 Onions 
8703234030 Motor vehicle exceeding 2000cc but not exceeding 3000cc imported 
by dealers (petrol) 
2004109000 Other Potatoes [Prepared or Preserved (Frozen; Excluding By 
Vinegar, Acetic Acid)] 
6908901000 Tiles, cubes and similar articles the largest surface of which is 
capable of being enclosed in a square the side of which is 7 cm or 
more 
8703339030 Motor vehicles 2500cc to 3200cc imported by dealers 
8703233030 Motor Vehicle exceeding 1800cc but not exceeding 2000cc 
imported by Dealers (petrol) 
0701900000 Other [Other Potatoes (Fresh or Chilled)] 
2202909030 Red Bull, Arizona, Monster and similar energy drinks. 
2204100010 Sparkling wine of fresh grapes. 
8703232031 Motor vehicle exceeding 1600cc but not exceeding 1800cc imported 
by dealers (petrol) 
2701190000 Other coal 
8703322031 Motor vehicles of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,600 cc but not 
exceeding 2000cc, imported by dealers 
0402210010 Not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter [milk and 
cream, concentrated or sweetened] 
2208700020 Liqueurs and Cordials, nesoi 
8703234010 Motor Vehicle Exceeding 2000cc but not exceeding 3000cc 
imported by individuals (petrol) 
2005519000 Other [Shelled Beans, Prepared or Preserved (Excluding By Vinegar; 
Not Frozen)] 
8703249032 Motor vehicle exceeding 3,500 imported by dealers 
8418300000 Freezers of the chest type, not exceeding 800 litre capacity 
8703233011 SUVs/Wagons (Pathfinders and the like) exceeding 1800cc but not 
exceeding 2000cc imported by individuals (petrol) 
2208201020 Brandy, in bottles of a strength not exceeding 46% volume, nesoi 
8703339011 SUVs/Wagons (Pathfinders and the like) exceeding 2500cc but not 
exceeding 3200cc imported by individuals 
2106909010 Dietary and nutritional supplements (vitamins and minerals etc, 
both in tablets and powders) 
8703232030 Motor vehicle exceeding 1500cc but not exceeding 1600cc imported 
by dealers (petrol) 
1904100000 Prepared foods obtained by the swelling or roasting of cereals or 
cereal products 
2004909000 Other [Other Vegetables and Mixtures of Vegetable (Prepared or 
Preserved; Frozen)] 
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APPENDIX 4B – DETAILED RESULTS FOR WIRE TARIFF REFORM 
SCENARIOS 
 
Table 4-15: Change in Pattern of Imports - Details 
Change in Pattern of Imports 
Scenarios 1 and 2 (US$ million) 
      
  EU CARICOM ROW Total 
Initial Imports          
$436,239,229  
         
$1,035,788,772  
         
$4,754,391,839  
         
$6,226,419,840  
Scenario 1         
Imports after Exporter 
substitution effect 
         
$450,661,532  
         
$1,034,927,263  
         
$4,740,831,045  
         
$6,226,419,840  
Imports after demand 
effect 
         
$460,767,126  
         
$1,035,768,348  
         
$4,752,532,239  
         
$6,249,067,713  
Scenario 2         
Imports after 
exporter substitution 
effect 
         
$477,929,061  
         
$1,078,500,229  
         
$4,669,949,105  
         
$6,226,378,395  
Imports after demand 
effect 
         
$469,212,451  
         
$1,009,646,200  
         
$4,409,190,160  
         
$5,888,048,811  
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Table 4-16: Revenue and Welfare Impacts of Linear Cuts of 5% and 10% in the Collected Applied Tariff Rate (US$) Details 
 
Total Imports  Imports from the EU Imports from ROW Imports from CARICOM Tariff Revenue Total Tax Revenue Welfare Change 
Scenario 1 (base) $6,249,064,760 $460,767,126 $4,752,529,286 $1,035,768,348 $204,304,795 $780,927,887 
 
Post Scenario 3a - Linear cut of 5% in the 
collected applied tariff rate 
$6,260,705,579 $460,589,825 $4,764,115,633 $1,036,000,121 $195,958,928 $773,289,339 $125,771.02 
Post Scenario 3b - Linear cut of 10% in the 
collected applied tariff rate 
$6,272,460,507 $460,415,218 $4,775,693,290 $1,036,351,999 $187,343,106 $765,353,957 $246,385.08 
 
Table 4-17: Revenue and Welfare Impacts of Maximum Collected Applied Tariff Rates of 15%, 20%, 30%, and 32% (US$) Details 
 
 Total Imports  Imports from the EU Imports from ROW Imports from CARICOM Tariff Revenue Total Tax Revenue Welfare Change 
Scenario 1 (base) $6,249,064,760 $460,767,126 $4,752,529,286 $1,035,768,348 $204,304,795 $780,927,887 
 
Post Scenario 4a - Maximum tariff of 15% 
for the collected applied tariff rate 
$6,285,852,058 $460,403,203 $4,789,500,896 $1,035,947,959 $175,438,771 $753,810,599 $367,577.59 
Post Scenario 4b - Maximum tariff of 20% 
for the collected applied tariff rate 
$6,256,433,042 $460,700,974 $4,759,997,263 $1,035,734,805 $198,343,651 $775,300,068 $75,887.98 
Post Scenario 4c - Maximum tariff of 30% 
for the collected applied tariff rate 
$6,251,059,938 $460,771,268 $4,754,553,191 $1,035,735,478 $202,780,496 $779,524,113 $20,152.30 
Post Scenario 4d - Maximum tariff of 32% 
for the collected applied tariff rate 
$6,250,558,712 $460,774,818 $4,754,043,028 $1,035,740,865 $203,186,536 $779,912,773 $15,128.45 
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Table 4-18: Revenue and Welfare Impacts of Uniform Collected Applied Tariff Rate of 3.3%, 4.3%, 4.5%, and 7.4% (US$) Details 
 
Total Imports  Imports from the EU Imports from ROW Imports from CARICOM Tariff Revenue Total Tax Revenue Welfare Change 
Scenario 1 (base) $6,249,064,760 $460,767,126 $4,752,529,286 $1,035,768,348 $204,304,795 $780,927,887 
 
Post Scenario 5a - Uniform tariff of 7.4% 
applied to Imports from ROW 
$5,947,144,487 $462,594,175 $4,470,316,948 $1,014,233,363 $331,690,800 $903,355,184 -$886,817.85 
Post Scenario 5b - Uniform tariff of 4.5% 
applied to Imports from ROW 
$6,156,682,145 $460,652,982 $4,671,351,713 $1,024,677,450 $211,095,020 $788,258,369 -$110,978.00 
Post Scenario 5c - Uniform tariff of 4.3% 
applied to Imports from ROW 
$6,171,188,969 $460,527,154 $4,685,258,064 $1,025,403,751 $202,350,084 $779,870,175 -$70,549.17 
Post Scenario 5d - Uniform tariff of 3.3% 
applied to Imports from ROW 
$6,243,827,764 $459,912,735 $4,754,869,332 $1,029,045,696 $157,793,662 $737,053,641 -$23,895.00 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has examined several aspects of the fiscal and revenue impacts of 
trade liberalisation over the course of three chapters.  In particular, the thesis 
answers the following questions: 
• How does trade liberalisation affect total tax revenue, and 
international trade tax revenue in particular?   
• Are there variations in the impact of trade liberalisation depending on 
a country’s level of economic development and dependence on specific 
types of taxes, such as export taxes? 
• Are the findings of the model sensitive to the indicator of openness 
used? 
• Can reform be designed to achieve welfare increasing and revenue 
enhancing outcomes in the context of a small open economy? 
 
Based on the results of the various models in the study, the impact of trade 
reform is country-specific, even though there are broad recommendations and 
best practices to achieve optimal outcomes.  A country’s level of development 
and in particular, its administrative capacity to tax are major determinants of 
the extent to which total tax revenue and trade tax revenue are impacted by 
trade reform.  The study found that while there may be a negative effect on 
tax revenue within a year of liberalisation, the long-term effect is likely to be 
positive.  Trade reform does not occur in isolation and it is clear that 
accompanying broader macroeconomic reforms often stimulate the economy 
and lead to additional activities that increase total revenue.  There is also 
evidence that countries do replace trade tax revenue with domestic taxes over 
time and so, any reform program should have a component to strengthen tax 
administration capacity, examine mechanisms to regularise the informal 
economy, and encourage greater compliance with tax schedules to minimise 
any possible negative effects. 
There is also some evidence that the existing tax structure influences the 
revenue impact of trade reform when assessed within the context of 
liberalisation events.  Countries with different levels of dependence on export 
taxes may implement trade reform to minimise the risk of a sudden reduction 
in export tax revenue.  These countries may therefore seek to convert export 
taxes to licensing fees or other charges that are linked to the provision of 
specific services.  Although regressive, one could also explore moving to 
indirect taxation with appropriate safeguards for vulnerable members of 
society.  The study found that it takes time for other sources of revenue to 
come on stream to mitigate the initial negative impact of trade reform.  It is 
therefore suggested that broader tax reform take place at the same time that 
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the country is implementing trade liberalisation so that alternative sources of 
revenue are identified. 
The thesis confirms that regression models that attempt to quantify the impact 
of trade reform on fiscal revenue are very sensitive to the indicator of 
openness used.  More than five different indicators of openness or trade 
liberalisation were used in the study and they yielded different results due to 
differences in criteria and methodology.  It is therefore recommended that 
researchers use multiple measures and triangulate findings with information 
on country context as well as global socio-economic conditions.  This approach 
is more likely to ensure an accurate understanding of the factors that drive the 
regression results and appropriate variable selection. 
In terms of a country’s experience in implementing trade liberalisation and its 
effect on fiscal revenue, the thesis examined the case of Jamaica and the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA and explored the possibility of achieving WIRE outcomes with 
tariff liberalisation.  The scenarios analysed in the thesis are highly stylised and 
allow for broad conclusions on the type of reform that will most likely lead to 
WIRE reform outcomes – a maximum tariff of 32% applied to ROW imports 
post-EPA in the case of Jamaica.  There also tends to be a trade-off between 
revenue and welfare; for example, in the case of applying statutory tariffs on 
ROW imports, there is a significant increase in total tariff revenue but a net 
welfare loss.   
In reality, trade policy and tariff reform are influenced by complex economic, 
social and political considerations and so, implementing reforms as designed 
within a theoretical framework is rarely possible.  Countries do take concrete 
steps to mitigate potential revenue loss from trade reform. Jamaica did this in 
the EU-CARIFORUM EPA  by excluding a majority of high revenue products 
from the agreement as their exclusion still meant that substantially all trade 
was liberalized under the GATT definition.  The liberalisation schedule saved 
the government potential revenue loss of 37% when the end term EPA is 
compared with full liberalisation of EU imports into Jamaica.  Other countries 
and regions that have not yet negotiated a final EPA agreement with the EU 
may use this approach to identify sensitive products that should be excluded 
from liberalisation or placed in the last phase of liberalisation to minimize 
negative fiscal effects. 
Realizing that other countries are likely to demand similar treatment to the EU, 
the government of Jamaica may wish to have a broader strategy to address 
tariff reform for ROW imports, minimizing tariff peaks and reducing tariff 
dispersion.  The strategy should take into account producer and consumer 
impacts, along with revenue considerations. 
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5.1 Limitations of the study and opportunities for further research 
 
As with all partial equilibrium models, the findings of this essay are limited to 
impact effects that do not take into account changes in relative prices and 
income due to changes in tariff rates.  There is therefore room to analyse the 
net effect of trade liberalisation by using a general equilibrium model that can 
take account of the impact of relative prices and demand for final and 
intermediate goods.  One could use this framework to examine the impact of 
changes in the price level due to adjustments in the tariff structure for a cross-
section of countries or for individual countries such as Jamaica.  Further 
research can also be undertaken to analyse the net impact of individual 
components of trade liberalisation; for example, changes in import and the 
removal of non-tariff barriers on government revenue.   
The findings of the events analysis are limited because of the small number of 
countries in the sample based on the event indicators used.  Sachs-Warner 
used thirty-four countries that liberalised in its original sample - twenty-nine 
of which were used in this study based on data availability for all indicators 
used in the models.  The findings, therefore, cannot be generalised.  Further 
work could be done to extend the Sachs-Warner (1995) methodology to other 
countries and update the dataset to see if there are other countries that have 
liberalised according to their criteria.   The models could then be re-assessed 
within an events framework to yield more robust results. 
In addition, while much of the theoretical literature on WIRE reforms is 
established in a first-best framework of non-preferential liberalisation, the 
thesis explored these effects in the second-best context of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA, using an empirical approach.  In a first-best scenario, it is easier to 
establish clearer rules for achieving WIRE outcomes (Falvey (1994)).  In the 
second-best context, it is not clear that lowering the tariff is necessarily welfare 
raising, particularly where the free trade agreement creates trade diversion.  
The empirical methodology utilised in the essay is therefore a very useful 
addition to the literature on WIRE reforms.  However, there is scope for further 
research on WIRE reforms for larger, more developed countries in a similar 
second-best environment of a free trade agreement. 
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